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


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THE  
H.A.C. IN SOUTH AFRICA



# THE H.A.C. IN SOUTH AFRICA

A RECORD OF THE SERVICES RENDERED IN THE  
SOUTH AFRICAN WAR BY MEMBERS OF THE  
HONOURABLE ARTILLERY COMPANY

EDITED BY

BASIL WILLIAMS  
AND  
ERSKINE CHILDERS

WITH A MAP

LONDON  
SMITH, ELDER, & CO., 15 WATERLOO PLACE  
1903

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TO  
HIS MAJESTY THE KING

CAPTAIN-GENERAL AND COLONEL OF THE HONOURABLE  
ARTILLERY COMPANY

THIS VOLUME IS, BY GRACIOUS PERMISSION,

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## N O T E

IN compiling this volume the EDITORS have received assistance from many quarters. Their best thanks are due to the Earl of DENBIGH and DESMOND, Lieutenant-Colonel commanding the Honourable Artillery Company, for advice and help on many occasions ; to Major DUNCUM, until recently the Major commanding B Battery, for valuable assistance in connection with the Appendix ; to Captains TREFFRY, NESHAM, and O'CONNELL, and to Mr. MORDIN and many others who kindly supplied information ; and to Sergeant-Major MAYHEW, of the Headquarters Staff.





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# THE H.A.C. IN SOUTH AFRICA

## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTORY

THIS book is intended to be an accurate, and as far as possible a complete, record of the part taken in the South African War by the Honourable Artillery Company. To explain its scope more particularly a few general remarks are necessary.

From first to last and in various capacities 193 members of the Regiment served in South Africa—a number which may assuredly be regarded with just and abiding pride. The work done by these 193 men falls under two main heads.

First come the quota contributed to the City Imperial Volunteers, a composite regiment con-

sisting of all three arms and representing a large number of Metropolitan Volunteer Corps. To them we sent 154 men: twenty-six for the Infantry, thirty for the Mounted Infantry, and ninety-eight for the Field Battery. (These figures, it must be noted, include supplementary drafts despatched in the summer of 1900.) As to the Field Battery, we need scarcely say that it may be regarded as a complete unit supplied by the H.A.C., which created and organised it, officered it, and provided two-thirds of its total strength.

Under the second head come sixty members of the Company who served in the Imperial Yeomanry, in the Regular forces, and in various other Corps, during a period which covers the whole of the War.

Twenty-one of this number belong also to the first class, having previously been in the C.I.V., and afterwards continued their service in other capacities. The remaining thirty-nine, when added to the 154 of the first class, make up the grand total of 193.

It will be seen, therefore, that to chronicle the doings of the H.A.C. with a due regard to proportion is no easy matter. Man for man and Corps for Corps there are no comparisons to be made. Each of our men in his own sphere was upholding the honour of the Regiment. But to describe the operations in which every individual took part would be to write the history of the War, for there is scarcely a corner of the vast area of hostilities to which one member or another did not penetrate. This applies especially to the second or miscellaneous class, but it applies also to the first, for the three arms of the C.I.V., though administratively parts of a whole, were never in fact united under one command in the field. For practical purposes their histories are distinct. As to two of them moreover, namely the Infantry and the Mounted Infantry, the contingents contributed by the H.A.C., although the maximum, be it noted, that were allowed under the rules of formation, were not large enough fractions respectively to justify a very detailed narrative of the operations in which they shared.



Such a narrative belongs more properly to a history of the C.I.V. as such.

Now the course taken by the Editors is as follows. The bulk of the book must necessarily be devoted to the Battery, which, being mostly composed of H.A.C. men, has a history of a peculiar and exclusive interest for the H.A.C. Framed on a smaller scale, there will be chapters about the Infantry and Mounted Infantry detachments. And then the services of the miscellaneous class will be briefly reviewed.

Lastly, there is an Appendix, consisting of a complete alphabetical list of all members of the H.A.C. who served in South Africa, and so arranged that it can be seen at a glance what the service of each man was, with any special circumstances about him that are worthy of note. It is hoped that this Appendix will prove one of the most useful parts of the book.

As was implied in the opening lines, the character of the book is historical, with the exception of one chapter. The Editors do not conceive it to be within their province to undertake

excursions into general criticism, whether of our Volunteer system as tested by war, or of the multitude of special matters—questions of mobilisation, equipment, conduct and handling in the field—which touch the efficiency of troops, Regular or otherwise. The exception is a chapter contributed by the Adjutant, Major Budworth, reviewing the work of the Regiment, and epitomising the lessons to be learnt from it. Here will be found compressed everything in the nature of criticism. It will be granted that such a review is imperatively needed, and no one will dispute the authority and value of it, coming from such a source.

## CHAPTER II

## THE CALL FOR VOLUNTEERS

As everybody knows, the story begins in the latter part of December 1899, at that dark and critical time when, without any sign of panic, it was clearly realised that our Regular Forces were inadequate for the prosecution of the war. There was a call, promptly responded to, for Volunteers, and the Imperial Yeomanry and the City Imperial Volunteers were created.

In the first instance, the H.A.C., which, as is well known, stands on a wholly different footing from other Auxiliary corps, was anxious to send out independent contingents of its own, and on the day before the first official call was issued from the War Office Lord Denbigh, the Colonel, issued a circular to members of the Company, in order to find out how many could be counted upon if

their services were required. Replies in the affirmative were numerous enough to justify him in making a definite offer to the War Office to provide a company of Infantry and a battery of Horse Artillery. The battery was declined by the authorities on the ground that there was enough Regular Artillery at their disposal, and, instead of a complete company of Infantry, it was preferred that the H.A.C. should send its quatum of forty men to the Infantry and Mounted Infantry of the C.I.V., the formation of which had just been announced.

Steps were at once taken to carry out this latter decision, and within a day or two the forty asked for were chosen. In point of fact, they were forty-four—namely, two officers, one civil surgeon, and forty-one N.C.O.'s and men, and thenceforward they became an integral part of the C.I.V. The Mounted Infantry embarked on the 'Briton' on January 15, the Infantry on the 'Ariosto' on January 20; and their further history is related in Chapters X. and XI. But here for the present we must leave them.

## CHAPTER III

## FORMATION OF THE BATTERY

THE answer of the War Office as to the Artillery seemed at the time final. But (most happily for us in this case) finality is not one of that body's strongest points. An announcement having appeared in the 'Times' two or three days later that the Elswick Volunteer Battery had been accepted for service, immediate advantage was taken of this symptom of a change of policy, and fresh inquiries and proposals were made. The result was the acceptance of a four-gun Field Battery, to be horsed by the Government.

On the day following this welcome decision there came a proposal from the Lord Mayor's Committee to incorporate the Battery in the C.I.V., which, by the addition of Artillery, would thus complete its threefold composition. The offer



was agreed to, and the Battery, though the H.A.C. was still entirely responsible for raising it, and for recruiting, equipping, and clothing the men, became from that time technically a branch of the C.I.V., enjoyed the privileges of that corps, and shared in the funds subscribed for it. At the same time the Lord Mayor offered to arm the Battery with four 12½-pr. quick-firing guns, which it was found that Messrs. Vickers, Sons & Maxim had on hand. The War Office at first demurred, expressing a decided preference for the Service 15-pr. gun, with which the H.A.C. was already armed; not from any doubts as to the excellence of the 12½-pr. gun, which, it was admitted, was superior in some details to the 15-pr., but from a fear that trouble might arise out of the necessity for a special type of ammunition for this one Battery. Permission, however, was eventually given, on the understanding that special and extra provision was to be made for the transport and supply of ammunition in the field.

The enrolment of the Battery was promptly initiated. At the time the Artillery Division of

the H.A.C. numbered about 180, a majority of whom volunteered, and a large proportion of these were accepted and sworn in. But it must not be supposed that recruiting was confined to the Artillery Division. Several men from the Infantry Battalion were anxious to serve and were enrolled, so that the whole Regiment was represented, to the number of 84. From this number all the combatant Officers of the Battery, all the Sergeants (except the two Staff Sergeants), and all the Corporals were selected. The total initial strength, with additions from other sources, was ultimately 131, and if these figures be borne in mind, together with the fact that of the reinforcing draft of 17 men 14 came from the H.A.C., it will be granted that it is perfectly fair and correct to describe the outcome as an H.A.C. Battery.

Of the original 131 men, the balance of 47 were chosen principally from Volunteer Corps, by special sanction of the War Office. The 1st Sussex Volunteer Artillery contributed eight, the 1st City of London Volunteer Artillery five, the 2nd and 3rd

Middlesex Volunteer Artillery three each, and various other Corps sent one or two representatives. There were also five old R.A. men. A difficulty—one inseparable from Auxiliary Artillery—was the scarcity of artificers; but eventually a retired Collar-maker Sergeant from Woolwich Dockyard and a retired Farrier-sergeant from the Arsenal were engaged; and the rank of Wheeler-sergeant was given to a member of the 3rd Kent Volunteer Artillery who joined us from the Royal Carriage Department of the Arsenal. Major McMicking was given the command of the Battery, and the Captain was Captain (now Major) Budworth, who was then and is still the Adjutant of the H.A.C. A full nominal roll appears at the end of the chapter. So much for the guns and *personnel*.

There remain the questions of funds and general equipment, which for convenience are taken together.

The cost of the Battery was defrayed partly by the Government and partly from the Lord Mayor's Fund for the C.I.V., and to a certain extent from private generosity. The harness

taken was the existing H.A.C. harness, as originally supplied by the Government, who now undertook to alter it to the rapid-release system, and also to make up some small deficiencies. They also converted four of our existing ammunition waggons into waggons capable of taking fixed ammunition; and they further paid for many of the mobilisation stores and for the horses, 45*l.* being allowed per horse. Before the intentions of the War Office in this respect were known many private members offered to provide horses, and Mr. W. R. Clarke promised to supply a complete gun-team. It was unnecessary, of course, to accept this munificent offer. Among many individual gifts, Colonel Stohwasser presented all the blankets, leggings, and picketing gear. All other expenses were borne by the Lord Mayor's Fund, to which, by the way, the Court of Assistants of the H.A.C. had officially contributed 1,000*l.*, and members of the Company, subscribing independently, another 1,500*l.* The four guns, together with 3,200 rounds of ammunition, and one Vickers-Maxim waggon,

and the clothing and equipment of the men, were the principal items so provided for. Another was a supplementary payment for horses, over and above the 45*l.* per horse given by the War Office. This amounted to 9*l.* per horse, or, roughly, 1,000*l.* for the whole complement of 114, since they cost on an average 54*l.* apiece.

As soon as an understanding on these matters was reached the purchase of material and horses was energetically proceeded with. The quality of the horses was, needless to say, of paramount importance. That of ours was excellent, thanks to the care and judgment of Major McMicking, who selected the majority of them. To establish this, in a word, by the best test of all, it is only necessary to point to the result—namely, that at the end of our campaigning, out of the original number of 114, we handed over to the Remount authorities at Pretoria between 80 and 90 of the original animals, in good condition; and wounds accounted for several of the rest. It must be admitted, however, that this good result was partly due to the length of our stay on the line of

communications ; a stay long enough to thoroughly acclimatise the horses. Nearly all of them were taken from London omnibus companies and jobmasters, and a point was made of choosing only strong short-legged animals, very few exceeding 15.3 in height.

In the matter of material, various members of the H.A.C. were of the greatest possible assistance in obtaining goods of the best quality and at wholesale prices. Buck-waggon of South African type were contracted for in Bristol, mule-harness in Bermondsey, forge and artificers' tools in Birmingham ; whilst orders for clothing and various stores and details of equipment were placed in many different quarters. Thanks to the zeal displayed, all the goods were delivered to date, and in good time for embarkation.

The total sum contributed by the War Office was 17,000*l.*, of which 5,100*l.* was paid for horses and the remainder for altering four H.A.C. waggon so as to hold fixed ammunition, for an



additional supply of ammunition, for buck-waggon, and for mule-harness.

The C.I.V. Committee, among other items, paid 8,000*l.* for the guns, the one waggon, and the 3,200 rounds of ammunition; and 1,000*l.* for horses.

### NOMINAL ROLL OF THE BATTERY

#### OFFICERS

Rank	Name	Corps of origin
Major . . .	G. McMicking . . .	H.A.C.
Captain . . .	C. E. Budworth, Adj. .	H.A.C. and R.F.A.
Lieutenant . . .	A. C. Lowe . . .	H.A.C.
„ . . .	H. Bayley . . .	„
„ . . .	J. F. Duncan . . .	„
Surgeon-Captain .	A. Thorne . . .	2nd Midd. Arty. Vol.
Vet. Surg. Lieut. .	E. Morgan . . .	—

#### N.C.O.'S AND MEN

##### *A. Sub-division*

Sergeant . . .	W. Dixon . . .	H.A.C.
Coll.-Maker Sergt. .	R. W. Goodwin . . .	Late R.H.A.
Corporal . . .	H. W. T. Elam . . .	H.A.C.
Bombardier . . .	R. L. Nelson . . .	Late R.H.A.
Bombardier . . .	G. W. Gutridge . . .	H.A.C.
„ . . .	C. Wright . . .	„
Shoeing-Smith . . .	M. B. Milne . . .	„
Trumpeter . . .	G. E. Mager . . .	„
Gunner . . .	C. W. Geddes . . .	1st Lanark Arty. Vol.
„ . . .	W. S. Herbert . . .	H.A.C.

NOMINAL ROLL OF THE BATTERY—*continued.*

## N.C.O.'S AND MEN

*A. Sub-division*

Rank	Name	Corps of origin
Gunner . . .	J. O. Whittome . .	H.A.C.
„ . . .	W. Tetley Jones . .	„
„ . . .	J. P. F. Symes . .	Late H.A.C.
„ . . .	C. J. Allen . .	H.A.C.
„ . . .	D. Martin . .	1st Sussex Arty. Vol.
„ . . .	A. Raisbeck . .	„
„ . . .	S. A. Keell . .	7th Midd. R. Vol.
„ . . .	J. F. O'Regan . .	Late R.G.A.
„ . . .	F. J. Clatworthy . .	3rd Midd. Arty. Vol.
„ . . .	G. W. Lea . .	1st City of London Arty. Vol.
Driver (Acting Bombardier) . . .	E. Chambers . .	H.A.C.
Driver . . .	E. M. A. Clough . .	„
„ . . .	E. R. Walton . .	„
„ . . .	A. J. Mordin . .	„
„ . . .	W. Baker . .	„
„ . . .	G. H. M. Vine . .	Late 3rd Midd. Arty. Vol.
„ . . .	F. K. Vigor . .	H.A.C.
„ . . .	H. M'Dougall . .	„
„ . . .	A. Hanks . .	1st City of London Arty. Vol.
„ . . .	G. Hoare . .	H.A.C.
„ . . .	H. Savage . .	1st Sussex Arty. Vol.
„ . . .	G. O. Ritchie . .	H.A.C.
„ . . .	H. Mackney . .	1st Sussex Arty. Vol.
„ . . .	J. Sullivan . .	Late 1st Royal Dragoon Guards



NOMINAL ROLL OF THE BATTERY—*continued.*

## N.C.O.'s AND MEN

*B. Sub-division*

Rank	Name	Corps of origin
Sergeant-Major	. G. E. Pilbrow .	. R.H.A.
Sergeant	. P. S. Taylor .	. H.A.C.
Farrier-Sergeant	. J. Hammond .	. Late R.H.A.
Corporal	. H. Attneave .	. H.A.C.
Bombardier	. H. S. Law .	. 12th Midd. R. Vol.
Bombardier	. F. G. Valentine .	. 1st Sussex Arty. Vol.
"	. C. J. Chapman .	. 3rd Kent Arty. Vol.
Gunner	. G. C. J. Brady .	. H.A.C.
"	. A. H. Shearman .	. Late R.M.A.
"	. A. F. Herbert .	. H.A.C.
"	. L. M. Murdock .	. "
"	. W. Sawle .	. 1st Sussex Arty. Vol.
"	. W. F. Palles .	. H.A.C.
"	. D. Flanigan .	. Late R.F.A.
"	. F. C. Hepburn .	. H.A.C.
"	. W. G. Mumford .	. "
"	. C. de V. Bates .	. "
Driver (Acting Bombardier)	. W. H. Gutmann .	. "
Driver	. J. A. Dobree .	. "
"	. A. S. Joseph .	. "
"	. R. H. Whitehead .	. "
"	. E. J. Cooper Smith .	. "
"	. R. J. Hutchinson .	. 12th Midd. R. Vol.
"	. R. Burgess .	. "
"	. E. J. Page .	. H.A.C.
"	. H. Blacklin .	. "
"	. F. C. Whitehead .	. "
Shoeing-Smith	. C. Baker .	. 3rd Batt Suff. Reg.
Wheeler	. H. W. Prendergast .	. H.A.C.

NOMINAL ROLL OF THE BATTERY—*continued.*

## N.C.O.'s AND MEN

*C. Sub-division*

Rank	Name	Corps of origin
Sergeant . . .	F. Abraham . . .	H.A.C.
Pay-Sergeant . . .	G. R. Barnett Smith . . .	"
Corporal . . .	H. B. Clifford . . .	"
Bombardier . . .	W. O. Gridley . . .	"
Br. Shoeing-Smith . . .	T. B. Goodall . . .	"
Br. Collar-Maker . . .	J. C. Kendall . . .	"
Bombardier . . .	G. Lorimer . . .	"
Gunner . . .	T. P. H. Armstrong . . .	2nd Midd. Arty. Vol.
" . . .	P. H. Tacey . . .	1st Sussex Arty. Vol.
" . . .	J. J. Bailey . . .	Queen's Westminst'rs
" . . .	S. W. Sulman . . .	H.A.C.
" . . .	H. L. Robinson . . .	"
" . . .	B. D. W. Archer . . .	"
" . . .	J. S. Dyson . . .	1st City of London Vol. Arty.
" . . .	D. Belmont . . .	Queen's Westminst'rs
" . . .	C. A. Tebay . . .	3rd Midd. Arty. Vol.
" . . .	W. A. Shultz . . .	"
Driver (Acting Bombardier) . . .	T. M. Brown . . .	H.A.C.
" . . .	H. H. Ward . . .	"
Driver . . .	L. B. Major . . .	"
" . . .	W. O. Walker . . .	"
" . . .	E. S. Halford . . .	"
" . . .	J. W. Chambers . . .	"
" . . .	R. H. Glover . . .	"
" . . .	A. C. Standen . . .	—
" . . .	A. Wensley . . .	1st Tower Hamlets Engineer Vol.
" . . .	P. F. Lucas . . .	H.A.C.

NOMINAL ROLL OF THE BATTERY—*continued.*

## N.C.O.'s AND MEN

*D. Sub-division*

Rank	Name	Corps of origin
Q.-M.-Sergeant	P. Oakley . . .	R.F.A.
Sergeant . . .	A. E. Wood . . .	H.A.C.
Wheeler-Sergeant	W. Difford . . .	3rd Kent Arty. Vol.
Corporal . . .	G. W. Osborn . . .	H.A.C.
Bombardier . . .	H. W. Dollar . . .	"
" . . .	H. P. Applebee . . .	"
Acting Bombardier	L. Walter . . .	"
Shoeing-Smith . . .	R. W. Stephenson . . .	"
Trumpeter . . .	H. H. Sawyer . . .	"
Gunner . . .	W. Murrell . . .	1st Sussex Arty. Vol.
" . . .	W. A. Rich . . .	2nd Wilts Cyclists
" . . .	E. Charleton . . .	Late R.H.A.
" . . .	G. Lemmens . . .	H.A.C.
" . . .	A. F. B. Williams . . .	"
" . . .	A. F. Vigor . . .	"
" . . .	A. J. M. Brown . . .	"
" . . .	W. H. Holt . . .	"
" . . .	W. D. Singer . . .	1st City of Lond. Arty. Vol.
" . . .	W. Faizey . . .	Late R.H.A.
" . . .	A. J. Riggs . . .	H.A.C.
" . . .	C. L. Duncan . . .	"
" . . .	S. J. Unwin . . .	1st City of Lond. Arty. Vol.
" . . .	H. W. Leacock . . .	"
Driver(Acting Bombardier)	A. A. Wink . . .	H.A.C.
Driver . . .	H. B. Ramsey . . .	"
" . . .	G. W. Colmer . . .	"

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### NOMINAL ROLL OF THE BATTERY—*continued.*

#### N.C.O.'S AND MEN

##### *D. Sub-division*

	Rank	Name	Corps of origin
Driver	. .	. J. S. Hills . .	. H.A.C.
"	. .	. W. A. Scantlebury . .	"
"	. .	. D. D. Storer . .	"
"	. .	. R. E. Childers . .	"
"	. .	. G. W. Butler . .	—
"	. .	. H. M. Perkins . .	. H.A.C.
"	. .	. J. Landsberg . .	"
"	. .	. L. W. Cohen . .	"

### THE DRAFT

On August 12 the new draft sent out from England to supply vacancies caused by illness joined the Battery. They came out under the charge of Bombardier Chillingworth.

The draft were assigned to the sub-divisions as follows:

##### *A. Sub-division*

	Rank	Name	Corps of origin
Gunner	. .	. H. C. Cowan . .	. 3rd Midd. Arty. Vol.
"	. .	. S. J. Askew . .	"
Driver	. .	. J. Oppenheim . .	. H.A.C.
"	. .	. N. D. Forbes . .	"

THE DRAFT—*continued.**B. Sub-division*

Rank	Name	Corps of origin
Gunner . .	. E. J. Douglas .	. 3rd Midd. Arty. Vol.
Driver . .	. B. Williams .	. H.A.C.
„ . .	. J. G. Houghton .	. „

*C. Sub-division*

Gunner . .	. M. P. Webster .	. H.A.C.
„ . .	. H. G. Trapp .	. „
Driver . .	. R. W. Bradshaw .	. „
„ . .	. R. H. Tremearne .	. „

*D. Sub-division*

Bombardier .	. G. Chillingworth .	. H.A.C.
Gunner . .	. T. J. Hamp .	. „
„ . .	. A. M. Cooper .	. „
„ . .	. C. H. Bradshaw .	. „
Driver . .	. H. V. Ramsey .	. „
„ . .	. W. J. Holm .	. „

## CHAPTER IV

THE TRAINING IN BARRACKS AND THE  
VOYAGE OUT*January—February, 1900*

ON January 9 the men enrolled were assembled in St. John's Wood Barracks for three weeks' preliminary training. Who, of those who made it, will forget that sudden plunge from civilian ease to rigorous and sordid labour? Of all the contrasts life presents there is probably none so sharp and chilling, and none so stimulating, if the men have grit and ardour. We had our fair share of both, and needed every ounce of it, for there was an immense amount to learn, and none too long a time in which to learn it. Nobody familiar with the subject will question that, or point in depreciation to the fact that our other detachments were able to embark a fortnight

before us. Artillery is a highly specialised branch of the military art, and under the present conditions of life and work in a great city, it is flatly impossible for an Auxiliary battery, be the evening drills, odd field days, and annual camp ever so well attended, to reach such a pitch of efficiency as to be fit to take the field without some weeks of prior training. We were a heterogeneous body, and had to shake down into coherence. We had a new gun, involving a new gun drill. Our riding and driving were far from perfect; and few of us had the requisite experience of those essential matters, the care of horses and harness. Happily we were stiffened by a strong leaven of old hands, N.C.O.'s and men, who fell into their duties easily, and gave an example to the weaker brethren. Marching drills and gun drills began at once, and in a day or two, when the horses began to arrive, riding drills and the business of 'stables,' three times daily. Concurrently with all this, we had to carry on the ordinary routine of barrack life, providing our own guards, stable-pickets, orderlies, postmen, etc., and doing our

own cooking, scullery work, coal heaving, window cleaning, and charing. Most of us also—how incongruous it all seems now!—had more or less important business matters or family affairs to arrange before starting on this distant enterprise, so that fragments of leisure—a Sunday out or an evening free—had to be schemed or bargained for amid the stress of work. It was a crowded, careless time, and nothing in it was stranger than the complete effacement of that painful anxiety about the progress of the war which most of us had felt before enlistment, in common with the whole nation at that trying time.

Driving drills, we should say, were never attempted; for it was only towards the end of our stay in barracks that the number of horses was complete, and their branding and final distribution among the sub-divisions and individuals effected. Then it was that the novice in horse-tending entered on his full responsibilities. One of the Editors, if he may be forgiven a personal touch, vividly remembers the moment when he was first



confronted with the pair allotted to him. One of them was of a meek and colourless disposition, save for the trait of ungovernable greed. The other—a sour and sullen roan—was introduced as follows by the callous Gallio who allotted him : ‘He can’t be groomed and he can’t be ridden, and you’ve got to drive him in the water-cart’; the merits of which terse address the Editor began to appreciate at evening stables, when, in bringing him his food, with many tactful blandishments, he was received with a pretty specimen of a remarkable screwing cow-kick, for which he afterwards became infamous, and which only prolonged study and experience enabled his groom to avoid. *À propos* of that humble vehicle, the water-cart, it should be explained that hitherto the intention was that we should horse some of our own auxiliary carriages, such as the forge-waggon, reserve-ammunition waggon, etc. The idea was abandoned, however; and in South Africa everything in the nature of transport was drawn by mules, and driven by natives. And, as it turned out, there were none too many drivers, with a due

allowance of spare men, for the four guns and five ammunition waggons.

Meanwhile, uniforms were fitted, kit gradually served out, and the thousand and one details of mobilisation attended to. Few of us probably realise the enormous amount of labour that the completeness of our personal equipment, harness and stores, entailed on Lord Denbigh, the Adjutant and others. At length, everything was ready ; all heavy material, including the guns themselves, had been packed and sent down to the Albert Docks, whence our ship the ' Montfort ' was to sail ; and, on the evening of February 2, all that remained was for the men and horses to follow. Helpful to the last, the H.A.C. comrades we were leaving behind assisted us in many ways on that busy and memorable night, which remains in the memory as a medley of riotous merry-making and feverish activity. They kept our guards and pickets, aided us to pack our kits and persons, and finally satisfied the extreme demands of friendship by helping us to ride the horses to the Docks—a really noble service, seeing that it meant

no proud progress through acclaiming crowds, but an obscure night-march of thirteen miles in a driving snow-storm. At 2 A.M. on the 3rd we filed silently out into the slushy streets from under the dim lamps of the barrack gateway, threaded the deserted highways of London from West to East, slipped and splashed down the interminable vistas of the Commercial Road and the Dock roads, and in the first ghastly dawn clattered, sodden, frozen, and muddy, into the sheds which bordered the 'Montfort's' berth. Early as it came in our career, this march, made by unseasoned men on strange horses, and ending without a hitch or casualty, was a real test of steadiness and discipline. 'Unpleasant, but of course nothing to what is coming,' was our stoical thought, even though we hummed instinctively the music of 'Die zwei Grenadieren' between chattering teeth; but, as a matter of fact, it was many months before any hardship befell us in the least similar to this one.

For an ordinary private soldier, life on a horse-carrying transport, during a slow tropical

voyage, would be pronounced by the dispassionate critic as the most wretched of all lots. That only shows how little he knows about human nature. He forgets that the keenest pleasures are those that are paid for the dearest, that all happiness is relative, and that its essence is contrast. Such, at any rate, was the philosophy wrung by the Editors from the three toilsome weeks that followed our departure from the dismal, sleet-swept quays of the Albert Docks. It was toil well and wisely spent, for the horses—which, of course, were the objects of nearly all of it—were landed in consequence in good condition, with a loss of only four. No doubt we ‘groused’ over the measures enforced to gain this end—the daily round of exercise and stall-cleaning; the tread-mill trampings over iron decks in the steaming bowels of the ship; the Augean squalors of ‘mucking-out’ in the tropics, and the giddy descents into Tartarean gloom after forage from the hold. But ‘grousing’ is a valued privilege of all soldiers, and at heart we did not grudge the labour, severe and repulsive

though much of it was. Indeed, we were as merry a ship as you could wish. We shared it with the Oxfordshire Yeomanry and the Irish Hospital, and made firm friends with both these Corps, holding joint concerts, athletic sports, and other amusements. By the fortune of war, we drifted apart from the Oxfordshire Yeomanry at the very outset, and never met them again, though we retained, as a pledge of their good will, a little four-footed recruit, in the shape of a monkey, obtained at Las Palmas, and solemnly presented on board, which followed all our fortunes thereafter, survived unscathed, and is now to be seen in the Zoo. The Irish Hospital we met again both at Bloemfontein and Pretoria, as many of our sick men have good cause to remember, having always received the utmost care and kindness from Dr. Stoker and his staff, in one of the best of the several very good volunteer hospitals which took part in the war.

All of us were inoculated for enteric fever during the voyage. It was a painful and irksome

operation, and, admittedly, at the time, of doubtful efficacy ; but it was cheerfully undergone, and, from a layman's point of view, appears to have been justified by results.

The thing which gave us most concern during this voyage was the fear—ridiculous as it seems now—that the war would be over before we had time to engage in it. A passing vessel signalled to us that Kimberley was relieved, and the day after we arrived in port, Paardeberg was blazoned abroad. The tide had indeed turned ; but there was plenty of time for us before it came to the flood.

## CHAPTER V

## ON THE LINES OF COMMUNICATION

*March—June, 1900*

THE Battery landed at Capetown on February 28, and spent a fortnight there, encamped at Green Point, a torrid expanse of sand bordering the sea—a very arduous fortnight for every one concerned. Three days of it were spent principally in disembarking and unpacking the guns and ammunition, the former having been shipped—with an excess of caution perhaps—in packing-cases.

As soon as our material was in order we began regular drills, and found ourselves very rough at first, though not rougher than was to be expected from a battery of such miscellaneous composition, with horses new to the work. Naturally, it was in driving that we were most backward, the gunners having already made substantial progress



in the use of the new gun at St. John's Wood. It will be convenient here to say a few words about our guns, noting the principal features which distinguished them from the fifteen-pounder then in use in the regular Field Artillery.

The gun is officially described as the '12½-pounder B.L. Q.F.' It is fitted with hydraulic buffers which take the recoil and automatically bring back the gun to the firing position, without any appreciable shifting of the carriage. The breech action is remarkably simple ; one motion, of one hand only, is needed to open and close, instead of two hands and three motions as with the fifteen-pounder. The tangent sight is worked by a wheel, and need not be removed when the gun is fired. There is a traversing gear on the carriage as well as an elevating gear ; so that traversing by hand-spike is needless. Fixed ammunition is used, and the Krupp fuzes for shrapnel are very simply contrived, and require no safety pins. All these improvements were admirable, and tended to rapidity of fire and simplicity of handling, while the range also (they are sighted to 6,000 yards) was greater



than that of the service gun. Also, though we never lacked men, the gun could in fact be worked by fewer than the service gun, five being ample, and two, in an emergency, being sufficient. The chief defects noticed were the weight of the trail and the form of the carriers, which, when loaded with four rounds, were too heavy, and, being of thin steel, too liable to dints which were difficult to repair. Wicker carriers, holding three rounds, would meet this objection. But these were trifles. The main difficulty which beset us was the mere fact that we had a different gun from the standard type, involving a special type of ammunition for our sole use. This no doubt was rather a serious matter, and may have been one of the reasons for our long detention on the lines of communication. In the field, we could never draw on the regular ammunition columns, but had to rely on depots of our own up the line, from which by difficult and often tardy methods we managed to replenish such reserves as we carried in our buck-waggon.

Concurrently with our field training the work of obtaining transport was pushed forward, and

eighty-four mules were secured, with eighteen Cape boys to drive and look after them. A few remounts were also obtained, giving us our first experience of the notorious Argentine pony. We say nothing against the aristocrats of that breed, but the rank and file were some of the most stupid, soulless, and vicious little monsters that ever vexed a soldier's soul.

As to our next destination, after many baseless reports had run their course, we were finally ordered to move to Stellenbosch, thirty miles up country, there to await further instructions. A two days' march brought us to that beautiful but ill-omened spot, afterwards to become a by-word for inactivity. Then we spent a week perched on an arid hill, working hard at our drills, our harness, and our horses, and tormented by conflicting rumours, which were crystallised into fact on February 20. The Battery was to be divided into two, and posted at two points on the line of communication in Cape Colony—at Piquetberg Road and Matjesfontein respectively. It was disappointing news, but there it was, and we made the best

of it ; said our farewells, entrained in two separate sections on successive nights, and spent two uneventful and bloodless months in that wearisome if necessary duty of 'guarding the line.' That was how it turned out. At the time, however, it seemed quite probable that we should have active work to do, for the districts we were posted in were seething with covert treason, and others further north of us with open rebellion. A large concerted plan was in the air to sweep the latter rebels southward to the mountains and drive them to surrender there, but it proved to be either not necessary or not feasible, for it was never carried out.

The right section, then, under Major McMicking, with Lieutenants Lowe and Duncan, Surgeon-Captain Thorne, and Veterinary Lieutenant Morgan, proceeded to Matjesfontein, a dreary little station 170 miles from Capetown in the heart of the great Karroo. It was healthy, but in every other respect a most trying and repellent spot to be quartered in, the country around desolate to the last degree, and its boulder-strewn kopjes and

valleys exceedingly difficult for artillery. There was no bathing to be got.

The left section, under Captain Budworth, with Lieutenant Bayley, were more happily situated at Piquetberg Road, another station on the same line, but ninety miles further south ; an important strategic point, covering as it does the southern outlet of the Tulbagh Pass, where the railway crosses the mountains referred to above. They were encamped with a number of other troops, whose various units were constantly shifting, close to the outlying spurs of the range, on ground which sloped down to a spacious scrub-clothed valley. For South Africa, the place was a Paradise. There were frequent dust-storms, it is true, and occasional deluges of rain ; but the country was easy, though not too easy, for artillery. Bathing, that precious solace for a soldier's dusty and laborious work, was always at hand in the Little Berg River, a mile away ; and in every direction there were beautiful and well-watered places, to give variety, interest, and amusement to the route marches which were constantly

practised, together with all the other phases of training.

So established, both sections made rapid progress in efficiency. In saying above that we were 'disappointed' at being placed on the lines of communication, it was not for a moment implied that we could have done without a period of probation, before being sent to take our place in the fighting line at the front. We did need a probation ; but, on the other hand, we can justly and without a shade of arrogance say that the period enforced on us was, from whatever cause, excessive, and that we reached the standard which afterwards carried us successfully through our campaign long before we were called upon to fight. The point cannot be laboured, for it is the business of every soldier, whoever he may be, to sink his ambitions and do what he is told ; it is only one, and not by any means the least, of his trials, to sit inactive (even though he be doing useful service, as we of course were) while others are passing him to the front. It is better, therefore, to be content with recording that we stood the

trial well, and, when we eventually had our chance, took it briskly, with unimpaired strength and unshaken spirits.

Like the fruit of Tantalus, our longed-for chance was constantly receding. Hopes were raised, and blighted again, in April, and it was not till May 20 that definite orders came for us to go to Kroonstad. Full of zest and excitement, we entrained and travelled slowly for three days down the line, at last entering the field of war and seeing in hospital trains, entrenched stations, ruined bridges, burnt trucks, and innumerable dead horses, symbols of the progress of our arms.

But we got no further than Bloemfontein. Our exasperation may be imagined when, after many hours stationary in a siding, we were detrained, and, after a frosty bivouac near the station, marched off to the fever-stricken camp outside the city, where 10,000 men were resting—and rotting.

Here we stopped a month, during which Pretoria fell, the Free State was formally annexed, and to us, in our ignorance of the true conditions



prevailing, it seemed that the war was practically over, and our enlistment for service in it an ignominious *fiasco*. The one gleam of hope centred round the name 'de Wet,' a name then beginning to be very widely and unpleasantly known.

Meanwhile we made the best of our time, drilling as a complete Battery, for both sections were now reunited under one command. But enteric was rife at this then notorious camp, and we naturally took our share of it, with the resulting depression of spirits. Rumours of a move were continually being falsified, and when, on the afternoon of June 20, a sudden order came to break up camp and go to Kroonstad the same night, not many of us, even then, were very sanguine as to the issue.

Marching out at midnight, we spent the whole night in entraining our guns, horses, mules, waggons, and harness, and at sunrise on the 21st, in a biting frost, screwed our persons into any odd crannies left over in the coal-trucks that formed our train, and so started.

## CHAPTER VI

## KROONSTAD TO LINDLEY

*June 21-27, 1900*

THE general situation was this. Lord Roberts, in pursuing his triumphant way to the capital of the Transvaal, had left behind him, and especially on his right rear, that is to say, in the south-eastern part of the Orange River Colony, large forces of unconquered Boers, their principal leader the famous Christian de Wet whose exploits had already caused us vast trouble, and were to cause an infinity more. Lindley, which was garrisoned by some troops under Lieut.-General Arthur Paget, was now closely invested by de Wet, and suffering repeated attacks. Even at Kroonstad, the principal British depot between Bloemfontein and Pretoria, our soldiers scarcely held more than the ground they stood on. For de Wet in person



rarely stayed long in any one spot, but was for ever swooping down on vulnerable points with a selected band, and decamping when he had done all the mischief he could. It was to one of these raids (and 'More power to the raider!' was, we regret to say, our selfish comment at the time!) that we owed our introduction to the real business of war, for, on June 22, news was brought to Kroonstad that he had cut the line at Honingspruit, a few miles to the north, and was making a determined attack on the small garrison station there. When this news arrived the Battery was shivering in its coal-trucks in a siding of Kroonstad station, where we had spent the night of the 21st after a long and tedious day's travel. Our original destination was, we believe, to have been Pretoria; but the result of the news was an order to detrain and march at once to Honingspruit to help succour the garrison.

It was a time of novelties, pleasant and unpleasant, solemn and humorous; and among the last class might be numbered our first taste of Staff methods in an emergency where time was

vital. For two hours, while Honingspruit was fighting for bare life, we were pelted by a rain of conflicting orders, each countermanding its predecessor, and each involving some inherent absurdity which killed it and called up another. Nobody appeared to know how many guns were wanted, or how (whether by train or road) they were to be got to the scene of action. As the said scene was the naked plain, with no vestige of a platform, you would have thought that question, at least, was tolerably simple. At one time it seemed likely that we should be asked to make our maiden effort either without horses or without harness, or—most formidable contingency of all—without guns! The Editors well remember the resigned stupor they sank into after doing and undoing the same job several times over, and thinking dimly all the while ‘This is war.’

In the end, the right section, with two guns, under the Major, was sent off to Honingspruit, where it is scarcely necessary to say that they arrived too late to be of any use, beyond completing the determination of the Boers to abandon their attack

in the face of the reinforcements which had already begun to muster. As it was, they had done a quantity of mischief, and caused us grave loss in men.

The left section, under Captain Budworth, together with a squadron of Lancers, and other troops, followed in support, to watch the country to the east of the line, and spent the day posted on a commanding eminence, and without firing a shot. It was proposed to leave the guns indefinitely on this eminence, in the hope that the sight of them might frighten away the Boers; but fortunately the officer in command of the force proved open to argument, and, towards nightfall, the guns were withdrawn, to the great relief of every one concerned, for the top of the hill was bestrewn with dead horses, so that a change of air was very welcome.

On the whole, it was not a satisfactory day; but, after all, the great thing was that we had won our freedom from standing camps, were at large on the field of war, and available for other enterprises. Bitterly cold as the nights were at this

season (the depth of winter), probably every man of us, as he rolled himself in his blanket that night, at a bivouac near the town, praised heaven that no tent stood over him, that hard service biscuit (and none too much of it) had supplanted inglorious bread, and that reveilles in the dark small hours, severe marching, and sharp fighting were to be his lot for the future.

An enterprise offered itself on the very next day (June 23), for the authorities determined to send a relief column to General Paget at Lindley, with supplies, of which he was in urgent need, and reinforcements, to enable him to break down the investment and take the field. The Battery was to form part of the column, whose other constituents were 400 Bushmen, four companies of the Yorkshire Light Infantry, the Militia Battalion of the Buffs, the Middlesex Imperial Yeomanry, and two guns of the 17th Field Battery—the whole under the command of Colonel Brookfield, M.P. Protected by this escort, there was an immense convoy of supply waggons drawn by mules and bullocks, besides several traction

engines with trucks attached, which, from their asthmatic immobility at bad drifts, proved to be an unmitigated nuisance.

The left section was to proceed with the column at once ; the right, which was still some distance away, was to follow as rapidly as it could, and join the camp at nightfall.

We started at 2 P.M., at the outset fording the Valsch River and mounting a precipitous drift from it. At the top of this we issued upon that rolling, buff-coloured expanse of withered grass, with its pink undertone, which was to be our hunting-ground for many weeks. Checks were frequent, and the column only did six miles before forming camp for the night. Everything had been new and strange : the lean and ragged foot soldiers who marched alongside of us, toughened, stained, and *blasés* after months of service ; the turmoil of encampment in the dark, with the shrill yells of black drivers, and the hustle and crush of crowding waggons ; the twinkle of hosts of camp-fires, and the hot glow of a distant veldt-fire ; and, finally, the ghostly ride of two

miles to water the horses, at a pond whose precise position nobody knew—a silent, mysterious ride, for it was hostile country, and Providence only knew where de Wet and his prowling bands might be. One thing only was sure, that he would make a vigorous effort to stop this column and thwart the release of Lindley's garrison.

Reveille was at 3 A.M. on the next day, and we found what it was to have hastily to harness-up with icy fingers and stiff frames, in pitch dark, with only a bare minute (and, if you were late, not even that) to swallow a mess-tin of hot weak coffee, before you hooked in your team and mounted. How singular it was, too, to be riding later on in the morning under a genuinely hot sun, while the tinkle of ice still sounded from within your frozen water-bottle !

Sixteen miles we did that day, with a long halt at mid-day in deference to the habits of the trek-ox, whose pensive progress over level ground, sullen obstinacy at critical spruits, and acute sensitiveness as to the hours of his meals, make up one of the many difficult problems of warfare



in a country such as this. Boer scouts had been seen, but no attack was made.

The next day also was uneventful, but on June 26—a red-letter day in all our memories—the Battery, after all those months of disheartening suspense, was at last put to the test. It was half-past 7 A.M., and after two hours' marching, we had halted on the crest of a hill overlooking a spruit, and were listening curiously to a rippling, crackling sound that broke the still air on our left front. We were all in our cloaks, for it was very cold ; but the Adjutant now came down the column of route, and, with jubilation in his face, recommended us to roll them on our saddles, as we might not soon get another chance. The situation was clear enough to anybody. The crest we were standing on curved away to the left front at about the same level, and then rose to and ended in an abrupt kopje directly commanding the road by which the convoy had to pass, and occupied by Boers whom it was essential to dislodge before any progress could be made. Mounted troops were sent round to take

them in the rear, and the Battery was ordered to engage them in front. Apparently, we could easily have done this from the sheltered crest where we then were, but the Brigadier thought otherwise, and we certainly were in no mood to dispute his wisdom, when he ordered us into the open plain below, there to come into action. 'Walk, March!' — 'Trot!' — and down we went into the most villainous gully, splashed through a stream, galloped up a steep and crumbling bank, formed line on the level, and trotted methodically into action. As soon as we topped the bank, our baptism of fire began—a fairly heavy rifle-fire, knocking up those uncanny-looking dust-spots all round us, and causing slight casualties among men and horses. But the advance was perfectly orderly; the guns were unlimbered smartly, the teams and waggons withdrawn to the rear, and without the least delay the range of the hostile kopje was found, and shrapnel rained accurately on its crest and reverse slopes.

It was the first occasion during the three and a half centuries of its existence that the H.A.C. had



fired a shot on foreign soil, and on a matter of such burning interest to us who love our Corps and are keenly jealous of its honour, it would be easy unconsciously to exaggerate. But all present, including the Brigadier, who gave us hearty praise, know that we are not doing anything of the sort. It was a day to be proud of.

We kept up the fire for an hour and ten minutes, expending 225 rounds, and by that time the Boers were silenced and had abandoned the kopje, so permitting the convoy to resume its advance in perfect security. As in all our fighting, we were wonderfully lucky; for though our position offered not a stock or stone of shelter, we had only two men, Gunner O'Regan and Driver Clough, wounded, and four horses hit.

It is known now that de Wet himself was not present either at this action or at that on the morrow. He states in his book that he was too much occupied at Lindley to be able to lead the resistance to our column—a resistance which he had intended to be more resolute and effective than it actually was.

For all that, it was resolute enough to put us in no little jeopardy. For the rest of this day there was only some long-range, desultory fighting; but on the next (June 27) we were hard put to it to cover the remaining miles to Lindley. Yet cover them we must, then and there, if we were to save the garrison, who were hard pressed at the moment, and unable to spare a single man to meet and assist our column. But for the convoy the matter would have been comparatively simple—a quick, running fight, audaciously conducted, would have settled the matter for good or ill; but the slow-moving, sinuous convoy, one of the most unwieldy things in the wide world, precluded any such course. The Boers knew this, too, and had chosen a spot to withstand us about seven miles on from our bivouac of the previous night, where one of those ugly spruits, that were becoming familiar, crossed the road and spelt delay and confusion for the ox-waggons. Above it, on our side, was a ridge which sloped down to the bed of the stream in two enormous undulations, like steps in a staircase. Beyond it were kopjes and

rising ground. The enemy were posted at various points to the front and on both flanks of this position; and a big Creuzot gun of theirs commanded the approach to the spruit.

As soon as their position disclosed itself, our right section, which had been part of the advance-guard, was sent on to the first of these undulations, or steps, where, in the list of new emotions, it obtained that of shell-fire from the Creuzot gun. Happily for us, Boer shells, though often aimed with uncomfortable accuracy, were rarely of good workmanship, only bursting on impact, and so doing little damage. The left section, which that day was with the rear-guard, was also hastily summoned to the same spot, and reached it after three miles' continuous trotting, mostly up-hill, past the whole convoy.

There was now a short time of hesitation, for, while shells were falling thick and fast in our neighbourhood, we found that we could not nearly reach the source of them with our own light guns. Our right section, therefore, and the two guns of the 17th Field Battery, were sent

forward by the Brigadier to engage the enemy's artillery at a nearer range, while it was decided at the same time to take the opportunity of immediately throwing the convoy across the spruit, and the left section was detailed to act as rear-guard for this operation and cover the transit with its guns.

To follow the fortunes of the right section first. They had a hard tussle with the Creuzot, and eventually silenced it; but not the Boer riflemen who swarmed on the front. Against these they repeatedly came into action, and so gave support to our own Bushmen and Yeomanry who were engaged in clearing the left flank. Finally they joined the van of the convoy, which was beginning to uncoil its cumbersome length ahead, having practically crossed the spruit, and safely reached Lindley at the head of it before dark.

As it turned out, the left section, under Captain Budworth, who were still posted on the undulation that we spoke of, had the chief post of danger. The Creuzot gun, only temporarily silenced, had shifted its position, and now, in

company with a second of the same calibre, opened fire on the convoy and rear-guard. Twice the Captain shifted the section to more commanding points and tried to reach them, but in vain. The Boer riflemen also, only beaten off for the time, closed in on all sides round the same quarter. Meanwhile the convoy wound its interminable length, with the most maddening slowness, across the spruit. Another circumstance tended to confuse the situation. The cordon of Boers, in closing in, fired the veldt, and the flames, driven by a favouring wind, licked their way up to our very guns and horses, while the whole atmosphere became murky with smoke, through which the sun appeared as a dull crimson ball, as in a November fog in London. There was a certain lack of intelligent direction too, for the Brigadier, assuming prematurely that the convoy was safe, had galloped off to the head of it with a cheery '*Au revoir* till dinner at Lindley,' and was now near that longed-for haven. The infantry who were helping to hold the extreme rear began filtering back with breathless stories of myriads

of Boers about to pour over the ridge above us, whereupon our guns were turned in that direction, but with scant hope of making any impression, even with case-shot, on an open line of skirmishers. In fact things looked really bad, and without some coolness and nerve would have ended badly. But Captain Budworth, then as always, was equal to the occasion, and the convoy did in the fulness of time ramble and scramble over the spruit. As the last waggons entered it the guns were ordered to cross also, and continue their covering tactics from the other side. Some of us can see now that pandemonium of yelling Kaffirs, plunging cattle, blaspheming transport officers, and panting traction-engines, through which we forced our road, and so climbed out of that accursed spruit, under its pall of lurid smoke.

The most critical moments were still to come, for an exceedingly difficult bit of ground flanked the farther side of the spruit, and the convoy, while scaling this, was highly vulnerable, having, besides, left some wreckage in the shape of broken-



down waggons and exhausted traction-engines in the bed of the gully itself. The enemy, who, to tell the truth, had never been as adventurous as they might have been, gained hardihood, and gradually drew their cordon tighter, till they enveloped us at nearly every point of the compass. There was only one thing to be done: to show a cool and determined front till darkness fell; and that was done. The Bushmen held a steep declivity, which overhung the spruit on the left, with gallantry and tenacity; we ourselves, from further back, fired over their heads and towards the rear at a target which, from the nature of the ground, we could only roughly conjecture at. The Yorkshire Light Infantry tackled the right (not without difficulties, for they left a company straying about there all night). And so, minute after minute was gained, till day melted into twilight and twilight thickened to night, and the convoy, safely extricated, was well on its forward way. Not till then did we ourselves limber up and follow, dead tired, both man and beast. There were still eight miles to Lindley—atrocious miles,

too—over rocky heights and hollows, and many an awkward donga ; but we were unmolested, and reached our haven at nine o'clock, were dumped down in a waste field, chucked off our harness (most kindly helped by some men of the 38th Field Battery), and slept like logs.

We call this action Paardeplatz, whether correctly or not it cannot be said with certainty. It was a good example of those small affairs which are never heard of unless they end 'regrettably,' but which are thrilling enough to those engaged in them, and which may have far-reaching consequences. If our column had been rushed or even seriously delayed, Lindley might easily have fallen, and a disaster of some magnitude incurred.

It should be recorded that the Brigadier sought out Captain Budworth on the following day, and congratulated him warmly on the behaviour of the artillery of the rear-guard.

Our first little enterprise was thus happily achieved, and its results for us were excellent, for it gave us confidence in ourselves and our officers, and showed that our long detention on the lines



of communication had at any rate made us sound and efficient.

Whether it was due to over-elation or not, the Editors cannot say ; but the fact remains that on the following day astonished Lindley woke to find a new and flaming piece of red and blue bunting floating in its midst. It is understood that the General himself instantly sent an indignant inquiry as to the meaning of this dangerous phenomenon, which was calculated to draw fire not only on his troops but on his own headquarters, which were uncomfortably close at hand ; and was told that it was the flag of the H.A.C. who had come to his rescue over-night. Our colours, we regret to record, had to be incontinently struck !

At Lindley we spent four fairly peaceful days, broken once, for the left section, by an excursion which deserves a word, because it imposed a fresh test of discipline and smartness. The section was sent out to help in escorting the empty convoy and some batches of sick and wounded back to Kroonstad over the same road. We did a

rapid day's march, of seventeen miles or so, and bivouacked in the evening; but at 11.30 P.M. were abruptly roused and ordered back at once to Lindley. The order was so sudden and unexpected that in our ignorance we thought some critical emergency had arisen, and that on us alone hung the fate of Lindley! In point of fact, it was only a natural impatience on General Paget's part to have his forces complete again before beginning a concerted movement southwards; but the test spoken of was none the less useful, for though we were scarcely awake, and the night was black, the teams were harnessed and on the homeward road in a time that would have done credit to a regular battery, while those now odiously familiar ridges and drifts were traversed without a hitch, and with all possible speed.

## CHAPTER VII

## LINDLEY TO BETHLEHEM

*July 2-5, 1900*

THE Battery was now definitely attached to General Paget's (the 20th) Brigade, and remained with it to the last. Captain Budworth was appointed Adjutant of the Brigade Artillery, and in that capacity was employed considerably with the C.R.A. and the 38th Field Battery, and, consequently, less than hitherto with ourselves.

With the reinforcements he had now received, General Paget was ready to take the offensive, and accordingly planned with General Clements a joint sweeping movement towards Bethlehem. This was begun on July 2, when we moved out of forlorn little Lindley (the victim of more bloody and abrupt vicissitudes than any town in the field of war), and marched south-eastwards,

over hilly country, in company with a battalion of the Royal Munster Fusiliers, ever afterwards our close and constant comrades in campaigning (bless their honest brogues and genial fun!), with the Yorkshire Light Infantry, too, and about 800 mounted troops, Bushmen, Yeomanry, etc., and finally the 38th Field Battery, with whom we were also long and intimately associated.

Of the march to Bethlehem as a whole, it may be briefly said that the enemy under General Christian de Wet fell back steadily before the Brigade, disputing the ground as they went in a series of rear-guard actions, one of which—that on the second day—was serious, and the others less so or trivial.

On the first day there was no lack of interest and excitement in isolated incidents. The right section, engaged on the right front, together with a company of Munsters, had just dislodged some Boers from a kopje, and were advancing further, when they suddenly found themselves enfiladed by a sharp fire from their old friend (or a mate of his) the big Creuzot gun, which had hitherto been silent in coy obscurity. Being on a wholly

unsheltered plateau at the time, there was nothing for it but to gallop back then and there, and an exciting gallop it was, with shells pitching fast and accurately at their heels. No damage was done, however, and they were soon in such safety that the Sergeant-major was able to gather in two trembling Boers as prisoners of war.

The left section, marching with Paget's centre and main body, engaged this same Creuzot gun again, as soon as it was unmasked. In its way it was a remarkable little duel, for Lieutenant Bayley, who was in charge of the section, picked up the range, which was 4,200 yards, in three shots, and in a few more caused the withdrawal of the gun. His layers must have made excellent practice, for on the following day, when the kopje was occupied, fragments of our shells were found in the gun-eпаulement itself.

Another small episode was an adventure of Captain Budworth's. He was attached to the left wing (of mounted men) which was detailed that day to turn the Boers' right. Towards the end of the day he was ordered off with a few

mounted men to help in extricating a telegraph cart from a morass where it was badly bogged. During the operation, and while the predicament was at its worst, a band of Boers arrived, and opened fire. Covered by Captain Budworth's party, however, Lieutenant Sherard, R.E., and a couple of men, by literally and figuratively putting their shoulders to the wheel, succeeded in saving the cart, with the loss of one horse only, and a couple of minor casualties.

The second day of the march must be treated in greater detail. In some respects it was the most memorable day in our campaign, and in one respect it was, we believe, unique in the whole history of the war.

De Wet in his book calls the scene of the action Elandsfontein; we have always called it Barkin Kop, and that name is adhered to here. The greatest pains have been taken to arrive at the exact truth as to what occurred, and the following account may be received as absolutely trustworthy. We lay stress on this, because, unhappily, an erroneous version has appeared in a recently published history of wide circulation.

*Action of Barkin Kop, July 3, 1900.*

Before daylight, on a cloudy, stormy-looking morning, the Brigade resumed its advance, and after an hour's marching was divided into two.

The main body, consisting of infantry and one section (the left) of our Battery, and led by the General in person, moved straight to its front, but shortly after starting, the guns, with an escort of Munsters, were sent up a kopje on the right flank, where they had a long duel with some hostile artillery. Here we leave them for the present.

The remainder of the Brigade, consisting of 800 mounted troops (Yeomanry, Australians, and other details), 38th Field Battery (4 guns), and the right section of our own Battery, was detached to make a wide turning movement on the left. This force was commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Brookfield; the artillery included in it was under the orders of Major Oldfield of the 38th Field Battery.

The force advanced slowly under a desultory rifle fire, which was silenced after a time by a few







rounds from the guns. About half-past nine, the enemy began shell-fire; and thus disclosed their main position. This was on a line running at right angles to our line of advance, marked in the centre by a small kopje (A) and terminating on the right (that is, on *our* right) in a big hill called Barkin Kop. Three Boer guns were located—two in kraals on high ground to the left, and one on kopje (A).

There was a pause to reconnoitre, and Major Oldfield galloped forward and chose ground—a ridge parallel to the enemy's position—where his artillery could come into action. All six guns advanced to this ridge, and, in doing so, came under an accurate shrapnel fire. A long duel ensued, with the result that the enemy were practically silenced, though by no means disabled, for whenever our fire slackened, theirs spurted spasmodically up again. At last, however, parties of Boers were seen to be retiring, and accordingly it was decided to push forward a mounted force to turn their right flank. The two H.A.C. guns were detailed to support the movement, and for

this purpose were withdrawn behind the crest of the ridge in readiness to move out. But the projected movement fell through, from causes that need not be gone into, and in the end the H.A.C. guns were brought into action on the ridge again, but in a new position, while two of the 38th Battery guns were shifted to the place we had originally occupied.

The artillery was now disposed in three sections of two guns each, in the positions marked on the plan, the two H.A.C. guns, under Major McMicking, on the left; two guns of the 38th Battery, in charge of Captain Fitzgerald, in the centre, about 130 yards distant from ours; and two guns of the same Battery, in charge of Lieut. Belcher, on the right, at a further distance of about 80 yards. The latter section was on the edge of a mealie field, and beyond, on their right front, was a considerable stretch of 'dead' ground.

It is to be noted that these three positions were divided from one another by slightly rising ground, so that each section was invisible to the

others. As for the H.A.C. guns, Major McMicking had them carefully run up by hand to the exact spot selected; and so skilfully were they thus concealed, that the Boer artillery failed properly to locate them for the rest of the day.

The troops in support were disposed as follows :

On the left of the H.A.C. guns was a small detachment of troops, with a look-out post on an eminence to their front. The rising ground between the H.A.C. guns and Captain Fitzgerald's section was held by Australians, and an escort composed of Yeomanry and Prince Alfred's Guards was posted on the right front of Lieut. Belcher's section, but was afterwards unfortunately withdrawn, by orders of the O.C.R.A., to the right rear. The main body of the Yeomanry were in extended order further to the right.

The weather throughout the day was dismal, with a high cold wind, and, frequently, drenching showers of rain.

At about half-past twelve the enemy increased their shell-fire, unmasking two fresh guns, one on

kopje (A), the other on Barkin Kop. The latter partly enfiladed our position, but on the whole the fire, though heavy, was doing little damage; so little that Major Oldfield presently ordered the gunners of his Battery to cease fire, and to lie down near their guns; his reasons being that his ammunition was running low and that it was best to wait until General Paget, with the rest of the Brigade, should make his presence felt on the right.

There can be no doubt that this cessation of fire gave the impression to the enemy that these four guns (which they could probably see) had been temporarily abandoned. In any case, they redoubled their own shell-fire, and also threw out skirmishers against our left, in resisting whom, among other casualties, Major Rose, of the Australians, was badly wounded. This was probably in the nature of a diversion, to cover a serious movement which, with extraordinary suddenness and secrecy, was launched against our right. It was heralded (at about 3.15) by a sharp burst of rifle-fire, at the first

sound of which Major Oldfield and Captain Budworth hurried up to the crest of the ridge, and found that a detachment of Boers, numbering about a hundred, had stolen up the dead ground ahead, through the mealie fields, and were now within fifty yards of Lieut. Belcher's section, into whose gunners they were pouring a rapid and deadly fire.

Major Oldfield, almost immediately, fell mortally wounded, and in such agony that Captain Budworth, after attempting to remove him, had to desist. Turning to obtain assistance, he saw that the detachment on the left of the H.A.C. guns, and also the Australians who had been holding the rise between our own and Captain Fitzgerald's guns, had retired. It will be remembered that the Yeomanry escort on the right flank had previously been withdrawn some distance to the rear (otherwise this dashing raid could never have been effected unobserved, if, indeed, it could have been attempted at all). The whole ridge, therefore, with its six unlimbered guns, was now left at the mercy of the Boers.

Behind it was a wide stretch of open ground, and if the enemy carried the crest and commanded this, nothing could hinder a terrible disaster like that of Sanna's Post.

Captain Budworth managed to reach his pony, and galloped back at once to call upon the Australians to return. That he succeeded in bringing them back, and promptly too, reflects the highest credit on him, and also, be it added, on the men he had to deal with. Who ordered their retirement it is impossible to ascertain; but it is just to say that when called upon to come back again, they did so willingly; and it is common knowledge that it requires more courage, both moral and physical, for troops in retreat to rally and face fire, than to sit tight and suffer it from the first.

But meanwhile terrible mischief was being done on the ridge.

When the surprise occurred, Lieut. Belcher's gunners were lying down, but on the alarm instantly ran to their guns, and were ordered to fire case, the last resource of artillery when



attacked at close quarters. One round only could be fired, and then the Boers were on them. Lieut. Belcher was shot dead, and all his gunners were either killed, wounded, or captured.

Captain Fitzgerald's section, eighty yards further to the left, had a little more time, and were ordered promptly to limber up. One gun was safely removed to the left rear, thanks to the coolness of the No. 1, Sergeant Adams; the other gun-team, in coming up to hook in to the limber, was driven in error too much towards the right, and, in the few seconds so lost, all the drivers and horses were shot, and Captain Fitzgerald was severely wounded in an endeavour to extricate the wounded horses. All the gunners too were killed or wounded. The Boers were thus in actual possession of three out of four of the 38th Battery guns.

Fortunately, instead of pressing forwards at once towards the remaining 38th gun, and, over the intervening rise, to the H.A.C. guns, which were completely at their mercy, they delayed to secure their prisoners and to attempt the removal

of the already captured guns. This delay gave time for help to arrive. The Australians, with Captain Budworth at their head, soon appeared on the scene again, were met with a hot fire, but pushed forward with such determination that the Boers abandoned the guns and made off, covered in their retreat by a renewal of shell-fire.

The H.A.C. guns on the left, hidden by their fold of ground, were not actually affected by the sudden raid we have described; but until the Australians returned, they also were left without a single protecting rifle, while they had at the same time to meet an emergency of their own, an attack on the left flank in support of the frontal raid; and to meet it without assistance too, for the detachment on their left, unlike the Australians, were very slow in returning. At one time, accordingly, the two guns were firing trail to trail, one at the Boers on their left, and one towards the right, over the heads of the disabled 38th. Under these difficult and perilous circumstances perfect steadiness prevailed.

As will be understood, however, the period of



imminent danger did not last long. It was over from the moment that, owing to the Australian fire, the Boers left the disabled guns and retreated. Shell-fire broke out again, but Lieut. Belcher's limbers were able to drive up and quietly remove their two guns. One of Captain Fitzgerald's had already been safely taken away, as was related above. The other, having lost its team and drivers, could not at first be moved, but two Yeomanry officers succeeded in hooking a pair of wounded horses into it, and were trying to get it away, when a H.A.C. limber appeared on the scene with fresh horses and men, and drove it out of action. All four of the 38th Battery guns were thus brought gradually round to support the left, and one of them, it should be recorded, was served by H.A.C. *drivers*. (For drivers to serve a gun was probably an unprecedented circumstance.) The mounted troops, including the Yeomanry on the right, took their places in the line, the welcome sound of General Paget's guns was heard on the right, and all seemed ripe for an energetic advance to follow up the enemy's repulse.

A bold and skilful handling of the mounted troops would have had excellent chances of success ; but doubtless the whole force was a little dazed by what had happened, and the advance when made was hesitating and ineffectual.

Another distraction was caused by some disquieting news from the main body, which had met with an ambush and required assistance. Let us now revert to their side of the field, and in doing so follow the fortunes of the left section of our Battery.

We left them in action under Lieut. Bayley on a steep kopje to the right of the main body. The guns opposed to them were long-range Krupps, and the problem before Lieut. Bayley was to reach these at a range of 7,000 yards. It was solved, after some delay, by sinking the trails and using aiming posts, but not before a number of wonderfully accurate shots had dropped unpleasantly close to our limbers and waggons, though, bursting on impact and on rain-sodden ground, they did us no hurt. The hostile fire slowly slackened and ceased, but it could scarcely

have been in deference to our own efforts, which, at such a range, must have been inconclusive at the best. Probably the Boer guns preferred to concentrate their energies on the unlucky 38th. We ceased fire, too, and there was a long wait in the rain, while we cooked little messes on cow-dung fires, and thought the fighting was over for the day. But at two o'clock orders came for us to descend into the plain, and support the Infantry in a general attack on the main Boer position, which was an extension of the same series of hills as that described above, and was flanked on our left by Barkin Kop. We advanced in a succession of short rushes, through barbed wire fences, over hollows and streams and heavy mealie fields, firing a few shots, and hurrying on again, the enemy's skirmishers falling back uninterruptedly. Blinding sheets of rain fell during this advance, which led us ultimately to the foot of the kopje. 'Up it,' was the order, and a very nasty ascent it was, especially with tired horses. The slope, naturally steep, was strewn with loose boulders, and, near the top, seamed with sangars built for defence, and

by no means easy for guns to pass. One of the limbers was overturned, but the accident was soon repaired, and the section fired from the summit at the dispersing enemy, under the direction of General Paget in person.

It was now about five; the last Boer disappeared from view in the direction of Bethlehem; Clements's Brigade was known to be pressing them on the far right, and for the second time it looked as though fighting was over for the day. The guns descended, flanked by the Infantry, into a broad undulating valley. About 600 yards to our front ran a low ridge, which, happily, struck Lieut. Bayley as suspicious in appearance. He halted his guns therefore, and sent forward ground-scouts to inspect it. It was well that he did so, for when these men had advanced a certain distance there was a furious outbreak of Mausers from the right front, whence the ridge curved backwards parallel to the line of march. The Infantry, who were in close order at the time (for every one of us thought we were merely marching into camp), spread out and scattered in all

directions. Lieut. Bayley had gone off at the moment to look at the camping ground, and Sergeant Wood was in temporary charge of the guns. Without waiting for orders, he promptly ordered 'action front,' and in a minute or two shrapnel were dropping accurately and rapidly on the ridge where the ambush had been made. The General now came up again, directed our fire, and forcibly persuaded the Infantry to lie down and give us a fair field. The affair was over in ten minutes ; and, all things considered, it was a narrow shave. If Lieut. Bayley had not reconnoitred the ground (a duty which, needless to say, did not strictly belong to him) the ambush would have come to light later, and far more disastrously ; and but for the coolness and decision of Sergeant Wood, it might have had very humiliating consequences as it was. The mounted wing of the Brigade now joined us, and at twilight camp was at last formed after this eventful day ; and our sections reunited and exchanged their experiences. There was a bitter frost that night, trying to men in sopping clothes ; there was gloom too, over the sad mishap

to our fellow battery ; but, on the other hand, a convoy had just arrived from Kroonstad with parcels and letters from England, and consoled by this we made the best of things.

A word more about the attack on the six guns. De Wet, in his account of it, says the party numbered 100 men, and was led by Commandant Michal Prinsloo ; but in this case there is strong reason for thinking that he purposely suppresses the name of his brother, who, at a later date, greatly to his anger, turned 'hands-upper.' Certainly Boer prisoners declared that it was Piet de Wet who led the charge. In praising the gallantry of the attack, he adds that the Boers were only compelled to retire by the advent of a 'large force' from the rear, before there had been time to bring up teams to remove the guns. The error is excusable ; but, as a matter of fact, the force of Australians that beat them off was very small, though they could scarcely have known this. That teams were actually on the way to remove the captured guns is, we believe, the truth. In any case, one cannot leave the subject without a word



of admiration for such a plucky exploit ; unique, too, so far as we are aware, in the history of the war, as was hinted early in the chapter. Artillery has been rushed and captured by various means at other times ; but we know of no other case where a small party of men on foot attacked and seized guns in action in the open.

As for the British side, it would be invidious to discuss the errors of the day. They were typical, in a sense, of the errors of the war ; and it is enough to say that they were amply redeemed.



## CHAPTER VIII

BETHLEHEM TO FOURIESBURG—FOURIESBURG  
TO PRETORIA*July 5—August 10*

As the result of this action the 38th Battery, besides a large number of men, had lost all their officers by death or wounds; and, accordingly, Captain Budworth took temporary command of them, with Lieutenant Duncan, also of our Battery, under him; while Major McMicking was for the time C.R.A. of Paget's Brigade. The last two days of the march may be briefly disposed of. The enemy made no stand of any consequence at all, and our work was confined to the perfunctory shelling of a few ridges.

On the evening of July 5 we encamped in a hollow three miles from Bethlehem. In the rosy dusk there towered ahead of us the conical

peak of Wolhuter's Kop, thrust up from a serrated range of downs. Behind and below that lay invisible Bethlehem, and, beyond again, more hills, leading up to the craggy plum-coloured line of the great Drakensberg range.

At Bethlehem, de Wet stood at bay ; sending a contemptuous refusal to the British demand for the surrender of the town, and adding that the blood of the women and children in it would be on our heads. He had, indeed, good reason for his firm attitude, for Bethlehem is an important centre, both strategically and otherwise ; and its natural defences are so strong that it took the united brigades of Generals Clements and Paget two days of hard fighting to win it.

Early on the next morning (July 6) we had sauce to our breakfast in the shape of shells—shrapnel bursting neatly over the camp, but too high to be dangerous or even to blunt our appetites ; none the less a very pointed challenge to the General to come and do his worst. It is difficult, in the limited space at our command, to describe the two days' battle of Bethlehem

accurately ; but we hope to give a clear general view of what happened, and at the same time to follow the doings of our Battery in particular. The town, as was said, lies in a hollow, surrounded on all sides by hills. Now, the eastern and northern sides may be ignored for the present purpose. The attack was from the west and south (for at the close of our march from Lindley we had glanced aside from our true course), and it is the western and southern defences only that need concern the reader. Immediately to the south of the town rises the conical Wolhuter's Kop, most conspicuous of all the heights ; immediately to the west stands another kopje of less eminence, which, as we are ignorant of its name, we will call A. Radiating westwards from these stretch a series of ridges of more or less marked contour, all of which were suitable for defence as outer works for the innermost strongholds, Kopje A and Wolhuter's Kop. The outermost was the one behind which we were now encamped, and over whose crest de Wet was wishing us the top of the morning with

complimentary shrapnel. He had guns posted at various places, and the whole position was freely entrenched. In the attack on it, roughly speaking, Paget's Brigade tackled the right and Clements's Brigade the left.

For ourselves the day began by an order to the right section to mount the ridge ahead of us and draw the fire of the Boer guns until Clements's 5-inch lyddite artillery could come into action and take up the task with greater efficacy. Lieut. Lowe, who was in charge of the section, did what he was told with judgment and promptitude, but the range was too great to admit of effective practice, and he merely kept the Boer gunners amused till the great cow-guns 'Weary Willie' and 'Tired Tim' relieved him. He then rejoined the other section, and the united Battery, under Major McMicking, spent the day in working slowly up the right flank, covering the advance of the Munsters and Yeomanry, and repeatedly coming into action; but without any great results, for the hostile guns were hard to locate. We had to put up with some harmless shell-fire, but not till

the end of the day with any rifle-fire to speak of. Then, in supporting a spirited assault by the Munsters on a strongly-held ridge, we came under a long-range fire, in which Bombardier Applebee was wounded in the knee by a soft-nosed bullet, and was afterwards invalided home. The Munsters paid dearly for their success with thirty casualties.

A good deal of ground had been won, at considerable cost, during the day, but the inner and strongest of the enemy's defences were still untouched.

The second day, July 7, was far more effective. The first decisive step was the capture, by storm, of Kopje A by Clements's Royal Irish and Paget's Yorkshire Light Infantry. The effect of this was to give the Battery a golden chance, of a sort that rarely occurs. The Boer riflemen, when dislodged from Kopje A, galloped in full retreat towards Wolhuter's Kop, across the open valley which separates the two hills, thus presenting a fine moving target to our guns, which happened to be stationed within view of the scene. Long as the

range was (4,600 yards) for so sudden a call, our gunners made good practice among the flying groups of horsemen, and so disorganised the retreat that the Boers had to abandon a British 15-pounder gun, which had been captured by them months ago at Stormberg, in Cape Colony.

Wolhuter's Kop now became the main citadel of resistance, and impregnable enough its entrenched crags looked. Lyddite shells, raising clouds of orange dust, were rained upon it for hours to prepare the way for its ultimate assault by Clements's Royal Irish. De Wet (who is very chary of praising his burghers) recounts that it was principally held by *Voetgangers*—that is to say, men who had lost their horses from exhaustion or wounds and who had to fight on foot; and he warmly applauds the stubborn pluck with which they faced that deadly rain—an eulogy which all who witnessed it must echo. They sat tight and fired imperturbably, not only from the central eminence, but from lower outlying ridges which had, perforce, to be wrested from them before the Kop could be stormed. The attack of these ridges



was entrusted to Paget's troops—namely, the Munsters, the Yeomanry, and his two field batteries (the 38th and our own). Of the two, the 38th, under Captain Budworth, was ahead, and had the lion's share of the work. It is worthy of mention that at one time he was ordered to advance his guns some distance ahead of the Infantry to a ridge which was thought to have been vacated by the enemy. He was prudent enough before carrying out the order to reconnoitre the ground ahead of him in person, and was rewarded by coming upon a party of Boers who had concealed themselves in a mealie field, well in front of their main position, and who received him with volleys at short range. He owed his life to a good horse, galloped back, and thoroughly searched the ground with shell before advancing his battery in the firing-line.

To be brief, the lower ridges were carried without much difficulty, and Wolhuter's Kop, weakened at last by incessant pounding, was successfully and most gallantly stormed by the Royal Irish; the enemy evacuated the last of his



positions, and at four o'clock the town, which had not received a single shell, lay at our mercy below. Already an immense train of Boer waggons could be seen in the distance, wending its way in full retreat for Retief's Nek.

In his despatches describing the two days' battle General Paget alluded to the 'rapid and accurate fire' of the 38th and H.A.C. Batteries; and the same General, at a dinner given in his honour at the H.A.C. headquarters on his return home from South Africa, presented the regiment with a Boer flag captured on this occasion.

In one sense it was but a Pyrrhic victory, hot though the fighting had been. De Wet declares that he could have held out longer, and was only prevailed upon to retreat by the approach of General Hunter from the Transvaal with a large accession of force. However that may be, it must be admitted that his retreat was orderly, and that he saved all his transport, not to mention the Free State Government, which rather nebulous entity was then travelling in his train. As usual, we had no cavalry to follow up our

success by harassing the retreat and cutting up the unwieldy convoys that were now creeping into safety behind the mountains. Hunter's troops arrived too late to be of any service in that respect, though they were to be the nucleus of a new and important scheme. Bethlehem was ours, but stripped to destitution of war-like stores and supplies; and, moreover, isolated towns in the field of war (witness Lindley) had an uncomfortable way of being reoccupied as soon as they were left. If the truth were known, the most important feature of the Battle of Bethlehem was the increased depression it instilled among the burghers, a depression destined to bear sinister fruit in vacillation and timidity when the new British scheme was translated into action.

They had retreated to the number of 8,000 behind the Roodebergen range, into an extensive basin of fertile country, elongated in shape, and shut in at nearly every point by impassable mountains. This singular region is only accessible at five places where defiles or 'neks' pierce

the screen. All these neks were Thermopylæ, in their way, and fitted for obstinate defence. On the other hand, if they were once forced, the interior, from a secure refuge, became a deadly trap. De Wet relates that the Boers now held a council of war, at which he urged the various leaders not to sacrifice their freedom of action nor risk a gigantic disaster by remaining in this potential trap; and he adds that his view was ostensibly adopted by all present, but that, when the time came for leaving the Roodebergen, he alone, with a fraction of the Boer army, acted on the resolution and escaped in time. The rest, under General Prinsloo, lost heart at the last moment and remained behind. This was precisely what we wanted, for the British scheme, conceived, we believe, by General Ian Hamilton, but carried into effect (owing to an accident to that officer) by General Hunter, was to surround the Roodebergen with overwhelming numbers of troops, to force the neks and drive the Boer army to surrender.

To this end, Bethlehem now became the centre

of concentration for many different brigades—Generals Hunter, McDonald, and Broadwood adding their forces to those of Clements and Paget; while these were only a part of the whole body concerned, for Bruce Hamilton was to close in from the south-west, and Rundle and Boyes from far away on the Basuto border.

To provision this concourse of columns, numbering about 25,000 men all told, was a gigantic task, requiring time. Bethlehem itself was eighty-one miles from a railway, and convoys to it had to cross unsettled country. Indeed, there was a serious shortage of food for men and horses for several days after the battle. It is impossible to say that there was unnecessary delay; but it is exasperating, nevertheless, to think that had our own column started one day sooner we should have been in time to offer effectual resistance to de Wet in his escape from the trap.

To return to the Battery.

We spent a week at Bethlehem, posted, cheek by jowl with the faithful Munsters, on the top of a hill overlooking a great valley. Forage was

short, food was short ; and the time was generally dull (if hungry men can ever be said to be dull ! ). I should say that this shortage of food was only a matter of proportion, for like most troops operating in these regions we had never yet had the full biscuit ration (without mentioning other details), and rarely obtained it afterwards. On the other hand, fresh meat began to be more plentiful, thanks to the immense flocks of sheep and cattle constantly being captured.

On July 15 came the welcome order to march, and, with Paget's Brigade, we moved out southward with a huge empty convoy, which was destined to bring back supplies from Senekal for Hunter. The 38th Battery, I should mention, had now been given officers of its own. Our road lay parallel to the mountains behind which the Boers were gathered. Nothing happened during the first day's march, which led us over a tract of veldt devastated by fire, and black as far as the eye could see. But in the evening scouts reported that a Boer force was in laager eight miles further on. Broadwood's cavalry brigade was at once

sent for from Bethlehem and arrived next day (July 16), when the march was resumed.

It now became clear that the Boer force was de Wet's, and that it had escaped from the Roodebergen by Slabbert's Nek, twelve miles on our left—one of the five defiles alluded to above. So certain were our authorities that the Boers intended to await us in their fastness *en masse*, that this nek was not even watched; and Clements with his whole brigade had passed the mouth of it three days before, on his way to get stores at Senekal. We were now just too late. De Wet's transport and main body was well away to the west, and the fighting of to-day, severe though it was, was only one of those rear-guard actions, delivered to gain time, in which he was a past master.

We call the scene of it Bultfontein, from a large farm in the neighbourhood.

De Wet's rear-guard was posted strongly on a rocky flat-topped kopje, sloping to mealie fields. We say 'posted strongly,' but all that was apparent at the time was a number of riflemen



in these mealie fields, who sent bullets whistling among our column, while we waited for orders. Several men were hit before it was settled that Broadwood's cavalry should endeavour to turn the left flank, and take the Boers in rear, while Paget's Brigade made a frontal attack. A small force, including the 38th Battery, was also detached to watch the mountains at our back.

Both sections of our Battery, and some pom-poms also, were brought into action against the kopje at 4,000 yards, fired for fifty minutes, and reduced the Boer riflemen to silence, and, indeed, to invisibility, for not a soul was to be seen on the position, or a sound heard from it. A general advance took place therefore; our sections being respectively on the right and left of the line, with 700 mounted men and some infantry and pom-poms between them. The ground was perfectly open. When the line was about 3,000 yards from the kopje two concealed guns suddenly opened fire from the top, and two shells fell into the middle of the Mounted Infantry, emptying seven saddles. At the same



time a third gun on the extreme right began to enfilade our whole line. De Wet, in fact, had been playing an old game of his, that of 'Will you walk into my parlour?'; and in we walked with charming innocence.

The surprise was so unexpected, and the target presented by our line so substantial, that some little confusion arose before the mounted troops could retire into safety; for of course they were impotent where they were. Meanwhile our guns were promptly unlimbered and turned on the kopje, the sections closing up to a distance of 300 yards from one another. There followed a period during which we underwent the hottest shell-fire we ever experienced. Of course we were in the bare open, and offered a good mark; but, even so, the Boer practice was excellent, their shells dropping in among the guns in front, and the limbers and waggons in the rear, while some fine sporting shots were made at waggons and teams on the move, in the course of bringing up ammunition. That we only had one man wounded (Gunner Brady) was due, as usual, to the enemy's

bad ammunition; the shells only bursting on the ground with a destructive radius of barely a yard or two. But making full allowance for that, we had, it must be admitted, extraordinary luck.

Besides being a most hazardous contest for us, it was an absurdly unequal one, for the Boer guns were admirably masked behind the rocky contours of the hill, and probably none of us pretend that we ever exactly located them. It is doubtful whether the General ever intended us to come into action where we did and engage in this quixotic duel; but, however that may be, for an hour and a quarter we pounded doggedly away, and suffered hairbreadth escapes.

It was a strange scene, lonely and almost uncanny to look back upon. The day was dark, the short brown grass was burning in all directions lambent tongues of flame licking across the valley leaving behind them smouldering black tracks. A scanty escort of our staunch Munsters lay smoking and dozing behind some pretence of shelter which a slight undulation afforded. Otherwise

not a soul was to be seen, Boer or Briton, anywhere, and only the yelp of the opposing guns was heard.

At the end of an hour and a quarter definite orders came to retire, and it is noteworthy that the limbering-up and hooking-in was done with absolute steadiness, under conditions which were the worst we had yet experienced.

Retiring about 1,400 yards, we began a still more futile bombardment, but not for long, for dark came on, and the whole brigade was gathered into camp. The Cavalry had made no impression on the left flank, and de Wet's force of 2,600 men (according to his own figures) escaped intact.

There was now a pause of another week, while the plans for surrounding the Boer army were being matured. The bulk of the Brigade, including our left section, under Major McMicking, spent it at Bultfontein, but a force was detached to march on to Winburg with the empty convoy, to fill it with stores and return. With this force went our right section, under Lieutenant Lowe, only rejoining us a fortnight later, when the great

*coup* had been successfully delivered ; so that they saw no more fighting in the Orange River Colony.

Allowing for de Wet's withdrawal, there still were left 5,000 Boers behind the mountains. The various defiles to be forced were now finally allotted to the different generals. Hunter was to take Retief's Nek ; Bruce Hamilton, Naauwport Nek and the Golden Gate ; Rundle and Boyes, Commando Nek ; and Clements and Paget, Slabbert's Nek.

During the week of waiting, Slabbert's Nek was watched carefully by our Brigade, and all was held in readiness for instant departure should a sign of a sortie be seen. The 38th Battery and our own section took it in turns on alternate days to have our teams harnessed and ready to march. On July 22 a reconnaissance in force was made towards the Nek to make sure no Boers were slipping out, and on the 23rd the Brigade definitely set out to assault the Nek, in conjunction with Clements.

There had been a diluvial rain-storm all night, so that few of us had had any sleep and all of us a

thorough drenching. Shivering, but merry, we waited two hours at the rendezvous for the mounted troops, whose horses had mostly stampeded in the night, and then marched over a rolling plain to the mouth of the Nek, which is just an abrupt gap in the mountains, flanked on each side by towering bastions of rock. These had been elaborately entrenched, while heavy guns, protected by strong earthworks, were posted in the space between, and pom-poms were ensconced among the lower rocks on the left. The position looked tremendously strong; but, on the other hand, we had overwhelmingly superior artillery, Clements's 5-inch lyddite pieces adding their weight to the field guns; we had infantry whom sangars and rocks had failed to daunt on many another bloody day; and, lastly, we could count on hesitation in the Boers, who had Retief's Nek away behind them, thundered at already by Hunter and the Highland Brigade.

Nothing decisive occurred to-day. There was little scope for *finesse*; it was just a hard persistent workaday fight, the infantry attacking the

entrenched heights, and the artillery covering sangars and gun-redoubts alike with shrapnel and lyddite. For a time the fire of the Boer guns was accurate and troublesome, big shells and pom-pom shells falling among the limbers, led horses, etc., in rear of the ridge from which our artillery fired. One, falling close to our waggon-teams, killed six horses, and wounded the Yeoman holding them. By some 'artful dodging,' however, the danger was evaded, and the only casualty was again among the unlucky 38th Battery—Captain Kelly, who had recently joined them, being severely wounded.

The Boer guns were never silenced; but in the late evening the Royal Irish gained a valuable footing (at the cost of 40 men) on a spur of the right-hand bastion, and retained it all night. It was long after dark before the rattle of musketry, which had been ceaseless all day, slowly guttered out.

But the defence had in reality been more weakened than we knew. All night the Boer laagers behind the Nek were breaking up, and



their transport getting into motion in case of a reverse. Early on the next day (July 24) the Royal Irish, in their own magnificent style, stormed the trenches which were the key to the position on the right, and thence enfiladed the rest. The Wiltshire Regiment backed them up manfully; the lyddite guns, placed in new epaulements built in the night, put the Boer artillery to final rout, and the whole force marched into the captured Nek.

Here there was an unfortunate delay, in order to wait for Hunter, who had had a severe struggle to force Retief's Nek. He joined us on the next day, and the three united columns moved southward down the valley, pushing the Boers before them deeper and deeper into the trap.

To eyes wearied with monotonous tracts of bleak and blackened veldt this rich and beautiful valley, dotted with thriving farms, and teeming with flocks and herds, was a wonderful change and relief. In sharp contrast to its smiling contours were its grim barriers of rock. On both sides the hills were precipitous, here and there assuming



grotesque shapes, with monstrous humps and excrescences; but on the east side and the southern end they rose to a tumbled riot of peaks, tipped at their summits with snow. The pleasure, be it added, was not only æsthetic, for the thriving farms referred to were some of them deserted, and provided a store of the most amazingly fat poultry as a change of diet. On the first evening a luscious row of geese, turkeys, and hens, the fruit of a foray by our mounted gunners, was laid out in the lines and impartially divided by the Adjutant. The same night an aide-de-camp of General Paget bitterly complained to one of our officers that some unknown ruffians had had the audacity to loot the poultry-yard of a very loyal and well-disposed farmer, at whose residence the General had taken up his abode. The officer, though he had shrewd suspicions as to the identity of the said 'ruffians,' was, needless to say, indignantly sympathetic. And, after all, there is reason to think that it was principally the nakedness of the General's larder that caused the storm, and not the alleged loyalty of the farmer!

The end was very near now. Every one of the neks had been forced, and the British cordon was slowly tightened till the Boer army was hemmed in—not inextricably, for Olivier and 1,500 men broke out at the very last; but completely enough to conquer the spirit of the majority. Fouriesburg was occupied on the 26th, and on the 29th General Prinsloo asked for an armistice. It was refused, and thereupon 4,150 Boers laid down their arms. This was the largest capture of Boers made during the war, exceeding by fifty the number taken at Paardeberg. Our guns were left to garrison Fouriesburg, and were not present at the final day's fighting—which, however, was not at all serious—nor at the actual scene of surrender, much to our disappointment.

At Fouriesburg a great camp was formed for the concentration of the prisoners of war, with a view to their despatch to the railway. Paget's Brigade was deputed to escort a batch of 2,000 to Winburg, and accordingly, on August 3, we started back on the same road. To many of us it was very interesting to come in contact with these

prisoners, and verify the common report among our soldiers at the front, and especially those who had themselves been prisoners, that the Boer, when you knew him, was a very good sort. A curious throng they were—old, middle-aged, and ridiculously young—each with a gay blanket and a little bag of possessions, each mounted on a little mouse of a pony, and *each leading another one, and sometimes two* (a most suggestive hint to us in our struggle for a ‘mobility’ which we never properly attained in the whole course of the war), and all addicted to thunderous hymn-singing in the evening when the column had camped.

On the 4th we turned our backs on the ‘happy valley,’ picking up our right section at Slabbert’s Nek, and marching together again south-westwards. On August 9 we were at Winburg, after a great deal of tedious, sultry marching, and on the 10th, in a veritable blizzard of dust, we gained Smalldeed, a station on the main line, and thence took train for Pretoria.

## CHAPTER IX

## THE NORTHERN TRANSVAAL

*August 10—September 28*

PAGET's Brigade had been ordered to the Transvaal, the General having been appointed to the command of the military district extending from Pretoria due north to Pietersburg. The Battery was, it is believed, to have been drafted into some other brigade, but, owing to the General's personal intervention, and to our own immense satisfaction, we were retained under his command. He had our confidence, and he let us repeatedly know that we had his. He had won our affection too, and those two things together mean an infinity in war.

For the rest, after our hard campaigning, we were tough, fit, and cheerful, if somewhat ragged and unkempt, like every one else. We were, however, about twenty men short of our full

complement, through wounds and sickness, and it was gratifying, therefore, to receive at Smal-deel the draft of fresh men sent out from England, whose names are given on pages 20 and 21.

Very pale and clean they looked beside our seasoned selves ; but the African sun and the rude veldt life soon made us all alike.

An accumulation of mails reached us here from Bloemfontein, and were a great solace during the two days' journey in open trucks to Pretoria. It should be mentioned here that we had become adepts in entraining and detraining the Battery, and in the care of horses during a railway journey. The latter duty is no easy one, when no proper horse-boxes are available, and closed vans have to be used. To climb into one of these by a little window to put on nose-bags is an experience not easily forgotten by the adventurous driver who is told off for it. It means a struggle for existence among a reeking crush of hungry animals, with the risk of a nasty kick or stamp, and the certainty of semi-asphyxiation.

At Pretoria, on the 15th, we were inspected

by Lord Roberts at headquarters. A nice question arose as to whether, with a due regard to public propriety, this function could possibly take place by daylight, owing to the condition of the men's breeches. This was decided to be false prudery, however; and in the fierce light of a mid-day sun, rags and all, we unblushingly marched past the Commander-in-Chief. Then we went out of the city to a camping ground, which long usage had made as tainted and unhealthy as many of those at Bloemfontein. Happily we had only one night of it, for by the afternoon of the next day the Brigade had collected, and we started north, roughly following the line of the Pretoria-Pietersburg Railway.

To understand the operations that were beginning, it must be explained that Lord Roberts was just now launching his great movement against the east, towards Middelburg and Komati Poort—a movement co-operated in by Buller from Natal and the south, and ending in large captures of men and material on the Portuguese frontier. General Paget's *rôle* was



to make a diversion to the north, in order to cover the grand advance, and hold in check two substantial forces under Generals Grobler and Erasmus, who were using Pietersburg, an important town 130 miles from Pretoria, as their base. Incidentally, he was to clear the whole country to the north, burning farms, collecting cattle, and generally harrying the enemy. But he was not to court serious engagements, Lord Roberts not wishing to risk the possibility of a reverse on this side, which would compel him to detach reinforcements from his main army. It was this need for caution that, had we known it, was the cause of a good deal of seemingly meaningless trekking in the near future.

It all seems natural enough now, but to us who had had no news of the outside world for seven weeks, and had not yet begun to realise what a protracted period of guerilla warfare was before the British Army, it seemed strange that the very outskirts of the captured capital, not to mention the outlying districts, should be infested with organised bodies of Boers. Yet so



it was ; for the very evening we marched out we had a pitiable story from a picket, of horses stolen in the night, and on the succeeding days we were in constant touch with the enemy.

On the first night (August 16) we had a foretaste of hardships to come in the non-arrival of the transport waggons, which had stuck in a spruit, and the necessity of going to bed without food or blankets. The lack of blankets was not so serious a matter as it would have been in the Orange River Colony, for a decisive change of climate had accompanied our transference to the Transvaal. The nights were still cold, but not with the stringent frosts we had been accustomed to, and the days were now often oppressively hot. The weather remained consistently fine till the end. A much more alarming hitch was that by some oversight we had attached ourselves to the wrong column ; but this error was corrected the next morning by a backward march to Paget's column, in company with which we passed through the range of hills encircling Pretoria, by way of a defile called Wonderboom

Poort, where there was a girth-deep river to ford. Here we entered the southern fringe of the 'bushveldt,' a strange region of long yellow grass, low scrub, and woods of varying extent and density; a parched, waterless country at this season, and, from its natural features, extremely difficult to manœuvre in.

For six weeks from now we performed the most labyrinthine wanderings—marching and counter-marching—sometimes by day, sometimes, in response to a sudden alarm, by night; generally without a glimmering of the end aimed at, and never with a good stand-up fight like those we had had in the Orange River Colony. Every one in the army had some such period to put up with, and we were no worse off than many thousands of others at that very time. None the less, it was a very tiresome, as well as a very toilsome business; and one thing it strongly suggests is that, as far as is prudently possible, every individual in a force should be given an intelligent notion of what he is doing, and why. Much apparently aimless exertion then is proved to have its signifi-

cance and value; and spirits are proportionately higher.

Ten miles out from the Poort we had a brush with the enemy, who fired on us, from several miles away, with a great 40-pounder gun of position. Its huge lumbering projectiles, dropping about with deafening explosions in our close neighbourhood, were very disconcerting; but cover behind a steep kopje was found, and they soon hurtled harmlessly overhead. One of our sections came into action, but the range was hopeless. There was some desultory skirmishing to the front, and a party of guileless Yeomanry, who found a deserted farm and improved the occasion by dining there, were surrounded and captured.

On the 19th, feeling our way slowly forward, we arrived at Waterval, and saw the great barbed-wire cage in which some thousands of British prisoners were kept by the Boers. It stands close to a moderately deep river, where the Battery enjoyed the first bathe it had had since leaving Bloemfontein.

For the next four days (till August 24) we

marched by way of Pienaar's River Station (two gutted houses and a blown-up railway-bridge) to Warmbad, which is seventy miles from Pretoria. On the way there were several little skirmishes with harassing parties of the enemy, and constant vigilance was needed owing to the thick thorny scrub through which we had to advance. Some Yeomanry were wounded, and we once or twice fired a few shells at retreating Boers, but there was no serious resistance. It was in country like this that the care our officers had taken in training ground-scouts bore its full fruit, though it had often before, and notably in the ambush episode at Barkin Kop, had excellent results. The topic deserves a special word, because probably more attention was given to this minor branch of artillery training than is usual in batteries. Five men were permanently told off for the duty, and others were occasionally pressed into the service as well. These men, besides having to forage, find watering-places, and so on, were accustomed to help in the choice of positions for action, to observe the front during action, to

ride ahead on the march, giving warning of obstacles and pointing out the shortest and easiest way, and, lastly, in progress like this, through dense cover, to keep touch with the escort, and generally act as eyes for that vulnerable and delicate machine, a battery of artillery. Theoretically, most of this latter duty belongs to the mounted troops; but it is infinitely wiser and safer to supplement this by spontaneous work from within the battery.

On the way we were joined by Baden-Powell and his mounted column, which pushed on ahead of us to Nylstrom, a village on a range of hills some distance north of Warmbad.

This, it is believed, was in excess of Lord Roberts's intentions, and was accountable for some spasmodic marching and counter-marching on our part, to support threatened communications. The 22nd was a day typical of this period: reveille at three A.M., bivouac at one o'clock after a long march; off again at three in the afternoon in response to a sudden call; an advance of a few hundred yards, and then a two

hours' expectant halt; then a return to camp; and at 10.30 P.M. another sudden alarm and a night march till 3.30 A.M., leading to nothing.

Another night march brought us, on the morning of the 25th, to Warmbad, a curious little settlement built round some hot springs in the middle of the bush, and consisting of a long row of tin bath-houses, an hotel, and a station. After a few days here, we were attached to a flying column under Colonel (now General) Plumer, and after doubling back to Pienaar's River, struck off twenty-five miles to the east of the line to Eland's River, where the Rhodesians and Australians who were with us made a smart capture of a Boer laager, with quantities of rifles, stores and cattle, and some fifty prisoners.

In the midst of this small triumph, came a message from General Paget to hurry back to Warmbad, where he was being besieged by Grobler with a number of big guns brought from Pietersburg. Back we hastened (September 3), covering the forty-five miles in thirty hours, took our share in the defence for two days, but on the



evening of the second (September 6) were despatched on another expedition, under Colonel Hickman, which led us for the fourth time over the road to Pienaar's River, and again by night and with elaborate precautions for secrecy and silence. This time we went further up the line to Haman's Kraal, where the right section was detached to march direct to Waterval, and the left diverged to the west with Colonel Hickman, reaching Zoutpan, and then circling back to Waterval. It was well that the Boers were not present in force during this excursion, for, owing to the density of the bush, at one time the column's various units were rather astray, the Colonel's whereabouts was unknown, and our own escort lost us for an hour. The expedition, as far as could be seen, had no results.

From Waterval, on the 12th, we started off on another flying raid, this time under General Paget himself, who had, by orders of Lord Roberts, evacuated Warmbad, then his extreme northern outpost. (By a singular comedy of errors, Grobler had on his side also decided to raise the siege,



with the strange result that Boers and British withdrew their forces on the same night, both using infinite care to conceal their retirement by enjoining silence and forbidding lights.)

The present trek was westward to Hebron and the Crocodile River, and was more successful than the last, for cattle were captured, farms burnt, and prisoners taken. We returned with our booty to Waterval on the 18th, and spent two days there, while rumours of a return home, which had been in the air for some time, grew more definite.

Before they came true, however, there was one more arduous trek before us, to the east, by way of a change, where Erasmus, another Boer General afoot in these regions, was thought to be striking away with a view to cutting Lord Roberts's communications with Komati Poort. It was now arranged that Plumer, from Pienaar's River, should fall upon him from the north, and that Paget, from Waterval, should cut off his retreat on the south.

We began (Sept. 21) with the usual silent night march, for the affair was to be a surprise, and

followed it by another trek on the next day lasting from three A.M. to three P.M., one of the hardest and hottest days we ever went through. An amusing incident occurred after we had camped, for scouts came galloping in to say that a force with guns was approaching on the left, and had fired on them. We turned out our guns instantly, all agog, tired as we were, to strike a blow at the elusive enemy after these weeks of abortive meanderings. Alas, for our hopes! The force sighted turned out to be Plumer's, which had made its junction with us a day too soon, and had, it appeared, also taken *us* for Boers, and had sent forward its guns, the Canadian Artillery, with deadly intent. Happily the mutual misunderstanding was dissipated bloodlessly.

Proceeding in company, the columns collected vast quantities of cattle and sheep, but did not come into touch with Erasmus till they reached Sybrand's Kraal, a wonderfully rich and picturesque little spot, with streams and waving corn and blooming orchards—a delicious oasis in the arid bush. Here General Paget opened negotiations

with Erasmus for a surrender of the latter's force, in view of the flight of Kruger and the general collapse of the Boer arms. Erasmus replied that he could not accept the British view of the situation, and would like an interview with Botha, his Commander-in-Chief. This was granted, and he and General Paget left for Pretoria, while a sort of partial armistice was arranged.

It was now, at midnight on September 26, that the Battery received orders to go back to Pretoria, and thence home, with the whole of the C.I.V. Starting on the morning of the 27th, we marched the thirty miles to Waterval almost without stopping, and on the 28th were drawn up to take farewell of General Paget, who had returned that far from Pretoria. He addressed us as follows :

‘ Major McMicking, Officers, Non-commissioned Officers, and Men :

‘ Lord Roberts has decided to send you home, and I have come to say good-bye and to express my regret at having to part with you. We have been together now for some months, and have

had rough times, but in its many engagements your Battery has always done its work well. Before my promotion I commanded a battalion, and I know what a heart-breaking thing it is to lead gallant fellows up a strong position unsupported by artillery ; and I made up my mind that, if ever I had a separate command, I would never advance infantry without an artillery support. I was fortunate enough to have your Battery with me, and it is very gratifying to know that everything we attempted has been successful. Owing to the excellent practice made by your guns, you have the satisfaction of knowing that you have been the cause of great saving of lives to the Infantry, and, at times, the Cavalry. I am sorry to lose you ; and I shall miss you very much. There is more hard work to be done, and you cannot realise what it is to me to lose a body of men whom I knew I could always rely upon. There are many episodes, some of which will remain a lasting memory to me. One in particular I might refer to, when, two days after leaving

Lindley, two companies of Munster Fusiliers came unexpectedly under heavy rifle-fire at short range ;<sup>1</sup> your guns coming smartly into action dispersed the enemy with a few well-directed shrapnel. It was one of the smartest pieces of work I have ever seen. On another occasion, outside Bethlehem (I forget the name of the place), in a rear-guard action with de Wet, you advanced under a heavy cross-fire of shrapnel, and rendered splendid service by silencing two guns and smashing a third. On that day not a single life was lost on our side. On still another occasion, outside Bethlehem, under heavy shell-fire from five guns in a strong position, the steadiness with which your guns were served would have done credit to the finest troops in the Empire. There are other incidents that I might mention, but these three occur to me specially at the moment. You are returning home to receive a hearty welcome, which you undoubtedly deserve ; and I hope you will sometimes think of me, as I

<sup>1</sup> The ambush affair at Barkin Kop, July 3.

certainly shall of you ; and now you can tell your friends what I think of you. I wish you a safe and a pleasant voyage. Good-bye.'

That address made us very proud, and deepened the regret with which we parted from the speaker. We cheered him with all our might, and then went on our way to Pretoria, where we joined the camp of the C.I.V. Infantry and Mounted Infantry, so that, at the eleventh hour, and for the first time, the three branches of the C.I.V. regiment were united under one command. General Paget went back to his Brigade for the same sort of weary but necessary work which was to last for a year and a half longer before the two provinces were finally conquered and peace declared.

We had only just enough of it to know how intensely weary it was, and how lucky we were to be quit of it. Nobody dreamed at the time that it would last so long, and indeed there was a general feeling abroad, strengthened by the over-sanguine estimates of those in authority, that the end was near, and that it was merely a question of which troops should be recalled first. In any case it



would be affectation to say that we were not heartily glad to be going home, though we became more sceptical as to the imminence of peace as we travelled down the 1,000 miles of line to Capetown, and saw entrenched stations and heard ceaseless rumours of war. But we never heard a whisper of envy at our good fortune from the various troops we passed, sick as they were of the war. All of us have felt since that we might well have stayed longer to share their labour, and that we received more than our due share of the honour and glory.

The whole Regiment embarked on the 'Aurania' on October 7 and landed in England on the 29th. What a magnificent welcome it received from the great City which sent it forth, is fresh in the memories of all.

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Of members of the H.A.C. in the Battery :

*Major McMicking* was mentioned in despatches, made a Companion of the Order of St. Michael and St. George, and was granted the honorary rank of Major in the Army.



*Captain Budworth* was mentioned in despatches, and received the Brevet of Major.

*Lieutenant Lowe* was mentioned in despatches, made a Companion of the D.S.O., and was granted the honorary rank of Lieutenant in the Army.

*Lieutenant Bayley* was mentioned in despatches and granted the honorary rank of Lieutenant in the Army.

*Lieutenant Duncan* was mentioned in despatches and granted the honorary rank of Lieutenant in the Army.

*Sergeants Dixon, Taylor, and Wood* were mentioned in despatches and received the Distinguished Conduct Medal.

*Sergeant Abraham, Bombardier Chambers, and Driver Ward* were mentioned in despatches.

The following afterwards obtained Commissions in Regular Regiments :

*Corporal Elam* (Lieut. in 68th Batt. R.F.A.).

*Gunner Trapp* (Lieut. Royal Irish Regiment).

*Driver McDougall* (Lieut. 3rd Hussars).

*Driver Tremearne*<sup>1</sup> (Lieut. 5th Batt. Royal Warwickshire Regiment).

The following afterwards served, with Commissions, in the Imperial Yeomanry :

*Corporal Clifford*, as Captain.

*Sergeant Wood*

*Gunner Lorimer*

*Driver J. W. Chambers*

„ *Storer*

„ *Ward*<sup>2</sup>

„ *McDougall*<sup>3</sup>

as Lieutenants.

*Gunner W. S. Herbert* afterwards served as a Lieutenant in Marshall's Horse.

The following served afterwards, without Commissions, in the Imperial Yeomanry :

*Driver Mordin*, as Sergeant.

*Driver H. V. Ramsey*, as Trooper.

Eight men were invalided home.

*Gunner Dyson* (1st City of Lon. Vol. Art.) died in hospital at Pretoria, October 1900.

<sup>1</sup> Died of enteric on April 14, 1902.

<sup>2</sup> Killed in action on February 5, 1902.

<sup>3</sup> Transferred afterwards to the 3rd Hussars.

For further individual details see Chapter XII. and the Appendix.

The following is an extract from the official *résumé* of the evidence given by Major-General A. H. Paget, before the War Commission, on February 25, 1903 :

‘General Paget stated his views as to the shooting and marching capacity, and the horsemanship and horsemastership of the troops, and referred to the high standard of the C.I.V. Battery.’

## CHAPTER X

## MOUNTED INFANTRY DETACHMENT

THE Honourable Artillery Company originally contributed twenty-four members (the full number allowed) to the C.I.V. Mounted Infantry. Roughly speaking, that was one fourteenth of the total strength of this Corps, which numbered 350, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Cholmondeley. The names and ranks of the H.A.C. men were as follows :

*Lieutenant B. Moeller*

*Sergeant G. J. O'Connell*

„ *A. S. Loder*

*Corporal P. C. Cooper*

„ *G. F. T. Murnane*

*Lance-Corporal G. St. J. Lobb*

*Private C. E. R. Betteley*

„ *A. E. Briggs*

„ *S. H. Byron*

„ *A. S. Clare*

„ *G. A. Cohen*

„ *R. Corfield*

„ *E. A. Dyer*

„ *C. O. Greenwell* (Commissioned later as  
Lieutenant)

„ *F. G. Hazell*

„ *J. E. Humphreys*

„ *D. A. M. Lewis*

„ *A. H. Moeller*

„ *C. F. Nesham* (Commissioned later as  
Lieutenant)

„ *C. F. Osmond*

„ *H. W. Perkins* (promoted to be Lance-  
Corporal)

„ *G. E. F. Pollard*

„ *G. D. Robbins*

„ *T. H. Toynbee*

*Draft*

The following H.A.C. men were in the reinforcing Draft which embarked for South Africa on the 'Ulstermore' on July 12, 1900 :

*Private R. Bassett*

„ *E. N. Carr*

„ *A. G. Colville*

„ *F. Fowler*

„ *A. L. Ladenburg*

„ *A. B. Morcom*

The Corps was divided into two companies of four sections each, and our men formed the right half of No. 1 Section (Lieutenant Moeller's) of No. 1 Company.

In reading the following description it should be remembered that the C.I.V. Mounted Infantry very rarely acted in its entirety as a complete unit in South Africa. Like all other corps it was frequently split up and its various fractions sent out with different columns. It would be out of place in a record of this character to describe the whole

work done by the Corps. That may be found fully and admirably described by Messrs. Guillum Scott and Geoffrey McDowell in their book on the work of the C.I.V. Mounted Infantry. As soon as the Corps reaches the front, we content ourselves with following the fortunes of that portion of it in which the H.A.C. contingent was included.

The Mounted Infantry were sworn in on January 4, embarked on the 'Briton' on the 13th, and, after a rapid voyage, landed at Capetown on the 29th. Here they were sent to Green Point Camp to be equipped with horses and saddlery, and to complete the details of mobilisation. Much to the delight of the men, they were told by Lord Roberts that they would be sent straight to the front as soon as they were ready. And so it happened that in the remarkably short time of ten days, six sections out of eight found themselves entraining for the north. This would have been altogether impossible had they brought English horses with them, but was feasible with the seasoned native horses which were supplied to them. But, even so, it was admittedly an experi-



ment, for, besides being a composite body, drawn from about forty different Volunteer battalions, they had had practically no training in mounted work, the ten days being fully occupied by the multifarious fatigues entailed by arrival and the process of equipment. Still, there was the opportunity, and officers and men snatched ardently at it.

Starting on February 8, with a hearty send-off from the citizens of Capetown, they detrained at Enslin (of bloody memory), and were there brought into the scheme of Lord Roberts's general advance. The period was that of the preliminary movements designed to cut off Cronje's retreat to Bloemfontein, and leading to his surrender at Paardeberg.

The first work of the Mounted Infantry was to act as scouts for General Colvile's 9th Division. Advancing with this division, they were at Ramdam on February 13, at Riet River on the 14th, and at Klip River on the 15th. There, half an hour after off-saddling, they were ordered to detach a hundred men, of whom the H.A.C. contingent

formed part, to act as scouts for General Wavell's (the 15th) Brigade in a movement on Jacobsdal. This was their baptism of fire, and they took it well. The position was vigorously attacked and carried, Lance-Corporal Lobb, of the H.A.C., being the first man in the town. Private Nesham, of the H.A.C., was wounded in the arm, and was *hors de combat* for six weeks. Lord Roberts telegraphed to England in reference to this engagement: 'The City of London Imperial Volunteers came under fire for first time yesterday under Colonel Cholmondeley at Jacobsdal, and behaved most gallantly.'

After two days' rest the Mounted Infantry went on to Paardeberg, and found the bombardment of Cronje's laager just beginning. Their work was confined to finding pickets and supplying orderlies for a variety of duties. Many of our own men acted as telegraph orderlies to Lord Roberts, and as such obtained a good view of the proceedings which preceded the surrender. It was a time of great hardship, for rain was incessant and rations were short, owing to the capture of a large British

convoy at Riet River, in the rear. On the night of the 26th our men were on picket-duty round the beleaguered army, and on the 27th, when Cronje surrendered, they were told off to take part in escorting the prisoners to Modder River Station, Lieutenant Moeller and another officer being in especial charge of certain prominent Boer leaders.

This mission performed, they rejoined the general advance at Osfontein, near Paardeberg, on March 4, arriving in camp in the midst of the worst rain-storm yet experienced.

Acting as escort to a brigade division of artillery, they left Osfontein on March 7 for the movement on Bloemfontein, shared in the heavy action of Poplar's Grove and in the less serious one of Driefontein, and, after some exhausting marches in continuously wet weather, arrived at Bloemfontein on March 14. Here they spent a fortnight on Brand's Kop, a hill near the town, resting from their labours ; but, unfortunately, also suffering from the enteric, which was now beginning to make such havoc in Lord Roberts's forces.

On March 28 they marched out with Wavell's Brigade for the general attack on the Boer position at Karee Kloof, and shared in the hot engagement that took place there before the enemy were dislodged.

There was now a long but by no means an idle halt, while preparations for the advance to Pretoria were being made. The Corps, owing to sickness, was very short of men, and those who were sound and well were on constant outpost and patrol duty, for the country teemed with small parties of Boers. Nesham, who had been hit at Jacobsdal, rejoined the section here.

The great advance (it is well to remind the reader), when at last begun, was triple in character, the main body moving straight forward by Kroonstad for the north, and two strong wings clearing the country on either side to right and left. No. 2 Company of the C.I.V. Mounted Infantry was attached to the right or eastern wing; No. 1 Company, including our own men, to the central or main body, which left Karee Kloof on May 3, being still attached to Wavell's

Brigade (the 15th) as part of General Tucker's (the 7th) Division.

In the northward march they acted, alternately with the other mounted troops of the Division, as advance, flank, or rear guard. On the first day they happened to be advance guard, and after moving over a troublesome country, thick with mimosa bush, fell in with the enemy near Brandfort, and were allotted that unpleasant task of 'drawing fire.' Two men (of the London Rifle Brigade) were killed by shrapnel before the end was effected. After some sharp fighting the enemy retired, however, and the British bivouacked at Zuurfontein.

On May 5, after a day's rest, there was another action at Vet River, and four days later a third at Zand River, where the company was employed on the right flank.

Kroonstad was reached on May 12. It had been evacuated by the Boers, and more than a week was spent there before the advance was resumed on the 21st. Thenceforward little resistance was met with, even at the Vaal River

where it had been expected, but which was crossed without opposition on the 27th by way of Viljoen's Drift. Klip River was passed, and Germiston occupied on the 29th, the Company camping near the Simmer and Jack Mine. Our men were among the first troops to enter Johannesburg, which formally capitulated on May 31st; but they did not reach Pretoria till June 5th, the first place of any importance which they had not entered in the vanguard of Roberts's advance.

They spent a fortnight at Pretoria encamped on the race-course, and principally occupied in guarding the vast collection of remounts which were collected from neighbouring farmers at this period. Greenwell was now given a commission in the C.I.V. battalion.

Just at this period the Mounted Infantry were frequently split up into detachments and given different work. Some of the H.A.C. men, for instance, were sent out to Diamond Hill, and, though arriving too late for the actual battle, received the clasp for it as being within the prescribed area.



Again, when the time came to leave Pretoria, Lieutenant Moeller and the bulk of the H.A.C. men, after being refitted with horses and clothing, started south again, on June 19, with the 21st Brigade, under General Bruce Hamilton, to take part in a sweeping movement through the eastern part of the two colonies, and finally to join in that same big concerted operation which was described in recounting the adventures of the Battery, and which culminated in the surrender of Prinsloo. Let us first follow the movements of this detachment of our men.

General Hunter was in supreme command, having taken it over from General Ian Hamilton, who had broken his collar-bone. Among his troops was the C.I.V. Infantry Battalion, and in it of course another contingent of H.A.C. men. Heidelberg, Villiersdorp, Frankfort, Reitz, and Bethlehem were successively reached without any serious opposition. (At Frankfort, it should be mentioned, Lieutenant Moeller left the corps to be attached to Colonel Bainbridge's Mounted Infantry. And at the same place the C.I.V.



Infantry Battalion was detached from the force and sent to garrison Heilbron.)

At Bethlehem they entered the investing ring of troops that were to surround Prinsloo, and to Bruce Hamilton, their General, were allotted Naauwport Nek and the Golden Gate as the defiles to be closed or forced. On July 21st Spitz Kop, at the mouth of the nek, was stormed, and a junction afterwards effected with General McDonald's Brigade. The united brigades then tackled the nek, meeting with stubborn and prolonged resistance, but eventually carried it, and were able to work round to the Golden Gate in time to block that exit to the retreating enemy. All the neks had now been forced, and the surrender took place, as described in Chapter VIII. ; the H.A.C. contingent, unlike the Battery, being present at the final scenes, which were very impressive. Like the Battery, they were next sent off to Winburg to act as escort to the prisoners on the journey back to the railway, and have equally vivid recollections of the blinding sandstorms encountered on that journey, which

ended at Smaldeel on August 13th. Here the Draft from England met them, included in which were the H.A.C. men whose names were given on page 127.

They were now sent to Pretoria by train, and encamped outside the town for six weeks, during which they were employed on various sorts of picket and patrol work, until October 3rd, when the whole of the C.I.V. turned southwards for home.

To revert now to those of our men who did not take part in these latter operations under General Hunter. From Pretoria, in the latter part of June, they were sent among a party of details of No. 1 Company to Kroonstad, where they drew remounts and were attached to Colonel Hickman's flying column. At the beginning of July they trekked to Ventersburg, and then back by a forced march to Kroonstad, where they were entrained for Pretoria, and arrived on July 10, to be sent out at once to the west to Nitral's Nek, where a force of Lincolns and Scots Greys had been cut up and captured. Their column was

too late to retrieve the situation, and their next expedition was northwards to Haman's Kraal and Waterval, on the Pietersburg line, and back to Pretoria by way of Silverton. Here they were split up, some going to Irene and some to Com-mando Nek (Magaliesburg Range), and it was not till August 18 that they finally returned to Pretoria and joined the general camp of the C.I.V. Mounted Infantry, remaining there till the end. Nesham, meanwhile (who was one of this party), received a Commission in the C.I.V. Battalion.

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*Lieutenant Moeller* was twice mentioned in despatches, afterwards serving with a Commission in the Second Battalion Middlesex Regiment. He died of wounds received in action at Holland, near Standerton, on December 23, 1901.

*Lieutenant Nesham* was mentioned in despatches and given the honorary rank of Lieutenant in the Army. He afterwards served as a Captain in the Imperial Yeomanry.

*Lieutenant Greenwell* received the honorary rank of Lieutenant in the Army, and afterwards obtained a Commission in the Third Battalion Durham Light Infantry. He was mentioned in despatches.

*Sergeant O'Connell* afterwards served as Captain in the Imperial Yeomanry, and received the honorary rank of Captain in the Army.

*Lance-Corporal P. C. Cooper* was mentioned in despatches.

*Private Dyer*

*Private Robbins*

{ afterwards served as Lieutenants in the Imperial Yeomanry. Lieutenant Robbins was killed in action at Standerton on August 22, 1901.

For further individual details, see Chapter XII., and the Appendix.

## CHAPTER XI

## INFANTRY DETACHMENT

THE names of the men originally contributed to the C.I.V. Infantry Battalion were as follows :

*Lieutenant E. Treffry*

*Colour-Sergeant R. Palmer*

*Civil Surgeon E. L. M. Rusby*

*Bugler S. V. Hunt*

*Private G. J. H. Brown*

„ *C. J. Brymer*

„ *J. C. Dale*

„ *R. S. Hutchings*

„ *G. R. Jackson*

„ *S. H. Little*

„ *D. R. Morford*

„ *A. R. Page*

„ *J. W. Portch*

*Private E. A. J. Seccombe*

„ *F. W. Shorter*

„ *R. G. Shorter*

„ *A. G. Simpson*

„ *H. P. B. Taylor*

„ *L. E. Wilton*

„ *A. L. Wood*

*Draft*

The following H.A.C. men were in the reinforcing Draft which embarked for South Africa on July 12, 1900, on the 'Ulstermore':

*Private E. K. Brown*

„ *S. C. Jones*

„ *E. A. McKechnie*

„ *C. H. Paine*

„ *L. H. Rusby*

„ *R. A. Woolner*

Lieutenant Treffry was in charge of the left half of C Company, and the rest of the H.A.C. men formed part of No. 4 Section of that half company.

The same preliminary caution applies here as it did with the Mounted Infantry. Fractions of the Battalion were frequently separated and doing different work ; but, unless it is otherwise stated, account is only taken in this narrative of the doings of our own men.

They left England on January 20, 1900, landed at Capetown on February 16, and four days afterwards were despatched by train (with the whole Battalion, under Colonel MacKinnon) to Orange River, for a spell of work on the lines of communication. C Company was sent thence to Wittiputs, seven miles south of Belmont, and the half company with which we are concerned was posted at Fincham Farm for five weeks. Our men thus took no part in the fighting at Prieska, where some of the Battalion were engaged ; but their position was no sinecure, for the country round was only nominally conquered, and was full of open disaffection. Rebel farms had to be watched, patrols regularly sent out by both night and day, and constant watchfulness sustained. The work was hard, but on the whole seems to



have been very enjoyable. It came to an end on March 30, with an order for the Battalion, whose various companies had been much scattered, to concentrate once more at Orange River and proceed by train to the front. There was a delay, however, of ten days at Naauwport, which were spent in practising battalion drill, field firing, and route marching; and of three more at Springfontein. Here marching began in earnest, eight continuous days of it; till they reached Bloemfontein on April 23, and obtained a glimpse of their mounted infantry comrades who had recently come in from their Paardeberg campaign.

Two days later, after a well-earned rest, the whole Battalion marched to Glen and were now literally at the 'front,' and in presence of the enemy. On the first night eight H.A.C. men, under Corporal Taylor, formed the southernmost outpost.

This was the period when Lord Roberts was gathering himself for the advance to Pretoria. In that advance, it will be remembered that part of the Mounted Infantry of the C.I.V. accompanied

the central or main body. The Infantry, including our own men, now joined the right wing and were incorporated in the 21st (General Bruce Hamilton's) Brigade. There were three days at Glen, and then the Brigade marched away to the east, taking up Broadwood's cavalry on the way. On the 30th they were at Schanskraal, and on May 1, near Jacobsrust, came in contact with the enemy, and joined Ian Hamilton's force, which had already had two days' fighting.

Here our men were under fire for the first time—a long-range rifle-fire—and behaved steadily and well. They marched the long distance of eighteen miles that day, and at the end of it were on outpost duty for the night, during which they captured a spy. The nights had begun to be very cold, with heavy dews.

Their Brigade now became part of Ian Hamilton's Division, and began to march north on May 3, pushing the Boers before them. On the fourth there was a fight at Welkom, in which our men had their first experience of a hot shell-fire, lying down in a mealie field while the artillery duel

raged. They afterwards attacked the Boer position, but found it evacuated by the time they arrived. The day, which included sixteen miles' marching, was a very trying one, but was borne admirably.

The 5th took them to Winburg, and the 6th to a camping-ground ten miles north of it, where they stayed two days. From here Lieutenant Treffry had to be sent back to Winburg, sick with dysentery. The rest of our men were present at the fight at Zand River, whither they marched on the 9th and 10th, and found the Boers in force. On the 10th they were afoot for thirteen hours, marching and fighting. On the 12th, after two more arduous days, they joined the main army again at Kroonstad. Here Lieutenant Treffry rejoined his company, having in his zeal utilised every possible means of conveyance, riding in a railway-trolley pushed by Kaffirs from Winburg to Smalldaal, and in a Cape cart thence to Kroonstad.

On May 15, Ian Hamilton's Division again started off east to clear the right flank, and in

three days arrived at Lindley without opposition, taking the same road that the Battery travelled by in its opening trek a month later. The last day's march was a very heavy one, and was topped—for the H.A.C. section, among others—with outpost duty. It should be mentioned that very strong outposts were habitually used in this Boer-ridden region, involving a heavy tax on the infantry, and accordingly on our men, who, from all accounts, rarely got more than one night in three to themselves. This particular one was exceptionally lively, for prowling Boers managed to get inside the line of pickets, and gave a good deal of trouble.

The next stage was a three days' march (May 20–22) to Heilbron, with no very serious opposition, but under a very severe strain from lack of food, owing to the slowness of the convoy. The second day, of eighteen miles' hard tramping, was done on a cup of coffee at starting. The enemy, after a slight demonstration, deserted Heilbron, and the Division marched through it and on to Spitz Kop on the 23rd. On the 25th, the C.I.V.

Battalion was part of the rear-guard, which was attacked by 800 Boers. C Company was deployed with another to support the Sussex Regiment, but the enemy lost heart when our guns opened, and drew off. On the same evening Vredefort Road (on the railway) was reached, and Lord Roberts's main army rejoined for the second time.

The Division now crossed over and took its place on the left flank instead of the right, passed the Vaal by wading on the 26th, and rapidly marched due north towards Johannesburg for three uneventful days. On the 29th, just beyond Doorn Kop, and at the close of a long day's march, the Boers at last made a vigorous stand, and afforded the C.I.V. Battalion the best chance they had yet had of showing their mettle.

The instructions given to Colonel MacKinnon were, briefly, to advance in attack formation towards the north-west, engaging the enemy wherever they resisted. The country was open and undulating for the most part, but was dotted with several kopjes, two of which, on the right and left of the line of advance, were strongly held by the

Boers with field guns, pom-poms, and riflemen. As soon as the Battalion was extended in the open it came under a heavy shell and rifle fire; but it accomplished its work with admirable steadiness, taking every advantage of cover, yet pushing on resolutely, and in the end storming both kopjes and driving the Boers from the whole position after four hours' continuous fighting. The H.A.C. men were on the extreme left flank during the whole day, and consequently had the farthest distance to travel, in addition to the item of fighting. They must have covered at least twenty miles in the day, for General MacKinnon (in his 'Diary of the C.I.V.') gives eighteen miles as the general distance traversed by the Battalion, apart altogether from the fight. Their company reached the camping ground last of all, and again it was their turn to do outpost duty at night. It should be mentioned that in the course of the day they were fired on from the farm where Jameson and the 'raiders' surrendered. The casualties for the Battalion were one officer and eleven men wounded; none of them H.A.C. men.



On the next day there was a short march to Florida, where messages of congratulation from General Ian Hamilton and Lord Roberts were read to the Battalion on parade. Here is an extract from the official despatch on the action, written by General Smith-Dorrien, who commanded the infantry :

‘The features of the day were the attacks of the Gordon Highlanders and the C.I.V. That of the C.I.V. convinced me that this corps, at any rate, of our volunteers, is as skilled as the most skilful of our regulars at skirmishing.’

The advance on Pretoria was then begun, Johannesburg being only skirted, not entered. On June 5 the capital of the Transvaal was reached, and in the afternoon the Battalion marched past Lord Roberts. Since leaving Springfontein they had covered 523 miles in forty marching days, a most remarkable performance, which was highly praised by the Commander-in-Chief.

Rest was urgently needed, but unhappily it could not be given them. South to Irene on



June 6, north-east to Garsfontein on the 8th, then west to Donker Hoek on the 11th, where the Boers were found in force. There was a long day's skirmishing, in which the enemy slowly retired to their main position on Diamond Hill. Among other casualties, one of the H.A.C. men, Lance-Corporal Little, was severely wounded.

On the next day there was fought the important battle of Diamond Hill, leading to the final retreat of the main Boer forces eastward towards Komati Poort. The formidable position that had to be stormed—three miles of rocky and precipitous kopjes—the deadly fire that swept the approaches to it, and the gallant conduct of the British troops, including the C.I.V. who were acting on the centre—these are matters well known to the public. It is only necessary to say that our men were in the supporting line during the first half of the day, but joined the front firing-line later, when it was finally strengthened for the assault. They were lucky in having no casualties, those of the whole

Battalion numbering nineteen, two killed and seventeen wounded.

The neighbourhood of Pretoria having been cleared of the enemy, Ian Hamilton's Division was ordered back to Pretoria, and arrived on June 16 ; but again no real rest was given them, for, on the 19th, they began another long march (the same that our men in the Mounted Infantry engaged in) southward to the Vaal, by way of Rietfontein, Springs, and Heidelberg ; the last place being evacuated by the Boers, after a little sniping and skirmishing, on June 23. Here General Ian Hamilton broke his collar-bone, and General Hunter took command of the Division. The march was resumed on the 27th, the Vaal crossed near Villiersdorp, and Frankfort reached on July 1.

A force, including our men, was now detached (July 4) to escort a convoy to Heilbron, under the command of Colonel MacKinnon himself. It was a delicate and dangerous undertaking, for the country swarmed with Boers who unceasingly harassed the escort and the long cumbrous convoy ; but it was successfully accomplished in

two days, twenty-one miles being covered on the second.

The almost unremitting exertions of the last two and a half months had reduced the C.I.V. to rags, footsoreness, and general exhaustion. Barely half the strength was fit for duty, and several of our own men had been left behind sick. It was decided, none too soon, therefore, that they should remain to recuperate at Heilbron, acting as garrison; and during the three weeks' rest that ensued they made rapid recovery. Our men were on outpost at Kaffir Kraal for the whole period. Meanwhile, Prinsloo was being surrounded on the Basuto Border, and de Wet had escaped from the great trap, as described in Chapter VIII., and, moving rapidly and audaciously among a host of enemies, had cut the line and captured a train near his favourite Honingspruit, and was now reported to be moving north towards Heilbron. The district round was becoming more and more infested with roving bands of Boers, and, on July 23, the order was given to evacuate Heilbron and remove the garrison to Krugersdorp. The

transference by train (under very great difficulties) took three days.

On July 28, the Battalion was ordered to join General Smith-Dorrien at Bank, twenty miles to the south-west. This it did, and then marched on with the whole force to Frederickstad (July 31) and bivouacked on some rising ground.

At 7.30 on the next morning (August 1) two Boers, under the white flag, were ushered in to Colonel MacKinnon (as he relates), and demanded the immediate surrender of his force. They were politely referred to headquarters, and shortly afterwards a fierce Boer attack was made on the camp, which had been partly surrounded during the darkness. Fortunately, the approach of the Boers was discovered in time—and discovered, it is pleasant to record, by H.A.C. men, who were on outpost duty that night, and reported suspicious signs to Lieutenant Treffry when he visited the sentries on his round. But for this the camp might have been completely surrounded, and serious disaster suffered; for the Battalion's bivouac was at some little distance from the rest of the force. As it

was, there was a very sharp little fight, in which two men were killed, and four wounded, before the Boers were beaten off.

A week was spent here on very short rations, and in the presence of the enemy. De Wet, meanwhile, was steadily trekking north with various pursuers at his heels, had crossed the Vaal and was moving on the Gatsrand Hills. The C.I.V.'s (under Smith-Dorrien as before) were now sent to assist in trying to cut him off, and marched away to Welverdiend by night with great secrecy, on August 8. Here part of them were detached on a separate mission, but the rest, including C Company, marched, on the 12th, to Rietvlei, and, on the 13th, twenty-five solid miles to Zwartkop, in order to draw near to Lord Methuen, who was fighting and chasing de Wet. There followed two more days of sixteen miles apiece, and then it was announced at Leeuwfontein (on the 15th) that de Wet had escaped once more, this time through Oliphant's Nek into the Magaliesburg mountains.

However, other work was promptly found for

our men, who, on the next day, were despatched to Brakfontein to relieve Colonel Hore. This officer had been for ten days invested on a kopje with five hundred men (Rhodesians and Australians), and had kept at bay two thousand Boers with three guns by sheer bluff and indomitable pluck. His besiegers decamped when our force appeared, and the position where this magnificent defence was made could be examined.

Two marches, on the 17th and 18th, brought the force to Rustenburg in the Magaliesburg mountains, and thence to Hoedspruit and Wolhuter's Kop (not to be confused with the Bethlehem hill of the same name). Sudden orders now came for Colonel MacKinnon to take half the whole force back to Pretoria, and, on August 23, our men re-entered the capital for the third and last time, having completed just 1,000 miles of marching since leaving Springfontein in April. They were reviewed by Lord Roberts, and then established at Arcadia Camp, their headquarters for the next six weeks, in the course of which parts of the Battalion were



engaged on various errands and duties at different times. The H.A.C. men, with the rest of C Company, were, on September 6, sent out to Daspoort range, about three miles outside the town, to do outpost duty, and remained there until the whole of the C.I.V. started homewards on October 3.

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*Lieutenant Treffry* was granted the honorary rank of Lieutenant in the Army, afterwards served as Captain in the Imperial Yeomanry, and was severely wounded at Bethel, May 1901.

*Private Little* afterwards obtained a Commission in the Second Battalion Connaught Rangers.

*Colour-Sergeant Palmer* was mentioned in despatches.

*Private Hutchings* died of enteric on board the ss. 'Aurania' during the voyage home.

For further individual information, see Chapter XII., and Appendix.



## CHAPTER XII

MISCELLANEOUS SERVICES—CONCLUDING  
SUMMARY*Miscellaneous Services*

HAVING now reviewed the history of our three organised contingents in the C.I.V., it remains to consider the services of our members in the Imperial Yeomanry, Regular Regiments, and, in a few cases, Colonial Corps.

The men concerned (sixty in number) fall into two main classes. A third of them—twenty-one, to be precise—had already served in one or other of the branches of the C.I.V., and are named at the end of their respective chapters. Going to the front a second time, most of them joined the Imperial Yeomanry, but six of them, viz. :

*B. Moeller*, Middlesex Regiment,

*C. O. Greenwell*, Durham Light Infantry

*S. H. Little*, Connaught Rangers,

*H. W. T. Elam*, 68th Batt. R.F.A.,

*H. G. Trapp*, Royal Irish Regiment,

*R. H. Tremearne*, Royal Warwickshire Regt.,

passed direct, with Commissions, into the Regular forces. Another exception was W. S. Herbert, who received a Commission in Marshall's Horse, and was severely wounded, but returned to the front again after his recovery.

The remaining thirty-nine had not previously belonged to the C.I.V., and with four exceptions took service for the first time in the Imperial Yeomanry. To dispose of these exceptions at once, chief among them was Captain (now Major) Wray, R.F.A. (now commanding A Battery), who had been Adjutant of the H.A.C. for five years, and in that capacity had won the respect and hearty good will of all of us. When war broke out he was appointed to the Second Brigade Ammunition Column for the Cavalry and R.H.A., and afterwards became Adjutant and Acting

Brigade Major of the First Brigade R.H.A. Among many other engagements he was present at the action of Sanna's Post. He was promoted to Major on March 15, 1900.

R. W. Allen, E. Hayward, and C. T. Flick were the other exceptions. Allen obtained a Commission at the outset in the 8th Hussars, and had two continuous years' campaigning with them. Hayward enlisted in that famous irregular regiment, the Imperial Light Horse; and Flick enlisted on the outbreak of war in that equally distinguished corps, the South African Light Horse, and went through the whole of Buller's campaign for the relief of Ladysmith, and the subsequent operations to the north, through Natal and the Eastern Transvaal. He has published an extremely racy and graphic diary of his experiences, entitled 'Twelve Months with General Buller in South Africa.' He afterwards served again as a Lieutenant in the Imperial Yeomanry.

Summaries of the individual service of all these sixty men are included in the alphabetical Appendix at the end of the book—summaries,

that is, which are as complete as our researches can make them; for, though pains have been taken to gather all possible facts, in certain instances information, from no fault of the Editors, has been lacking.

In this chapter it is proposed to take a general survey of the miscellaneous work, noting salient points, and distinguishing certain groups of men who went out together and had similar adventures.

The majority took service in the second levy of Imperial Yeomanry, which was sent out in the first quarter of the year 1901, and gradually replaced the original levies of 1900. In one way or another we were represented in all the principal campaigns and drives of the last fourteen months of the guerilla war, and in many of the principal actions, such as Brakenlaagte, Vlakfontein, Moedwill, Tweefontein. Three groups of men are large and important enough to justify a tolerably full and connected account of their doings.

*Contingent of Officers in the 21st Battalion I.Y.*

The first was a party of six who received Commissions in the 21st Battalion I.Y., namely:

*Captain E. Treffry*, 82nd Company

*Lieutenant C. F. Nesham*, senior subalt. 82nd  
Company

*Lieutenant H. B. Clifford*, 80th Company

*Lieutenant A. E. Wood*, 81st Company

*Lieutenant D. G. Robbins*, 83rd Company

*Lieutenant G. F. D. McConkey*, 83rd Company.

They left England with their Battalion on March 14, 1901, and landed on April 5. They were sent up country on the same night to Elandsfontein, and thence to Standerton, where they joined Rimington's Column, which, with others, under Generals Elliott and Knox, was engaged in the seemingly endless labour of clearing the south-eastern corner of the Transvaal. The first casualty to our men was in the month of May, at Bethel, where Captain Treffry was dangerously wounded in an affair of outposts. Part of his company was attacked, and he him-

self, while reconnoitring to the front, was surprised by some Boers, and was shot at short range, receiving three bullets in the legs. He was in hospital at Standerton for some months, and later at Winburg, and was then invalided home.

Lieutenant Nesham took his place as acting Captain of the 82nd Company, and two months later had his promotion confirmed.

During May and June the Battalion was trekking to and fro in various quarters of the same region. In June, Lieutenant Clifford was promoted to be Captain, and was appointed Adjutant of the Battalion. At the end of June it returned to Standerton and was there split up into several portions, the 80th Company (Captain Clifford's) going to Greylingstad, the 81st (Lieutenant Wood's) to Heidelberg, the 82nd (Captain Nesham's) up the Natal Railway line, and the 83rd (Lieutenant Robbins's) retaining Standerton as its centre. Lieutenant McConkey had been invalided to the base. The work of all the companies was much the same—patrolling, farm-burning, convoy-

duty, etc.—for about three months. The chief incident, and a sad one for us, was the death of Lieutenant Robbins, on August 15. His company was engaged on cattle-guard about four miles from Standerton, when they were attacked by Boers, who, being disguised in khaki, were able to surround and surprise the party. A sanguinary little fight ensued in which six Boers were killed and three British. Robbins was struck by four bullets at point-blank range, and fell dead.

Lieutenant Wood, whose company went to Heidelberg, was employed there on a detached command of forty men at Eden Kop, in August and September, and had a good deal of desultory fighting.

We now come to October, when a determined and successful effort was made finally to clear the North-eastern Transvaal. Our men—those that were left of them, that is—joined Colonel Rawlinson's column, which, with others under the supreme command of General Bruce Hamilton (with Colonel Wools-Sampson as his brilliant intelligence officer), swept rapidly up the country to the



north-east, carrying all before them to Komati Poort, and capturing 1,700 prisoners in eight weeks. This involved incessant forced marching by night and day, often in the worst of weather, and consequently a terrible strain on the troops engaged—Colonel Rawlinson's column alone losing nearly two-thirds of its original strength. The whole campaign lasted four months—to the end of January 1902, that is. Lieutenant Wood was invalided home about Christmas.

Two only were now left of the original six—Captains Nesham and Clifford; and they—with the now reunited 21st Battalion—were engaged for a month in scouting for block-house work, first on the Ermelo-Carolina line, afterwards in Swaziland. Then, the Battalion being again split up, they were quartered, one at Volksrust and one at Botha's Pass, till peace was declared. Captain Nesham went home in the middle of August; but the last of all the six, Captain Clifford, remained in Africa for some months longer as Adjutant of the I.Y. Depot at Elandsfontein, and only regained England on October 25, 1902.

*The H.A.C. Machine-gun Section*

A special note should also be given to another group, of nine men, who went out together in the Imperial Yeomanry.

Their names were :

*J. S. Watney*, Private ; promoted to Lieutenant.

*G. H. Macdonnell*, Corporal ; promoted to Sergeant.

*A. J. Mordin*, Private ; promoted to Corporal and Sergeant.

*F. R. Seaton*, Private.

*A. R. Shield*, Private.

*F. E. Short*, Private.

*E. Baynes*, Private.

*A. A. Waters*, Private.

*A. H. Debenham*, Private.

They left England early in March 1901, and landed at Durban on the 23rd. Debenham henceforward has a separate history, for he joined the 25th Company I.Y. (see page 209), while the remaining eight joined the 62nd Company. After two months' trekking and fighting in the

Brandwater district of the Orange River Colony, seven of them (that is, all except Waters—see page 230) were transferred in the middle of June to the 34th Company, and made a complete section in charge of a Maxim gun. Watney was given a Commission, and became the Lieutenant in charge of the section ; G. H. Macdonnell was promoted to Sergeant ; Mordin to Corporal, and the other four remained as troopers. Starting from Harrismith, they first took part in the great drive to Standerton, next in a campaign through the Witkopjes with a flying column under Colonel Reay. In September and part of October they were engaged in convoy work between Bethlehem and Harrismith ; a troublesome business, for that region was still alive with guerillas. On October 15 they were sent to a standing camp at Blomeveldt Bridge, at the foot of Van Reenen's Pass, and from thence (and, later, from another camp at Glenlennie) joined various short expeditions into the neighbouring districts. During this period, Short, G. H. Macdonnell, and Shield were invalided home, and J. A. W. Macdonnell arrived from

England to join the section. Mordin was promoted to Acting-Sergeant. The other two places were filled by Yeomen from the 34th Company.

The next important date is December 14, when they joined General Dartnell's ill-fated column of Yeomanry and Imperial Light Horse, and for an opening enterprise made a forced march to surprise Christian de Wet at Barkin Kop, the same spot where the H.A.C. Battery had had such a sharp encounter with him eighteen months before, and when the 38th Field Battery had suffered so severely. The surprise failed, however, and four days later it was de Wet's turn to attempt a surprise of the British. He attacked Dartnell at Eland's River Bridge, on the road between Bethlehem and Harrismith, enveloping the column completely, and pressing home his assaults with all the dash and ferocity that distinguished Boer tactics at this period. But he met with resistance just as spirited, and retired after a four hours' struggle with severe losses. Our section was heavily engaged on the right flank. This was in every way a most creditable episode, but unhappily

a lamentable disaster was close at hand. On December 21 the column was sent to Tweefontein to guard the head of the block-house line, and on the night of the 24th, as every one knows, it was rushed by de Wet. On that night Macdonnell and Baynes were on picket (but not, it is fair to note, on the side of the camp from which the surprise came), Seaton was on horse-guard, Lieutenant Watney was on the crest of the hill in the officers' lines, and the rest of the section were with the gun in the men's lines behind the crest. The circumstances of the surprise are well known. De Wet's burghers noiselessly climbed the steep declivity which bounded the camp on one side, and were on the British before they knew it. All accounts show (and the terribly heavy lists of killed and wounded speak for themselves) that the Yeomanry in that desperate situation behaved with the utmost gallantry. The murderous *mêlée* that ensued is indescribable, but for us of the H.A.C. there stands out the fact that Lieutenant Watney died while doing his best to stem the torrent. At the first alarm he had taken

his place with the Maxim, but forbade the section to fire it as friends and enemies were mingled irretrievably together, and instead he collected some men and ordered a charge, leading it himself but falling immediately. It is impossible to think without deep emotion of the death of this brave young comrade of ours. It is certain that the effort he made was utterly hopeless, and that it was pure devotion to duty and innate gallantry that prompted him to sacrifice his life.

The rest of our men were taken prisoners, and the Maxim was captured, but not before Sergeant Mordin had disabled it. The prisoners were marched off on foot to the Basutoland border and there released, afterwards returning to Harrismith, where they were re-armed and re-horsed, and soon after the gun section was re-constituted, with a new Maxim. In February 1902, they were present at the great drive which culminated with large captures on Majuba day, and at various other operations, and they were finally sent home, the war being at an end, in July, and were discharged in London on September 3, after eighteen months' service.



*The H.A.C. Contingent in the 27th Company,  
7th Battalion, Imperial Yeomanry*

Another group of seven left England on March 1, all attached to the 27th Company, 7th Battalion, Imperial Yeomanry.

These were :

*C. A. Cutbill*, Private, till September 15, 1902,  
when Commissioned as Lieutenant in the 8th  
Company, 4th Battalion

*L. N. Garstin*, Private, till November 1901, when  
Commissioned as Lieutenant in the 74th  
Company, 8th Battalion

*H. T. P. Curtis*, Corporal

*P. C. Wooton*, Corporal

*F. H. S. Satchwell*, Private

*H. S. Elam*, Private

*W. D. Tress*, Private.

In Africa they became so much separated that their histories cannot be given in full ; but all of them served during April and May, 1901, under



General Dixon in the Western Transvaal, and four of them were present at the battle of Vlakfontein on May 28, 1901, where Delarey surprised the British force, and in a dashing charge of 500 mounted men, under cover of a veldt-fire, temporarily captured two guns, which were, however, regained after a long and bloody struggle. Three of our four men—Wooton, Elam, and Curtis (the fourth being Satchwell)—were in the escort to the guns, and were all wounded more or less seriously at the first rush, when the escort was shot down to a man. The total losses of the day were terribly heavy. Again, in September of the same year, most of the seven were in General Kekewich's column in the same district, and three, Garstin, Cutbill, and Satchwell, were at the action of Moedwill (Sept. 30) when the same veteran Boer leader dealt one of his smashing and unexpected blows on a force ill-placed to meet it. But this time, too, a magnificent resistance was improvised and persisted in, and the Boers completely repulsed, though at lamentable cost in killed and wounded. On this day it is admitted that the young un-

seasoned troopers of the Yeomanry behaved every whit as well as the veteran regulars.

In March, April, and May of 1902, Curtis, Wooton, and Satchwell (the two first having recovered from their wounds and rejoined their company in August 1901) again served under Colonel Kekewich in the Western Transvaal, and were present at the severe action of Rooiwal on April 11, when, in the course of a big drive, 1,500 Boers under Kemp attempted to break the line by means of what was practically an old-fashioned cavalry charge, but were repulsed with heavy loss.

Under the heading of Imperial Yeomanry should be given a short account of the death of Lieutenant H. H. Ward. He had already served as a driver in the H.A.C. Battery, and as such was mentioned in despatches. Volunteering again for the front, he first served in Bethune's Horse, and then received a Commission in the Imperial Yeomanry. In February 1902, he was with Colonel Doran's column in Cape Colony, and on the 5th his company was sent to Middle Post, between

Calvinia and Sutherland, to escort the baggage of the column. On the same night the force was surrounded and attacked by an overwhelming number of Boers. Ward at the time was in charge of a small detached outpost. Accounts of the exact circumstances of his death vary; but, from comparing them, there is little doubt that he held the post with great gallantry to the last, refused to surrender, and was shot at close quarters. That is what the evidence goes to prove; but even without it, any one who knew Ward, his high ideals of a soldier's duty, and his unswerving adherence to them in every detail of military life, can well believe that that is how he died.

Besides those whose names have already been mentioned in this or one of the preceding chapters, the following members served in the Imperial Yeomanry:

<i>A. W. J. Chambers</i>	}	as Lieutenants		
<i>H. T. Hanson</i>				
<i>C. G. Stewart</i>				
<i>H. W. Callingham</i> , as Sergeant				
<i>W. L. Haywood</i> , as Lance-Sergeant				

*W. C. M. Carpenter*, as Corporal

*J. V. Barff*, as Lance-Corporal

*W. A. C. Bailey*

*G. Baily*

*R. F. Brooks*

*H. J. F. Calrow*

*J. D. Kay*

*L. L. Lewis*

*J. D. Lockton*

*H. D. Osmond*\*

*G. S. Sanderson*

} as Privates

### *Regular Regiments*

Among those who joined Regular Regiments the Company has two further deaths to deplore, those of Lieutenant B. Moeller and Lieutenant R. H. Tremearne.

Moeller first took service as a Lieutenant in the C.I.V. Mounted Infantry, was transferred in July 1900 to Colonel Bainbridge's Mounted Infantry, served with them for three months, and was then given a Commission in the Second Battalion

\* Served also in the Imperial Light Horse.

Middlesex Regiment (Sept. 1900). In November he joined the Mounted Infantry Company which was thenceforward incorporated in the 14th Mounted Infantry Regiment. With this Regiment he was constantly trekking and fighting for more than a year in many different districts of both colonies. On the night of Dec. 18, 1901, when serving on a column under General Spens, he was in charge of the advance-guard for a night attack on some Boer farms at Holland, near Standerton, in the Eastern Transvaal. The farms were taken, but in the early morning of the 19th the British were surprised by a superior force of Boers and suffered very heavily. Moeller, who was now in charge of the rear-guard, made a most gallant and resolute stand and checked the enemy's onslaught. Having, by his nerve and judgment, effectually covered the retreat of the rest of the force, he gave the order to his own men to mount and gallop back. At the last moment, however, he was mortally wounded in endeavouring to save a wounded trooper who was in the hands of the Boers. He was carried into Standerton, and died

there on Dec. 23, 1901. An exceedingly interesting diary of his experiences, as written by him from day to day in the field, has since been published, under the title of 'Two Years at the Front with the Mounted Infantry,' with a preface by Lieut.-Colonel Boyle (H.A.C.).

Tremearne first went out with the Draft to the H.A.C. Battery, and was afterwards commissioned in the Fifth (Militia) Battalion Royal Warwickshire Regiment. Soon after landing, however, he contracted enteric fever, and died at Carnarvon, Cape Colony, on April 14, 1902.

H. W. T. Elam, having obtained a Lieutenancy in the 68th Field Battery, was severely wounded at Dewetsdorp, on Nov. 23, 1900.

## CONCLUDING SUMMARY

One hundred and ninety-three Members of the  
Company served in South Africa.

Four were killed in action, or died of wounds.

Two died of disease.

Thirty were wounded or invalided home.

Thirty-three held His Majesty's Commission, of  
whom eight were promoted from the ranks  
while serving in the field.

Eighteen were mentioned in despatches for  
special or meritorious services.

One was made a C.M.G.

One was made a member of the Distinguished  
Service Order.

Three received the Distinguished Conduct Medal.

Peace declared on May 31, 1902.



## CHAPTER XIII

### A REVIEW OF THE REGIMENT'S WORK

*By Captain and Brevet-Major C. E. D. BUDWORTH,  
Adjutant of the H.A.C.*

#### 1.—*Introductory*

HAVING been asked to write a few lines of criticism on the H.A.C. in war, I venture to do so in the hope that they may prove of some assistance to us in living up to our motto of 'Arma Pacis Fulcra.'

I ask those to whom these criticisms may appear harsh, to remember that the writer is proud to have shared in his comrades' trials and difficulties in South Africa, and would not, if he could, dissociate himself from their errors or failings. It should be the chief source of their pride to have overcome those trials and difficulties, in

their humble efforts quietly and steadfastly to do their duty as soldiers, and uphold the honour of their Country and Regiment. The picture of war as a series of cavalry charges and infantry attacks is a false one, and the South African War, even in its early stages, was no exception to the rule. Food, sleep, weather, and petty details play a much more prominent part than fighting.

Not that the H.A.C. was not called upon to bear its part in the more brilliant episodes. What more noble, if melancholy, story than is told by our death-roll? Moeller, Lieutenant in our Battalion, mortally wounded whilst covering the retreat of a shattered British force; Ward, driver in 'A' Battery, and Lieutenant in the Yeomanry, preferring death to surrender; Watney, Trumpeter in 'A' Battery, and Lieutenant in the Yeomanry, killed whilst facing certain death in the endeavour to retrieve the fortunes of his side; Robbins, Private in the Battalion, and Lieutenant of Yeomanry, and Tremearne, driver in 'B' Battery, and just

appointed to a Commission in the Militia, returning to South Africa a second time, only to meet their deaths; Hutchings, Private in the Battalion, dying almost within sight of home.

Nor is the story confined to individuals. The steady discipline of the Battery at Barkin Kop, when death, and indeed annihilation, were very nigh, will in days to come be a proud remembrance; and the glorious souvenir of their conduct at Bethlehem—the flag presented to them by the General commanding the troops engaged—such a souvenir as is possessed by no other Auxiliary Force in the country—will always be a cherished and inspiring possession.

2.—*On the Employment of the H.A.C.  
in future Wars*

For purposes of Home Defence, for which, of course, the H.A.C. exists, we should take the field as a regiment; but if ever we are called upon again to furnish men for foreign service, it is to be sincerely hoped that we shall do so as an independent unit, or, failing this, that our members

will be attached to a regiment of the Regular Forces. Composite volunteer regiments, in my opinion, have no advantages to recommend them. Fortunately, in the case of the Battery, a large majority of the men were drawn from one corps, our own. Otherwise the difficulties of taking the field would have been more than doubled.

Even were the efficiency conditions much more severe than they are at present, to say nothing of those prior to the war, members of our Regiment, like those of any other Auxiliary corps, must expect to go through the 'whooping-cough and measles,' on first taking the field. As an independent unit, *esprit de corps* would soon free them from such ailments. Attached to Regular troops they would find them of slight consequence, thanks to serving with men who have learnt their work. Moreover, the presence of a body of well-educated men in the ranks would be a source of increased strength to a regiment of His Majesty's Regular Forces.

3.—*On Mobilisation*

Mobilisation presupposes that *personnel*, horses, weapons, ammunition, clothing, stores, transport are held in readiness, or that arrangements have been made previously for obtaining the same promptly when required. This is easier in the case of Infantry than of Artillery. Our Battalion requires but the addition of a few transport waggons and stores to take the field. But to put a Battery on a war footing is a very different matter. Going down to camp with a few guns and waggons gives but a faint idea of what is wanted.

It is hoped that the mobilisation arrangements for the H.A.C. will soon be completed, but these arrangements, in the case of the Auxiliary Forces in general, are not such a simple affair as they might at first sight appear, nor indeed purely a military question. To place all our Auxiliary Forces on a thoroughly sound mobilisation footing would entail the expenditure of an enormous sum of money, and whether the country

is prepared to sanction this I am not in a position to say. The commencement of the war found the H.A.C. mobilisation arrangements in a very rudimentary stage, if indeed they can be said to have existed at all. In spite of this the Battery mobilised in the space of about four weeks, thanks, largely, to the energies of Lord Denbigh and his staff, and to the patriotism of many members of the Regiment, who were unable to go to the front.

Mobilisation also presupposes that all ranks have received a training fitting them for service in the field, and to the consideration of this I will now proceed.

#### 4.—*Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers*

The lessons of the South African War point unmistakably to the conclusion that the training which the officers and non-commissioned officers of the Auxiliary Forces receive, for service in the field, is lamentably deficient.

The keenest admirers (amongst whom I count myself) of the Auxiliary Forces are obliged to admit that here is the weak spot. I consider it

certain that those forces, as a result of this weakness, would receive a rude awakening if called upon to face highly trained European troops. Bravery alone would not suffice ; ignorant bravery is dangerous. And, in making these remarks, let it be clearly understood that I firmly believe our own officers to be at least the equal of any other body of Auxiliary officers.

Nor must it be supposed for a moment that I am making a general attack upon Auxiliary officers as compared with others ; on the contrary, the majority of those whom I have met are as capable and as keen as, if not more so than, others. But it is not a question of capabilities or keenness ; it is a question of military training dependent on time, business, money, and opportunities.

No individual regimental arrangements will alter it. It is a question for the country, and the country only. Training must mean time, and time must mean, to Auxiliary officers, compensation. No small pettifogging change will have the slightest effect. In the meantime the only thing we can do is to make the best of difficult



conditions and endeavour to attach officers, as far as possible, to the Regular Forces. What chiefly astonishes me is how excellent they are, considering what few military opportunities and advantages they obtain. These remarks apply in but little less degree to our senior non-commissioned officers, whose standard of training should be at least equal to that formerly required from the officer. The work demanded from such men as Artillery Nos. 1 on service requires a very high military training, while colour-sergeants become of an importance undreamt of at headquarters.

The importance of the same high standard for the more junior non-commissioned officers is even greater in the infantry than it is in the artillery. Those of the former class, from the first day they take the field, are much more likely to find themselves thrown upon their own resources in positions of what may be vital importance.

The value of the fact that our non-commissioned officers are educated men, and that implicit reliance can be placed on them, cannot be over-estimated.

As to the officers and non-commissioned officers whom we sent out in the early stages of the war, I can personally vouch for their exceptionally high capabilities. They would compare favourably, I believe, with men of any other corps possessing a relative training. Moreover, the fact that of the large number of our members who obtained commissions in the field or on the recommendations of the officer commanding the H.A.C., none but favourable reports were received, speaks for itself.

#### 5.—*On the Rank and File*

Happy is the commander who possesses in his command the material of which our rank and file are composed. There may be other classes of untrained men who from the nature of their daily occupations are more fitted for immediate work in the field; but, given a short practical training, if our rank and file are not as good soldiers as any that can be brought against them, it is the fault of the instructors and not of the men.

6.—*On Physique*

The physique of the men we sent out was on the whole good. In the Battery the men were rather young and scarcely up for some time to the hard physical work demanded from gunners and drivers.

In the case of the gunner, particularly, muscular strength is a necessity ; and speaking of the regiment generally, it is a pity that more members do not supplement cricket and football by a systematic development of their chests and muscles, opportunities for which are provided at our School of Arms at headquarters. Comparatively few of our men were invalided home.

7.—*On Discipline*

True discipline springs from a high sense of duty. Without it any body of troops degenerates into a mob. It holds men steady in trying ordeals, makes them straighten their backs, however long the march, and bear up cheerfully, however weary the work which falls to their lot.

Our members carried with them into the field the high standard of discipline maintained at headquarters, and, as far as my experience went, individually and collectively, never faltered.

The high sense of duty which permeates all ranks should make the officers or non-commissioned officers all the more careful to remember that the men under their command are educated men and can think for themselves. Orders should be framed in accordance with common sense, and not made vexatious. When an unpleasant order has to be given—and such must be given at times—let the officer or non-commissioned officer responsible for it take the men, if possible, into his confidence, and frankly tell them the reason. Much good may result and little harm.

I believe that our rank and file would be the first to resent any breach of discipline.

#### 8.—*On the Care of Man and Horse in the Field*

Ignorance of how to look after the one and the other was probably common to all Auxiliary

troops on landing in South Africa, and meant much discomfort at first.

Men cannot well learn to look after themselves except on service. Much can be done by officers to increase the comfort and well-being of those under their charge; unfortunately ignorance of how to set about it, and even ignorance that it is their duty to do so, has accounted for much unnecessary suffering in the field. Probably those of our members who were with their own officers saw comparatively little of this; but from what I am told by others, it was much felt by some regiments with which our members were not unconnected.

Field cooking forms a useful part of a soldier's education, but unhappily there is no time for teaching it in camp during peace. The best we can do is to encourage individuals to go through courses. There must always be a considerable amount of inventive ability in any body of educated men, and this may also be turned to useful account for the general good.

Horse management is a severe stumbling-

block. The more we look after our own horses in time of peace the better. As to the officers, they can pick up something by being attached to Regular troops ; but a thorough knowledge is not to be guaranteed even by several years of constant service.

9.—*On Scouts, Patrols, and Orderlies*

It is marvellous how little the war appears to have impressed us with the necessity of moving with patrols, scouts, etc. as a protection against sudden surprise.

Speaking from experience with the Battery, in whose work on the lines of communication the training of patrols and scouts was by no means neglected, our men were very quick to learn the work, and some of them soon became quite expert at it. This was only natural, as the principal quality required is common sense.

An orderly often becomes an important man in the field. Probably no general officer would regret acquiring a few of our men for the purpose.

10.—*Artificers*

When we mobilised, our artificer ranks were in a sadly deficient state, not only in numbers, but in ability to perform the duties of the posts held. And yet it would be better for a battery to take the field without a man who had ever done a day's gun drill, than without good shoeing-smiths.

No man should be allowed to hold any artificer's position the duties of which he is not prepared to perform on service.

The artificer question is the hardest our batteries have to tackle.

Unless we can get sufficient members to make a hobby of these jobs in peace time, as some do at present, the necessity of falling back on the professional element should be acknowledged, and steps taken accordingly.

In South Africa, of our head artificers, two were ex-soldier artificers, and one was a professional civilian. The subordinates were all H.A.C. men, some of whom not only learnt their job, but



became very good at it. These, however, were exceptionally good men, and slaved to learn it day and night.

### 11.—*On the Battery*

The men who composed the Battery were neither in training nor physique up to the average standard of an H.A.C. Battery, and many of them had but lately joined, and were very young.

We started for the docks on one of the most abominable nights imaginable, and it was a happy augury that men and horses reached their destination without mishap.

On the whole it was a motley crew which landed in South Africa. A few knew their job. There was a percentage of old H.A.C. hands, who could ride and drive, and had done some manoeuvring in the field ; but the majority may be said to have been as ignorant of artillery work as they were keen to learn it ; and, thank goodness, they were keen. Even had they been up to our present H.A.C. standard there would have been much to learn.

Our peace training provides us with non-commissioned officers, gunners, and even drivers, who can both lay and fire a gun, understand how to handle ammunition, and can set fuses in a modicum of time. A good proportion can ride fairly well, and the drivers can take their guns over indifferent ground without upsetting them; but, unfortunately, we have not the time to learn much of the more prosaic duties connected with horse management—the practical care of the horse in stables, camp, and on the march, rapid and good grooming, a thorough knowledge of harness, how to keep it in good order, and how to put it on a horse rapidly and correctly. To this must be added work connected with the interior economy of a battery. It is only in camp as a Regiment that we can attempt to learn these things.

An artillery man is not made in a month, nor an officer in a year; and, unless we had had educated men as keen as mustard, and no trouble about discipline, I doubt if the Battery in South Africa would have been much good for a long time.

As it was, the delay on the lines of communication, though unnecessarily long, was useful.

Officers and non-commissioned officers had first to learn experience in the care of horses, and in 'running' their sections and sub-divisions. At home they are handicapped by the very limited opportunities of exercising that control and supervision of those under them which becomes their duty in time of war.

Both, at first, displayed a curious disregard of business principles in managing their sections or sub-divisions. It was difficult to persuade them that they must constantly have at their fingers' ends the number of men, horses, sets of harness, etc. under their control, without which it is impossible to make the necessary rapid arrangements to meet emergencies.

Every subaltern and No. 1 should carry a notebook, and keep a careful account of casualties to men, horses, equipment, etc. besides carrying in their heads peculiarities connected with both man and horse.

All things considered, they came well through

these difficulties, showing initiative and common sense, when, as often happened, they were thrown on their own resources.

Our gunners in South Africa, though they had to handle a gun and ammunition which they had practically never seen before, and though some of them had never done gunners' work in their lives, gained proficiency very rapidly, though not all became expert layers.

But it was a long up-hill task for the drivers (and for the gunners too, as far as horses and harness were concerned), except for a few old hands. That the drivers did ultimately surmount their difficulties and become efficient, speaks volumes for their determination and hard work; and in the end, from 'Whistle' to 'All Ready,' probably few could give them points.

An artillery driver takes long to make; but the task would be certainly a much lighter one if the vast quantity of unnecessary harness, which clogs the progress of a battery, was done away with.

Range-takers were at a discount, one officer and

the quarter-master sergeant representing all that were available.

The men were invariably keen and generally cheerful, and a long wait on the lines of communication will try the humour of the best troops.

Of their conduct under fire I will only say this, that not only were they always on the most friendly terms with their Regular comrades, but that I believe the latter were always right glad to have the Battery with them; and there are no better judges.

Every member of the Regiment, and it must be remembered that the Battalion as well as the Artillery Division was represented in the Battery, has a right to be proud of the reputation which the latter gained in South Africa. Its shooting has been cited in Parliament, and the opinion of the General under whom it principally served is too well known to require quoting. Something of this is no doubt due to the reputation which the gun, justly or unjustly, made for itself; but there can be no doubt that the Battery became a thoroughly efficient unit.

12.—*The Infantry Detachment*

The members whom we sent out to serve in the C.I.V. as Infantrymen were, as a body, in many respects readier for service in the field than were our representatives in the Battery, Mounted Infantry, and Imperial Yeomanry.

Shooting, *esprit de corps*, fire and marching discipline can all be learnt at or near headquarters. For educated men, an annual field training as private soldiers of some two weeks in camp should suffice.

Free from the worries of horse management, the infantryman on service quickly shakes down. On the other hand, he is not without his difficulties. He has to walk whilst others ride, and often to watch whilst others sleep. His transport is often very restricted, and he has not the same opportunities as his mounted comrades of replenishing his larder.

Our annual training in camp is of course very short—shorter indeed than the minimum of two weeks quoted above—and does not allow of a

thorough standard of field training being attained. A percentage of members are, moreover, always prevented from attending the yearly training, such as it is.

Owing to the widely extended order of modern fighting lines, the difficulties of control and supervision on the part of infantry officers and non-commissioned officers have so increased, that initiative and resourcefulness on the part of the most junior privates have become a necessity. A thorough field training, therefore, is now of the highest importance.

The standard of musketry efficiency is of paramount importance, and indissolubly bound up with it is the provision of suitable rifle ranges. This, again, is a question for the country.

Our detachment, whose history is related in a previous chapter, was too small for me to speak of its members as a body ; but from careful inquiries made in South Africa from the officers under whom they served, I know that they worthily sustained the credit of our regiment.



13.—*On Mounted Infantry and Imperial  
Yeomanry*

Of the members whom we sent out to act as Mounted Infantry or Yeomanry, a few could both ride and shoot. Some could ride, but not shoot ; and others could shoot, but not ride. Some again could neither ride nor shoot—that is to say, to the extent required for service. A man to be an efficient mounted infantryman must be able to ride and to look after his horse, in addition to his infantry duties and qualifications.

The regiment possesses no mounted infantry section, as the number of mounted infantry obtainable from Imperial Yeomanry and existing mounted infantry sections is sufficient for home defence. But any member of our Battalion can learn to ride, as our gunners do ; and any member of our Artillery can learn to shoot, as our infantry do. Both branches would be rendered all the more valuable, from a service point of view, if, to this extent, they learnt one another's duties.

Moreover, I think (though perhaps the wish is

father to the thought) that in the future there may be opportunities for those members of the Auxiliary Forces who can ride and shoot of seeing foreign service.

The experiences of our Mounted Infantry and Imperial Yeomanry, scattered about as they were amidst all classes of men, were in many respects rougher than those of our other branches. It is not for me here to speak of individuals; but, knowing the stamp of man we sent out, I am not the least surprised that so many favourable reports have come to hand, and that so many who left as privates have returned home as officers.

# APPENDIX

## ALPHABETICAL LIST OF MEMBERS OF THE H.A.C. WHO SERVED IN SOUTH AFRICA

*Note.*—The second column gives the member's position in the H.A.C. at the time of enlistment for service. In the third column, 'Battery' = H.A.C. Battery in South Africa; 'Mounted Infantry' = C.I.V. Mounted Infantry; 'Infantry' = C.I.V. Infantry.

NAME	POSITION IN THE H.A.C.	SERVICES
<i>Abraham, F.</i>	A. Batt., gunner.	Battery, Sergeant C. sub- division. See chaps. iii.-ix. Mentioned in despatches ('London Gazette,' September 10, 1901).
<i>Allen, C. G.</i>	A. Batt., gunner.	Battery, gunner. See chaps. iii.-ix.
<i>Allen, R. W.</i>	No. 6 Co., Sergeant.	Commissioned as Second Lieutenant, 8th Hussars, March 14, 1900; Lieutenant, De- cember 29, 1900. Fighting continuously from July 1900 to the end of the war, under Generals French, R. Knox, Pulteney, Broad- wood, Plumer.

NAME	POSITION IN THE H.A.C.	SERVICES
<i>Applebee, H. P.</i>	A. Batt., gunner.	Battery, Bombardier; promoted to Pay-sergeant. Wounded at Bethlehem and invalided home. See chaps. iii.-vi.
<i>Archer, B. D. W.</i>	A. Batt., gunner.	Battery, gunner. See chaps. iii.-ix.
<i>Attneave, H.</i>	A. Batt., Bombard.	Battery, Corporal. See chaps. iii.-ix.
<i>Bailey, W. A. C.</i>	A. Batt., driver.	Imperial Yeomanry, 77th Company, 8th Battalion, private.
<i>Baily, G.</i>	A. Batt., gunner.	Imperial Yeomanry, 23rd Company, 8th Battalion. Served from February 1901 to August 1902. Present at recovery of Col. Benson's guns at Florence, and at MacClochlan's Nek.
<i>Baker, W.</i>	A. Batt., driver.	Battery, driver. See chaps. iii.-ix.
<i>Barff, J. V.</i>	No. 6 Co., Corporal.	Imperial Yeomanry, 67th Company, 18th Battalion (Sharpshooters), Lance-corporal. February 1900-July 1901. Served under Sir F. Carrington in Rhodesia. Invalided to Cape Town, but returned to front and served under Col. Parke (Kimberley district), Col. Thorneycroft (Western Colony), Col. Parsons (Zwarte Berge).

NAME	POSITION IN THE H.A.C.	SERVICES
<i>Barnett-Smith, G. R.</i>	A. Batt., gunner.	Battery, Bombardier; promoted to Pay-ser- geant. See chaps. iii.-ix.
<i>Bassett, R. . .</i>	No. 6 Co., Lce.-corp.	Mounted Infantry (draft), private. See chap. x.
<i>Bates, C. D. V.</i>	A. Batt., gunner.	Battery, gunner. See chaps. iii.-ix.
<i>Bayley, H. . .</i>	B. Batt., Lieut.	Battery, Lieutenant. See chaps. iii.-ix. Men- tioned in despatches (‘London Gazette,’ September 10, 1901). Granted the honorary rank of Lieutenant in the Army.
<i>Baynes, E. . .</i>	B. Batt., gunner.	Imperial Yeomanry, 34th Company, 11th Bat- talion. Private in a machine-gun section. See chap. xii., page 165.
<i>Betteley, C. E. R.</i>	No. 1 Co., private.	Mounted Infantry, pri- vate. See chap. x.
<i>Blacklin, H. .</i>	A. Batt., driver.	Battery, driver. See chaps. iii.-ix.
<i>Bradshaw, C. H.</i>	B. Batt., gunner.	Battery (draft), gunner. See end of chap. viii. and chap. ix.
<i>Bradshaw, R. W.</i>	B. Batt., driver.	Battery (draft), driver. See end of chap. viii. and chap. ix.
<i>Brady, G. C. J.</i>	A. Batt., gunner.	Battery, gunner. See chaps. iii.-ix. Wounded at Bultfontein, July 16, 1900.
<i>Briggs, A. E. .</i>	No. 6 Co., private.	Mounted Infantry, pri- vate. See chap. x.

NAME	POSITION IN THE H.A.C.	SERVICES
<i>Brooks, R. F.</i>	No. 2 Co., private.	Imperial Yeomanry.
<i>Brown, A. J. M.</i>	B. Batt., gunner.	Battery, gunner. See chaps. iii.-ix.
<i>Brown, E. K.</i>	No. 3 Co., private.	Infantry (draft), private. See chap. xi.
<i>Brown, G. J. H.</i>	No. 3 Co., private.	Infantry, private. See chap. xi.
<i>Brown, T. M.</i>	A. Batt., driver.	Battery, gunner. See chaps. iii.-ix.
<i>Brymer, C. J.</i>	No. 1 Co., private.	Infantry, private. See chap. xi.
<i>Budworth, C. E. D.</i>		Captain and Adjutant in the Battery. See chaps. iii.-ix. Mentioned in despatches ('London Gazette,' September 10, 1901). Received the brevet of Major. Com- manded the 38th Bat- tery R.F.A. at the actions round Bethle- hem (July 1900), owing to the fact that all the officers of that Battery had been killed or wounded.
<i>Byron, S. H.</i>	No. 1 Co., private.	Mounted Inf., private. See chap. x.
<i>Callingham, H. W.</i>	A. Batt., gunner.	67th Company, 18th Battalion Imperial Yeomanry, Sergeant. Transferred as private (by request) to 70th Company. Ten months' service from March 1901 in Colonel

NAME	POSITION IN THE H.A.C.	SERVICES
		Thorneycroft's column, Orange River Colony. Invalided home (enteric).
<i>Calrow, H. J. F.</i>	A. Batt., gunner.	Imperial Yeomanry.
<i>Carpenter, W. C. M.</i>	B. Batt., Trumpeter.	Imperial Yeomanry, 42nd Company, 12th Bat- talion, Corporal. March 1901 to March 1902. Served under General Broadwood, April-De- cember 1901; served under Col. Fanshawe, December-January 1901. Present at capture of Free State Government at Reitz, June 1901. In cam- paign against de Wet after Tweefontein, April 1901. In the great drives at end of 1901. At Brakenlaagte, Oc- tober 26, and at relief of Fort Itala.
<i>Carr, E. N.</i>	No. 3 Co., private.	Mounted Infantry (draft), private. See chap. x.
<i>Chambers, A. W. J.</i>	B. Batt., gunner.	Imperial Yeomanry, 63rd Company, 1st Bat- talion, Lieutenant. March 1901.
<i>Chambers, E.</i>	A. Batt., Bombard- ier.	Battery, driver, with rank of Acting-Bom- bardier. See chaps. iii.-ix. Mentioned in despatches ('London



NAME	POSITION IN THE H.A.C.	SERVICES
<i>Chambers, J. W.</i>	B. Batt., driver.	Gazette, 'September 10, 1901). Battery, driver. See chaps. iii.-ix. After- wards Lieutenant in Imperial Yeomanry, 11th Battalion (July 1901). Granted the honorary rank of Lieu- tenant in the Army.
<i>Childers, R. E.</i>	A. Batt., driver.	Battery, driver. See chaps. iii.-ix. Pub- lished a diary entitled 'In the Ranks of the C.I.V.'
<i>Chillingworth, G.</i>	B. Batt., Sergeant.	Battery (draft), Bom- bardier. See end of chap. viii. and chap. ix.
<i>Clare, A. S. . .</i>	No. 6 Co., private.	Mounted Infantry, pri- vate. See chap. x.
<i>Clifford, H. B. .</i>	B. Batt., Corporal.	Battery, Corporal. See chaps. iii.-ix. After- wards commissioned as Lieutenant, Imperial Yeomanry, 80th Com- pany, 21st Battalion (March 9, 1901). See chap. xii., page 161. Appointed Captain and Adjutant July 9, 1902; appointed Adjutant, Imperial Yeomanry Depot at Elands- fontein, July 1902. Service, March 1901- October 1902. Men-

NAME	POSITION IN THE H.A.C.	SERVICES
<i>Clough, E. M. O.</i>	A. Batt., driver.	tioned in despatches ('London Gazette,' July 29, 1902). Granted the honorary rank of Captain in the Army. Battery, driver. See chaps. iii.-ix. Wounded, June 26, 1900, between Kroonstad and Lindley.
<i>Cohen, G. A.</i>	No. 6 Co., private.	Mounted Infantry, private. See chap. x.
<i>Cohen, L. W.</i>	A. Batt., driver.	Battery, driver. See chaps. iii.-ix.
<i>Colmer, G. W.</i>	No. 1 Co., private.	Battery, driver. See chaps. iii.-iv. Invalidated to base May 1900.
<i>Colville, A. G.</i>	No. 5 Co., Lce.-corp.	Mounted Infantry (draft), private. See chap. x.
<i>Cooper, A. M.</i>	B. Batt., gunner.	Battery (draft), gunner. See end of chap. viii. and chap. ix.
<i>Cooper, P. C.</i>	No. 4 Co., Lce.-corp.	Mounted Infantry, Lance-corporal. See chap. x. Mentioned in despatches ('London Gazette,' September 10, 1901).
<i>Cooper-Smith, E. J.</i>	A. Batt., driver.	Battery, driver. See chaps. iii.-ix.
<i>Corfield, R.</i>	No. 1 Co., private.	Mounted Infantry, Lance-corporal. See chap. x.
<i>Curtis, H. P. T.</i>	No. 2 Co., Lce.-corp.	Imperial Yeomanry, 27th Company, 7th Battalion, Corporal. See

NAME	POSITION IN THE H.A.C.	SERVICES
<i>Cutbill, C. A.</i>	No. 2 Co., private.	<p>chap. xii., page 170. Served under General Dixon. Wounded at Vlakfontein, May 28, 1901. Served again in August 1901 till peace declared. Under Col. Kekewich in March 1902, Western Transvaal. Chief action, Rooiwal. In final drives in this district.</p> <p>Imperial Yeomanry, 27th Company, 7th Battalion, private (March 1901). Promoted to Lieutenant and transferred to 8th Company, 4th Battalion, September 15, 1902. See chap. xii., page 170. Served in Western Transvaal under Generals Dixon and Kekewich. Present at Moedwill. Also in Orange River Colony, under General Elliott; present at all the big drives in the Kroonstad, Bethlehem, Harri-smith districts. Returned August 1902. Received hon. rank of Lieutenant in Army.</p>
<i>Dale, J. C.</i>	No. 1 Co., private.	Infantry, private. See chap. xi.

NAME	POSITION IN THE H.A.C.	SERVICES
<i>Debenham,</i> <i>A. H.</i>	B. Batt., gunner.	Imperial Yeomanry, 25th Company, 7th Battalion, private (February 1901). See chap. xii., page 165. Served under General Barton in Pretoria, Rustenburg, Zeerust districts, June–September 1901. At Nooitgedacht, July, when scene of Clements's disaster was recaptured. Successful night-scouting with the 25th Company, leading to capture of a General and sixty Boers at Damhoek, July 25, 1901. Invalided home December 1901.
<i>Dixon, W.</i>	A. Batt., Sergeant.	Battery, Sergeant A. subdivision. See chaps. iii.–ix. Mentioned in despatches, September 10, 1901. Received the Distinguished Conduct Medal.
<i>Dobree, J. A.</i>	A. Batt., driver.	Battery, driver. See chaps. iii.–ix.
<i>Dollar, H. W.</i>	B. Batt., gunner.	Battery, Bombardier; promoted to Corporal. See chaps. iii.–ix.
<i>Duncan, C. L.</i>	B. Batt., driver.	Battery, driver. See chaps. iii.–ix.
<i>Duncan, J. F.</i>	B. Batt., 2nd Lieut.	Battery, Second Lieutenant. See chaps. iii.–ix. At the actions round

NAME	POSITION IN THE H.A.C.	SERVICES
<i>Dyer, E. A.</i>	No. 6 Co., private.	Bethlehem served as a Lieutenant with the 38th Battery R.F.A., under command of Captain Budworth. Mentioned in despatches ('London Gazette,' September 10, 1901). Granted the honorary rank of Lieutenant in the Army. Mounted Infantry, private. See chap. x. Afterwards Commissioned as Lieutenant, Imperial Yeomanry, 4th Company, 1st Battalion (June 27, 1901). Served under General Campbell in clearing the Brandwater Basin and Basuto border, autumn 1901. Also at most of the final drives of the war, including that on Majuba Day, February 1902. Present at attack on Oliver's farm, April 20, 1902.
<i>Elam, H. S.</i>	No. 1 Co., private.	Imperial Yeomanry, 27th Company, 7th Battalion, private. See chap. xii., page 170. Wounded at Vlakkfontein, May 28, 1901.
<i>Elam, H. W. T.</i>	A. Batt., Corporal.	Battery, Corporal. See chaps. iii.-ix. After-

NAME	POSITION IN THE H.A.C.	SERVICES
<i>Flick, C. L.</i>	No. 6 Co., Corporal.	wards Commissioned in the 68th Battery R.F.A. (August 14, 1900). Operations in Orange River Colony. Wounded severely in action at Dewetsdorp, November 23, 1900. Invalided home, February 1901. Rejoined in Cape Colony, December 1901. Returned to England with the Battery, October 1902. Mentioned in despatches ('London Gazette,' September 10, 1901). South African Light Horse, trooper; promoted later to Sergeant. Fought at Colenso (December 15, 1900), Vaal Krantz, and in many other battles during the operations to relieve Ladysmith. Orderly on General Buller's telegraph staff, May 1. Went through Buller's campaign to the north, through Natal and Eastern Transvaal; present at most of the principal actions. Returned home, October 1900. Published a

NAME	POSITION IN THE H.A.C.	SERVICES
		diary entitled 'Twelve Months with General Buller in South Africa.' Afterwards Commissioned as Lieutenant, Imperial Yeomanry, 35th Battalion, and served again from April 1902 to February 1903. Received the honorary rank of Lieutenant in the Army.
<i>Forbes, N. D.</i>	B. Batt., driver.	Battery (draft), driver. See end of chap. viii. and chap. iv
<i>Fowler, F.</i>	No. 2 Co., private.	Mounted Infantry (draft), private. See chap. x.
<i>Garstin, L. N.</i>	No. 2 Co., private.	Imperial Yeomanry, 27th Company, 7th Battalion, private (March 1901). Promoted to acting Quartermaster Sergeant. Commissioned as Lieutenant, 74th Company, 8th Battalion, November 28, 1901. Served in Western Transvaal under Gen. Dixon and Col. Kekewich. See chap. xii., page 170. Fought at Moedwill, September 30, 1901. Afterwards in Cape Colony under Major Parris and Colonel Bethune. Received the



NAME	POSITION IN THE H.A.C.	SERVICES
<i>Glover, R. H.</i>	A. Batt., driver.	honorary rank of Lieutenant in the Army. Battery, driver. See chaps. iii.-ix.
<i>Goodall, T. B.</i>	A. Batt., Sh. Smith.	Battery, Bombardier, shoeing-smith. See chaps. iii.-ix.
<i>Greenwell, C. O.</i>	No. 2 Co., private.	Mounted Infantry, private. Commissioned as Lieutenant in the C.I.V. Battalion, August 1900. See chap. x. Transferred as Captain to the 3rd Battalion Durham Light Infantry, December 30, 1900. Afterwards attached to the 3rd Battalion Highland Light Infantry. Mentioned in despatches ('London Gazette,' July 29, 1902).
<i>Gridley, W. O.</i>	B. Batt., Bombard'r.	Battery, Bombardier; promoted to Corporal. See chaps. iii.-ix.
<i>Gutmann, W.</i>	B. Batt., driver.	Battery, driver, with rank of Acting-Bombardier. See chaps. iii.-ix.
<i>Gutridge, G. W.</i>	A. Batt., gunner.	Battery, gunner. See chaps. iii.-ix.
<i>Halford, E. S.</i>	A. Batt., driver.	Battery, driver. See chaps. viii.-ix.
<i>Hamp, T. J.</i>	B. Batt., gunner.	Battery (draft), gunner. See end of chap. viii. and chap. ix.
<i>Hanson, H. T.</i>	No. 6 Co., Lieutenant.	Imperial Yeomanry, 93rd Company, 5th Bat-

NAME	POSITION IN THE H.A.C.	SERVICES
		<p>talion, Lieutenant (February 1901). Transferred (March 1902) to 13th Company, 5th Battalion. Employed as signalling officer, lines of communication, Bloemfontein - Ladybrand; then at Small-deel till September 1901; then Railway Staff Officer at Bloemfontein till January 1902, when appointed to command of No. 13 Armoured Train in operations in Cape Colony under General French; afterwards under Col. Kekewich in Western Transvaal. Fought at Rooiwal, April 11, and commanded 13th Co. I.Y. from April 13. Present at the last drives in Western Transvaal. Served till end of war.</p>
<i>Hayward, E.</i>	B. Batt., driver.	Imperial Light Horse, trooper.
<i>Haywood, W. L.</i>	No. 5 Co., private.	Imperial Yeomanry, 42nd Company, 12th Battalion, Corporal (March 1901). Promoted to Lance-sergeant. Served under Col. Broadwood and General Elliott

NAME	POSITION IN THE H.A.C.	SERVICES
		in Orange River Colony, 1901. Capture of Reitz, June. Made Storeman to 42nd Company, November 1901. Invalided home, April 1902.
<i>Hazell, F. G.</i>	No. 5 Co., private.	Mounted Infantry, private. See chap. x.
<i>Hepburn, F. C.</i>	B. Batt., gunner.	Battery, gunner. See chaps. iii.-ix.
<i>Herbert, A. F.</i>	A. Batt., gunner.	Battery, gunner. See chaps. iii.-ix.
<i>Herbert, W. S.</i>	B. Batt., gunner.	Battery, gunner; afterwards Commissioned as Lieutenant in Marshall's Horse. Wounded and invalided home. Returned to the front again, and is now in civil employment at Capetown.
<i>Hills, J. S.</i>	B. Batt., driver.	Battery, driver. See chaps. iii.-ix.
<i>Hoare, G.</i>	A. Batt., driver.	Battery, driver. See chaps. iii.-ix.
<i>Holmes, W. J.</i>	B. Batt., driver.	Battery (draft), driver. See end of chap. viii. and chap. ix.
<i>Holt, W. B. L.</i>	B. Batt., gunner.	Battery, gunner. See chaps. iii.-ix.
<i>Houghton, J. G.</i>	A. Batt., driver.	Battery (draft), driver. See end of chap. viii. and chap. ix.
<i>Humphreys, J. E.</i>	No. 5 Co., private.	Mounted Infantry, private. See chap. x.

NAME	POSITION IN THE H.A.C.	SERVICES
<i>Hunt, S. V.</i> .	No. 4 Co., Lce.-corp. & Bugler.	Infantry, bugler. See chap. xi.
<i>Hutchings, R. S.</i>	No. 2 Co., private.	Infantry, private. See chap. xi. Died of ente- ric on board the ss. 'Aurania' during the voyage home.
<i>Jackson, G. R.</i>	No. 6 Co., private.	Infantry, private. See chap. xi.
<i>Jones, S. C.</i> .	No. 3 Co., private.	Infantry (draft), private. See chap. xi.
<i>Joseph, A. S.</i> .	A. Batt., driver.	Battery, driver. See chaps. iii.-ix.
<i>Kay, J. D.</i> . .	No. 2 Co., private.	Imperial Yeomanry, 68th Company, 19th Bat- talion ('Paget's Horse') private (March 1900). Served under General Carrington, and was besieged in Lichtenburg for four months from January 1901. Severe attack by Delarey on March 6. Relieved by Lord Methuen. Returned June 1901.
<i>Kendall, J. C.</i> .	B. Batt., Bombard- ier collar- maker.	Battery, Bombardier collar - maker. See chaps. iii.-ix.
<i>Ladenburg,</i> <i>A. L.</i>	No. 3 Co., Sergeant.	Mounted Infantry (draft), private. See chap. ix.
<i>Landsberg, J.</i> .	A. Batt., driver.	Battery, driver. See chaps. iii.-ix.

NAME	POSITION IN THE H.A.C.	SERVICES
<i>Lemmens, G. J.</i>	A. Batt., gunner.	Battery, gunner. See chaps. iii.-ix.
<i>Lewis, D. M.</i>	No. 1 Co., private.	Mounted Infantry, pri- vate. See chap. x.
<i>Lewis, L. L.</i>	No. 4 Co., Bugler.	Imperial Yeomanry. Served from February 1901 to August 1902.
<i>Little, S. H.</i>	No. 1 Co., private.	Infantry, private; pro- moted to Lance- corporal. See chap. xi. Severely wounded at Donkerhoek. After- wards Commissioned as Second Lieutenant in the 2nd Battalion Connaught Rangers (November 21, 1900).
<i>Lobb, G. St. J.</i>	No. 6 Co., private.	Mounted Infantry, Lance- corporal. See chap. x.
<i>Lockton, J. D.</i>	No. 3 Co., Corporal.	Imperial Yeomanry.
<i>Loder, A. S.</i>	No. 5 Co., private.	Mounted Infantry, Ser- geant. See chap. x.
<i>Lorimer, G.</i>	A. Batt., Corporal.	Battery, gunner; pro- moted to Bombardier. See chaps. iii.-ix. After- wards Commissioned as Second Lieutenant, Imperial Yeomanry unattached), February 1901. Posted to 78th Company, 12th Bat- talion (May 1901). Served under Col. Broadwood (Elliott's Division) in Orange River Colony. Present

NAME	POSITION IN THE H.A.C.	SERVICES
		at capture of Free State Government at Reitz, June 1901. Later in Col. de Lisle's Brigade, in fight at Colenso, near Reitz; took part in the drives in North - Eastern district, under Cols. Broadwood, de Lisle, and Fanshawe. Returned August 1902. Granted the honorary rank of Lieutenant in the Army.
<i>Lowe, A. C.</i>	A. Batt., Lieutenant.	Battery, Senior Subaltern. See chaps. iii.-ix. Mentioned in despatches ('London Gazette,' September 10, 1901). Made a Companion of the Distinguished Service Order. Granted the honorary rank of Lieutenant in the Army.
<i>Lucas, P. F.</i>	B. Batt., driver.	Battery, driver. See chaps. iii.-ix.
<i>MacConkey, G. F. D.</i>	No. 6 Co., private.	Imperial Yeomanry, Commissioned as Lieutenant, 83rd Company, 21st Battalion (March 9, 1901). See chap. xii., page 161. Invalided home.
<i>Macdonnell, G. H.</i>	B. Batt., gunner.	Imperial Yeomanry, 34th Company, 11th Battalion (February 1901),

NAME	POSITION IN THE H.A.C.	SERVICES
<i>Macdonnell, J. A. W.</i>	B. Batt., Bombard'r.	Corporal. Promoted to Sergeant of a machine-gun section composed entirely of H.A.C. men. See chap. xii., page 165. Invalided home, Nov. 1901. Imperial Yeomanry, 34th Company, 11th Battalion. Served from October 1901 to July 1902. Private in H.A.C. machine-gun section. See chap. xii., page 166.
<i>McDougall, H.</i>	A. Batt., driver.	Battery, driver. See chaps. iii.-ix. Afterwards Commissioned as Lieutenant in Imperial Yeomanry, 23rd Battalion (April 3, 1901). Invalided home, September 1901. Afterwards transferred as Second Lieutenant to 3rd Hussars (November 2, 1901).
<i>McKechnie, E. A.</i>	No. 5 Co., Lce.-corp.	Infantry (draft), private. See chap. xi.
<i>McMicking, G.</i>	A. Batt., Major commanding.	Commanded the Battery from the date of its formation to its disbandment (December 1899–November 1900). See chaps. iii.-ix. Mentioned in despatches ('London Gazette,' September 10, 1901).



NAME	POSITION IN THE H.A.C.	SERVICES
		Made a Companion of the Order of St. Michael and St. George. Granted the honorary rank of Major in the Army.
<i>Mager, G. E.</i>	A. Batt., Trumpeter.	Battery, senior trumpeter. See chaps. iii.-ix.
<i>Major, L. B.</i>	A. Batt., driver.	Battery, driver. See chaps. iii.-ix.
<i>Mate, C. J.</i>	A. Batt., Bombard'r.	Battery, Bombardier. See chaps. iii.-ix.
<i>Milne, M. B.</i>	A. Batt., Sh. Smith.	Battery, shoeing-smith. See chaps. iii.-ix.
<i>Moeller, A. H.</i>	No. 3 Co., private.	Mounted Infantry, private. See chap. x.
<i>Moeller, B.</i>	No. 3 Co., Lieutenant.	Mounted Infantry, Lieutenant and Adjutant. See chap. x. Mentioned in despatches ('London Gazette,' September 10, 1901). Transferred in July 1900 to Col. Bainbridge's M.I. Afterwards Commissioned as Second Lieutenant in the 2nd Battalion Middlesex Regiment (September 1900). Joined the M.I. Company and served till his death with the 14th Mounted Infantry Division. See chap. xii., page 174. Died of wounds

NAME	POSITION IN THE H.A.C.	SERVICES
		received in action at Holland, near Standerton, on December 21, 1901. His diary, as written in the field, has since been published, entitled, 'Two Years at the Front with the Mounted Infantry.'
<i>Morcom, A. B.</i>	No. 1 Co., private.	Mounted Infantry (draft), private. See chap. x.
<i>Mordin, A. J.</i>	A. Batt., driver.	Battery, driver. See chaps. iii.-ix. Afterwards served in Imperial Yeomanry, 34th Company, 11th Battalion, H.A.C. machine-gun section. See chap. xii., page 165. Promoted to Corporal and Sergeant.
<i>Morford, D. R.</i>	No. 6 Co., private.	Infantry, private. See chap. xi.
<i>Mumford, W. G.</i>	A. Batt., gunner.	Battery, gunner. See chaps. iii.-ix.
<i>Murdock, L. M.</i>	A. Batt., gunner.	Battery, gunner. See chaps. iii.-ix.
<i>Murnane, G. F. T.</i>	No. 6 Co., Sergeant.	Mounted Infantry, Corporal. See chap. x.
<i>Nesham, C. F.</i>	No. 5 Co., Lieut.	Mounted Infantry, private. Commissioned as Lieutenant (August 1900). Wounded at Jacobsdal. See chap. x. Mentioned in despatches ('London Gazette,' September 10,

NAME	POSITION IN THE H.A.C.	SERVICES
<i>O'Connell, G. J.</i>	No. 5 Co., Sergeant.	<p>1901). Given the honorary rank of Lieutenant in the Army. Afterwards served as Senior Subaltern with the 82nd Company, 21st Battalion, Imperial Yeomanry (March 1901). Promoted to Captain, August 8, 1901. See chap. xii., page 161.</p> <p>Mounted Infantry, Sergeant. See chap. x. Afterwards Commissioned in the Imperial Yeomanry, 23rd Battalion, as Captain (March 18, 1901). Commanded 91st and 93rd Companies in the field. Served in Col. Damant's column in the final drives of the war. Fought at Bosehbult, March 31, 1902, when Delarey, de Wet, and Botha attacked Cookson's force. Transferred to Lowe's column, April 1902. Returned August 1902. Received the honorary rank of Captain in the Army.</p> <p>Battery (draft), driver. See end of chap. viii. and chap. ix.</p>
<i>Oppenheim, J. .</i>	A. Batt., driver.	

NAME	POSITION IN THE H.A.C.	SERVICES
<i>Osborn, G. W. .</i>	A. Batt., Corporal.	Battery, Corporal. See chaps. iii.-ix.
<i>Osmond, C. F. .</i>	No. 2 Co., private.	Mounted Infantry, pri- vate. See chap. x.
<i>Osmond, H. D.</i>	No. 2 Co., private.	Imperial Yeomanry, 79th Company, 20th Bat- talion, Corporal. March - Dec. 1900. Transferred to Imperial Light Horse January 1901, and served as Corporal till May. Re- joined in September and served till end of war. Present at opera- tions in Pretoria dis- trict under General Ian Hamilton; marches to Barberton, Komati Poort, Warmbaths; operations in Western Transvaal under Colonel Benson and General Babington, in Eastern Orange River Colony under Colonel Rawlinson and General Dartnell; at final drives in Western Transvaal. Made a 'King's Corporal' for services rendered in the Bethlehem district.
<i>Page, A. R. . .</i>	No. 5 Co., private.	Infantry, private. See chap. xi.
<i>Page, E. J. . .</i>	A. Batt., driver.	Battery, driver. See chaps. viii.-ix.

NAME	POSITION IN THE H.A.C.	SERVICES
<i>Paine, C. H.</i> .	No. 1 Co., private.	Infantry (draft), private. See chap. xi.
<i>Palles, W. F.</i> .	A. Batt., gunner.	Battery, gunner. See chaps. iii.-ix.
<i>Palmer, R.</i> . .	No. 1 Co., Corporal.	Infantry, Colour-sergeant. See chap. xi. Men- tioned in despatches, September 10, 1901.
<i>Perkins, H. M.</i>	B. Batt., driver.	Battery, driver. See chaps. iii.-ix.
<i>Perkins, H. W.</i>	No. 4 Co., Corporal.	Mounted Infantry, Lance- corporal. See chap. x.
<i>Pollard,</i> <i>G. E. F.</i>	No. 5 Co., private.	Mounted Infantry, pri- vate. See chap. x.
<i>Portch, J. W.</i> .	No. 6 Co., private.	Infantry, private. See chap. xi.
<i>Prendergast,</i> <i>H. W.</i>	B. Batt., wheeler.	Battery, wheeler. See chaps. iii.-ix.
<i>Ramsey, H. B.</i>	B. Batt., driver.	Battery, driver. See chaps. iii.-ix.
<i>Ramsey, H. V.</i>	B. Batt., driver.	Battery (draft), driver. See end of chap. viii. and chap. ix. After- wards served in Im- perial Yeomanry, 118th Company, 25th Bat- talion, private (Novem- ber 1901). Trekked under Col. Callwell in Cape Colony (Suther- land, Ceres, &c.), January-March 1902. Appointed orderly to staff officer of column in March. Sailed from Capetown to Port Nolloth, April 1902,

NAME	POSITION IN THE H.A.C.	SERVICES
		and marched to relief of Ookiep. Severe fighting on the way. Afterwards at Concordia till peace signed. Returned August 1902.
<i>Riggs, A. J.</i>	B. Batt., gunner.	Battery, gunner. See chaps. iii.-ix.
<i>Ritchie, G. O.</i>	A. Batt., driver.	Battery, driver. See chaps. iii.-ix.
<i>Robbins, D. G.</i>	No. 3 Co., Lce.-corp.	Mounted Infantry, private. See chap. x. Afterwards Commissioned as Lieutenant in the Imperial Yeomanry, 83rd Company, 21st Battalion (March 9, 1901). See chap. xii., page 161. Killed in action at Stander-ton, August 23, 1901.
<i>Rusby, E. L. M.</i>	No. 3 Co., private.	Infantry. Served as civil surgeon. See chap. xi.
<i>Rusby, L. H.</i>	No. 3 Co., Corporal.	Infantry (draft), private. See chap. xi.
<i>Sanderson, G. S.</i>	No. 1 Co., private.	Imperial Yeomanry, 34th Company, 11th Battalion.
<i>Satchwell, F. H.</i>	No. 2 Co., private.	Imperial Yeomanry, 27th Company, 7th Battalion, private (March 1901). See chap. xii., page 170. Fought at Vlakkfontein (May 26, 1901), and Moedwill (September 30, 1901). Served under General

NAME	POSITION IN THE H.A.C.	SERVICES
		Dixon and Cols. Keke- wich and Grenfell, in Western Transvaal. Returned August 1902.
<i>Sawyer, H. H.</i>	B. Batt., Trumpeter.	Battery, trumpeter. See chaps. iii.-ix.
<i>Scantlebury, W. A.</i>	B. Batt., driver.	Battery, driver. See chaps. iii.-ix.
<i>Seaton, F. R.</i>	B. Batt., gunner.	Imperial Yeomanry, 34th Company, 11th Bat- talion, private (Feb- ruary 1901). H.A.C. machine-gun section. See chap. xii., page 165.
<i>Seccombe, E. A. J.</i>	No. 1 Co., private.	Infantry, private. See chap. xi.
<i>Shield, A. R.</i>	A. Batt., gunner.	Imperial Yeomanry, 34th Company, 11th Batta- lion, private (February 1901). H.A.C. machine- gun section. See chap. xii., page 165. Invalided home, January 1902.
<i>Short, F. E.</i>	A. Batt., gunner.	Imperial Yeomanry, 34th Company, 11th Batta- lion, private (February 1901). H.A.C. machine- gun section. See chap. xii., page 165. Invalided home, January 1902.
<i>Shorter, F. W.</i>	No. 6 Co., private.	Infantry, private. See chap. xi.
<i>Shorter, R. G.</i>	No. 6 Co., private.	Infantry, private. See chap. xi.
<i>Simpson, H. G.</i>	No. 5 Co., private.	Infantry, private. See chap. xi. At the time of enrolment was a



NAME	POSITION IN THE H.A.C.	SERVICES
<i>Stephenson, R. M.</i>	A. Batt., Sh. Smith.	member of the L.R.B. Served part of the time with the Maxim gun detachment. Invalided home, June 1900. Battery, shoeing-smith. See chaps. iii.-v. In- valided home.
<i>Stewart, C. G.</i>	No. 3 Co., private.	Imperial Yeomanry, Com- missioned as Lieu- tenant in 30th Com- pany, 9th Battalion, March 1901. Served under Col. Damant in north-east and south- east of Orange River Colony. Fought at Tafel Kop, December 20. Afterwards took part in drives to Harri- smith, and drives in Western Transvaal against Delarey. Inva- lided home, June 1902. Received the honorary rank of Lieutenant in the Army.
<i>Storer, D. D.</i>	B. Batt., driver.	Battery, driver. See chaps. iii.-ix. After- wards Commissioned as Lieutenant in 23rd Bat- talion Imperial Yeo- manry (March 11, 1901). Received the honorary rank of Lieu- tenant in the Army.

NAME	POSITION IN THE H.A.C.	SERVICES
<i>Sulman, S. W.</i>	B. Batt., gunner.	Battery, gunner. See chaps. iii.-ix.
<i>Tayler, H. P. B.</i>	No. 2 Co., private.	Infantry, Sergeant. See chap. xi.
<i>Taylor, P. . .</i>	A. Batt., Sergeant.	Battery, Sergeant of B. sub-division. Men- tioned in despatches, September 10, 1901. Received the Distin- guished Conduct Medal.
<i>Tetley-Jones, W.</i>	A. Batt., gunner.	Battery, gunner. See chaps. iii.-ix.
<i>Toynbee, T. H.</i>	No. 4 Co., private.	Mounted Infantry. See chap. x.
<i>Trapp, H. G. W. J.</i>	B. Batt., gunner.	Battery (draft), gunner. See end of chap. viii. and chap. ix. After- wards Commissioned in the 5th Battalion Royal Irish Regiment (De- cember 21, 1900).
<i>Treffry, E. .</i>	No. 4 Co., Captain.	Infantry, Lieutenant (C Company). See chap. xi. Granted the honor- ary rank of Lieutenant in the Army. After- wards transferred as Captain to the 82nd Company, 21st Bat- talion, Imperial Yeo- manry (March 9, 1901). For service see chap. xii., page 161. Dan- gerously wounded at Bethel, May 1901. In- valided home.

NAME	POSITION IN THE H.A.C.	SERVICES
<i>Tremearne, R. H.</i>	B. Batt., driver.	Battery (draft), driver. See end of chap. viii. and chap. ix. After- wards Commissioned as Lieutenant in the 5th Battalion Royal War- wickshire Regiment (November 2, 1901). Died of enteric fever at Carnarvon, Cape Colony, on April 14, 1902.
<i>Tress, W. D.</i>	No. 4 Co., private.	Imperial Yeomanry, 27th Company, 7th Bat- talion, private. For service see chap. xii., page 170.
<i>Vaughan, E.</i>	B. Batt., driver.	
<i>Vigor, A. F.</i>	B. Batt., gunner.	Battery, gunner. See chaps. iii.-ix.
<i>Vigor, F. K.</i>	B. Batt., driver.	Battery, driver. See chaps. iii.-ix.
<i>Walker, W. O.</i>	A. Batt., driver.	Battery, driver. See chaps. iii.-ix.
<i>Walter, L.</i>	B. Batt., gunner.	Battery, gunner; pro- moted to Bombardier. See chaps. iii.-ix.
<i>Walton, E. R.</i>	A. Batt., driver.	Battery, driver. See chaps. iii.-ix.
<i>Ward, H. H.</i>	A. Batt., driver.	Battery, driver; pro- moted to Bombardier. See chaps. iii.-ix. Afterwards served in Bethune's Horse, and on October 12, 1901, Commissioned in the

NAME	POSITION IN THE H.A.C.	SERVICES
<i>Waters, A. A.</i> .	No. 6 Co., private.	<p>Imperial Yeomanry, 8th Battalion, as Lieutenant. Killed in action at Middel Post, Cape Colony, on February 5, 1902. See chap. xii., page 172.</p> <p>Imperial Yeomanry, 62nd Company, 11th Battalion, private (February 1901). See chap. xii., page 165. Remained in the 62nd Company after the H.A.C. machine-gun section had been formed for the 34th Company, and was trekking in the Harrismith district July–November 1901. At Oliver Hoek, December 1901 and January 1902. Afterwards on patrol work at Bester's Station, Natal. Returned August 1902.</p>
<i>Watney, J. S.</i> .	A. Batt., Trumpeter.	<p>Imperial Yeomanry, 34th Company, 11th Battalion, private. Promoted in the field to Lieutenant, and placed in charge of the H.A.C. machine-gun section (June 1901). Killed in action at Tweefontein on December 21, 1901. See chap. xii., page 165.</p>

NAME	POSITION IN THE H.A.C.	SERVICES
<i>Webster, M.</i>	B. Batt., gunner.	Battery (draft), gunner. See end of chap. viii. and chap. ix.
<i>Whitehead, F. C.</i>	A. Batt., driver.	Battery, driver. See chaps. iii.-ix.
<i>Whitehead, R. H.</i>	A. Batt., driver.	Battery, driver. See chaps. iii.-ix.
<i>Whittome, J. O.</i>	A. Batt., gunner.	Battery, gunner. See chaps. iii.-ix.
<i>Wickes, L. J.</i>	A. Batt., gunner.	Imperial Yeomanry. Served as private in the Volunteer Service Company, 2nd Batta- lion, Royal Fusiliers (London Rifle Brigade section), April 1900- June 1901. In General Barton's Fusilier or Union Brigade, first Brigade to enter the Transvaal in May 1900, in support of the Mafek- ing Relief Force. Forced march from Taungs to Vryburg, 44 miles in 32 hours. With Brigade in 875 miles marching and at capture of Christiana, Lichtenburg, Friederik- stad, Potchefstroom, Ventersdorp, Krugers- dorp, Rutland, and Kraaipan.
<i>Williams, A. F. B.</i>	A. Batt., gunner.	Battery, gunner. See chaps. iii.-ix. Now in

NAME	POSITION IN THE H.A.C.	SERVICES
<i>Williams, B.</i>	A. Batt., gunner.	the Transvaal Govern- ment service. Battery (draft), driver. See end of chap. viii. and chap. ix.
<i>Wilton, L. E.</i>	No. 1 Co., private.	Infantry, private. See chap. xi.
<i>Wink, A. A.</i>	B. Batt., driver.	Battery, driver, with rank of Acting-Bombardier. See chaps. iii.-ix.
<i>Wood, A. E.</i>	B. Batt., Sergeant.	Battery, Sergeant of D. sub-division. See chaps. iii.-ix. Mentioned in despatches, September 10, 1901. Received the Distinguished Conduct Medal. Afterwards Commissioned in the Imperial Yeomanry, 81st Company, 21st Battalion (March 12, 1901). For service see chap. xii., page 161. Received the honorary rank of Lieutenant in the Army. Invalided home, January 1902.
<i>Wood, A. L.</i>	No. 3 Co., private.	Infantry, private. See chap. xi.
<i>Woolner, R. A.</i>	No. 1 Co., private.	Infantry, private. See chap. xi.
<i>Wooton, P. C.</i>	No. 2 Co., private.	Imperial Yeomanry, 27th Company, 7th Bat- talion, private (Feb- ruary 1901). Promoted to Corporal, March 1902. Under Gen.

NAME	POSITION IN THE H.A.C.	SERVICES
<i>Wray, J. C.</i>	Major, Veterans' Company.	<p>Dixon in Western Transvaal, April-May 1901. Wounded at Vlaktefontein (May 28). Rejoined, and was mounted orderly to the Rand Rifles at Krugersdorp, August-November 1901. Then joined 27th Company again, and till March 1902 was at Naauwport Nek (Transvaal), patrolling, block-house work, &amp;c. In March moved to Western Transvaal, under Col. Kekewich, and took part in the great drives. Fought at Rooiwal (April 11). Made cattle and sheep drover in the drive to Bechuanaland border (May). See also chap. xii., page 170. Returned August 1902.</p> <p>Captain, Royal Artillery. Appointed to the 2nd Brigade ammunition column for Cavalry and R.H.A. Afterwards Adjutant and Acting Brigade - major, 1st Brigade R.H.A. Promoted Major, March 15, 1900. Taken prisoner at Sanna's Post.</p>







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